dissenting.
I agree that the state court’s denial of Pudelski’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence did not violate Pudelski’s due process rights, and I therefore join the majority’s decision to affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief as to that claim. However, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of Pudelski’s claim that the prosecution violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), when it failed to disclose a police report that was provided to the state’s expert witness. Taking into consideration the facts presented in this case, there is a reasonable likelihood that the report at issue could have been used to impeach a critical state witness who testified unequivocally as to the cause of the victim’s death. However, because the contested report was never provided to Pudelski and is not part of the record in this case, no court has had an opportunity to properly assess its impeachment value in order to determine whether the prosecution withheld favorable and material evidence in violation of Brady. In light of these concerns, I decline to join the majority’s decision to deny habeas relief as to that claim. Instead, I would remand with instructions that the state be required to produce the report so that the district court can evaluate whether non-disclosure of the report violated *616clearly established federal law under Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.1
I.
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant and material to his guilt and punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The Supreme Court has since held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even if there has been no request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A Brady violation has three distinct components and Pudelski has the burden of showing (1) that the prosecution withheld evidence, (2) that the evidence was favorable to him, and (3) that the evidence was material. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972).2
A.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the prosecution failed to disclose a police report that was provided to the state’s expert witness. At trial, Pudelski requested a copy of the police report that had been reviewed by Dr. Elizabeth Balraj, Cuyahoga County Coroner (“Balraj”). The court allowed defense counsel to conduct a voir dire regarding the police report outside of the jury’s presence, and Balraj testified that she had used the report in her review of the case. When asked by the court if there was “anything specific in the police report that caused you to render you medical opinions!,]” Balraj answered in the negative. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 1165.) The trial court then denied Pudelski’s motion to instruct the prosecution to disclose the report. This sequence of events establishes that the report at issue existed and that it was not disclosed to the defense. It is therefore clear that, at a minimum, the prosecution failed to disclose the contested report. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (“Two of those components [of a Brady violation] are unquestionably established by the record in this case.... [Wjith respect to [the] documents, there is no dispute about the fact that they were known to the State but not disclosed to trial counsel.”).
B.
The salient questions then become whether the report contained evidence that was favorable to Pudelski and whether any such evidence was material. See id. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has made clear that “favorable” evidence encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. *617at 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (“Impeachment evidence ... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.”). This is because impeachment evidence, “if disclosed and used effectively ... may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.” Id.; see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.”).
In the instant case, it appears that the police report requested by the defense had potential impeachment value. At trial, the defense presented its own medical experts who had reviewed the infant’s medical records and who unequivocally concluded that a birth injury was the cause of death. Balraj, in contrast, provided expert testimony that the infant died “as a result of a blunt impact to head” and that “the manner of death [wa]s homicide.” (J.A. at 1161-62.) Because the cause of death was a central and disputed issue in the case, Balraj’s testimony was critical.
On cross-examination, Balraj stated that she reviewed police reports received by her office and that the police investigation was one of the facts she relied upon to reach a conclusion as to the matter of death. She acknowledged that her coroner’s verdict contained several references to an alleged assault by the father, which included a statement that “[t]he death in this case was the end result of blunt impact to head sustained when allegedly assaulted by her father.” (J.A. at 1209.)
Based on this testimony, Pudelski had a viable argument that the coroner’s findings were influenced by the police report and that he could have used the report to impeach her impartiality and the basis for her conclusions. Consequently, this Court can fairly conclude the report was favorable. See Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028, 1033 (6th Cir.2009) (“Because Brady applies not only to exculpatory evidence but also to impeachment evidence, ... and because Harris could have used these statements to cast doubt on the credibility of Ward’s testimony, Brady covers the statements. Harris, then, satisfies the first two elements of a Brady claim[.]”) (citation omitted).
C.
The most difficult question underlying Pudelski’s Brady claim is whether the report was material. Favorable evidence is “material,” and constitutional error results from its non-disclosure, if there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed to the defense. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. “Bagley’s touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).
If Balraj’s testimony had played a limited role in the determination of guilt, there would be considerable doubt as to whether non-disclosure of the report, and the concomitant limitations on Pudelski’s attempts to impeach Balraj, were significant enough to “undermine confidence in the trial” as required in Kyles. See id. However, the circumstantial nature of the case against Pudelski and the centrality of Balraj’s testimony both weigh in favor of a finding *618that any potential impeachment evidence would have been material. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-113, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (“The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt.... [T]he omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.”) Here, the state had no physical evidence linking Pudelski to the crime, and the jury obviously credited Balraj’s expert testimony over the testimony of Pudelski’s medical experts. As the Supreme Court has noted, in a case like this, where “the verdict is already of questionable validity,” evidence is more likely to be material because “additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.” Id.
The prosecution and defense disagree as to how effective the police report would have been as an impeachment tool. The majority asserts that “all of the evidence in the record tends to show that multiple witnesses testified as to the contents of the police report, and that the police report simply eliminated accident as the cause of the infant’s death.” Slip op. at 614. However, Balraj’s own statements make clear that the contested report implicated Pudelski as the perpetrator of a physical assault. Balraj acknowledged that her coroner’s verdict contained several references to an alleged assault by the father and included a statement that “[t]he death in this case was the end result of blunt impact to head sustained when allegedly assaulted by her father.” (J.A. at 1209.) The report therefore did more than “eliminate accident as a cause of death.” To the contrary, it put before the coroner the police investigator’s conclusion that the infant had been physically assaulted by her father. Even if the report was likely not exculpatory, its impeachment value alone could render it material. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 684, 105 S.Ct. 3375.
Pudelski’s attorney could have used this report and Balraj’s references to it in her coroner’s verdict to suggest that Balraj conducted her investigation with a preconceived notion that a homicide had occurred. He also could have used the report to impeach Balraj as to the accuracy of her representation of the report. Without the police report, defense counsel had no way of challenging whether the report said more than or less than what Balraj said it did and the extent to which the report may have influenced her medical findings. As noted above, when asked about the report in voir dire, Balraj stated that she used the report only to eliminate accident as a cause of death. On cross-examination, however, she conceded that her coroner’s verdict contained several references to an alleged assault by the father and concluded that “[t]he death in this case was the end result of blunt impact to head sustained when allegedly assaulted by her father.” (J.A. at 1209.) This concession suggests that Balraj had understated the role that the report played in her verdict until she was confronted with contradictory evidence. It is likely that other discrepancies about Balraj’s portrayal of and use of the report could be discovered only through access to the report itself. There is therefore no dispute as to the report’s critical relationship to the issues presented by this case.
Although Pudelski has been denied an opportunity to review the report, the majority believes that Pudelski should be denied access to it unless he can specifically explain in advance why the report might have made a difference to his defense. The unfairness of demanding that Pudelski address his arguments to the particulars of a report that he has not seen is evident. As a result, Pudelski has been left in the untenable position of being a defendant who has made available to the prosecution at trial his experts, their reports, and the *619evidence they used to reach their conclusions, but has been denied the reciprocal right to have access to the police report utilized by the prosecution’s expert with respect to the same issues. Pudelski was therefore unable to fully and effectively challenge the extent to which the report may have influenced Balraj’s conclusions and to have the jury determine whether her conclusions could be sustained to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
D.
At oral argument, there was discussion as to whether Pudelski, the habeas petitioner, bore the burden of producing the report. The majority concludes that he did. In support of this conclusion, the majority asserts that “Pudelski has not presented any evidence tending to show that the police report contained material evidence” and that Pudelski “should have had the police report made part of the record at trial so that its contents would be available to any reviewing court.” Op. at 614.
I disagree with these assertions on two bases. First, Pudelski in fact did present evidence tending to show that the report contained material evidence because, as discussed above, he presented evidence that Balraj considered the police report in reaching her conclusions and rendering a cause of death. (See J.A. at 1209.) Second, it is undisputed that Pudelski requested the report at trial and made significant efforts to alert the court to the value of the report in his defense. It is unclear how Pudelski could have “had the police report made part of the record at trial,” see op. at 614 when he was denied a copy of the report even though he explicitly requested it at trial. While it is true that Pudelski bears the burden of establishing that the report was material, see Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir.1998), this burden does not logically translate into a conclusion that Pudelski also bears the burden of producing a report to which he was denied access. Just as the Supreme Court has stated that a rule that “ ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process[,]” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004), it is equally untenable to fault Pudelski for failing to produce a report that he himself requested but was denied.
While it might have been preferable for Pudelski to have requested this report again in proceedings before the district court, his failure to do so does not preclude us from remanding for further fact finding. The critical point is that Pudelski requested that the report be provided to him at his state court trial; and Pudelski preserved the Brady issue with respect to having been denied the report in his arguments before the district court. The majority states that “we cannot change or remake the record that is presented to us on appeal[,]” op. at 614, but this Court has broad discretion to order a remand, can require further proceedings that it deems “just under the circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. § 2106, and routinely does so when it determines that consideration of additional evidence would help it render a proper decision. Under the circumstances presented in this case, I conclude that a remand for additional fact finding is the just and proper course.
II.
In light of the aforementioned concerns, I disagree with the majority’s decision to deny habeas relief with respect to Pudelski’s Brady claim. Instead, I would remand with instructions that the state be required to provide the contested report to the district court, and that the district *620court evaluate whether the failure to disclose the report violated clearly established federal law under Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. I therefore respectfully dissent.
. As the majority notes, when Pudelski presented this claim to the state courts, he relied solely on Ohio law when arguing for relief. I agree that his claim appears to be procedurally defaulted, but I also agree with the majority's decision to excuse the apparent default. See op. at 605-07.
. The Supreme Court has explained that ”[t]he term ‘Brady violation’ is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence— that is, to any suppression of so-called ‘Brady material' — although, strictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936.