concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am not persuaded that the previously-imposed limitation on recovery set forth in § 24-10-114(1)(a), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A) overrides the subsequent enactment of § 13-17-202, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.). Therefore,-I dissent from that part of the majority’s decision.
Section 13-17-202 was enacted, effective May 31,1990, to encourage reasonable settlement offers by all parties so that protracted and fruitless litigation would be avoided and victims of accidents would be compensated for their injuries in a less costly and more timely fashion. See Centric-Jones Co. v. Hufnagel, 848 P.2d 942 (Colo.1993); Colo. Sess.Laws 1990, ch. 100 at 848.
We may not presume that the General Assembly was not fully cognizant of the policy of fiscal certainty underlying the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, § 24-10-114, C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.), inasmuch as since its passage in 1971 it had been revisited in 1979,1981, and 1986, and its interpretation in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo.1986), when it explicitly mandated that § 13-17-202 be applied “Mot-withstanding any other statute to the contrary, in any civil action of any nature commenced or appealed in any cou/rt of record in this state.” (emphasis added) See Rodriquez v. Nurseries, Inc., 815 P.2d 1006 (Colo.App.1991).
Nor may we ignore the maxim that when construing seemingly inconsistent statutes, the most recent enactment controls. De Jiacomo v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 817 P.2d 552 (Colo.App.1991). Therefore, I will not assume that the General Assembly chose to use the plain language which marks the proviso of § 13-17-202 capriciously.
Consequently, inasmuch as there is no justification for subjugating the plain language of § 13-17-202 to the proper limitations in § 24-10-114(1)(a), I would hold that plaintiff is entitled to recover the actual costs incurred after the making of the rejected settlement offers.