I concur in the judgment with respect to defendant Rivas but respectfully dissent with respect to defendant Trevino.1
*700Though I am in complete agreement with the majority’s holding that Hispanics are a cognizable class and that the exclusion of Spanish surnamed jurors is sufficiently indicative of exclusion of Hispanics so as to shift to the People the burden to rebut the inference of impermissible group bias, I cannot concur with the standard of review employed by the majority to determine whether the inference of group bias was rebutted in this case. Instead, I believe we should adhere to the approach set forth in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 282 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748] and reiterated in People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 168 [197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854]—“we rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.” It is in this light that I review in some detail the specific reasons which the prosecutor gave for the peremptory challenges at issue in this case.
First, however, some general observations:
(1) This particular trial judge did precisely what the trial court in Hall failed to do: he made a “sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor’s explanation in light of the circumstances as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has exercised challenges for cause or peremptorily . . . .” (Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 167-168.) In Hall the trial court made it known that it was abdicating its function and “apparently considered itself bound to accept all of the prosecutor’s explanations at face value . . . .” {Id.., at p. 169.) Nothing of the sort can be said here. Yet the majority gives no weight to the trial court’s assessment of the prosecutor’s veracity and instead assumes the crucial fact-finding role itself. So much for reliance on the “good judgment” of the trial court.
(2) The majority focuses on the six Hispanics who were peremptorily excused by the prosecution and pretty well ignores the characteristics of the fifteen non-Hispanics who were similarly challenged and of the jurors and alternates who were eventually seated. This inevitably distorts the picture. For example, the majority discounts Faller’s reason that he dismissed certain Hispanics because they had no strong views on the death penalty, pointing out that seven of the jurors eventually seated professed similar attitudes. Not discussed, however, are other characteristics of the seated jurors which might properly have neutralized this “minus” from the prosecution’s point of view. Nor does the majority point out that Faller challenged four non-Hispanics—Opal Jennings, Bonnie Goodwin, Patricia Olds, Laquita Brown—who had no views on the death penalty.
(3) In this connection I note that the majority apparently objects to this dissent’s comparing of the prosecution’s claimed specific bias of challenged *701Hispanics with similar characteristics of non-Hispanics who were also challenged by the People—such as the non-views on the death penalty of prospective jurors Jennings, Goodwin, Olds and Brown. The majority says that “such a comparison must be presented to the trial court at the time the prosecution attempts to justify the challenges made to members of the cognizable class.” (Ante, p. 692.) One cannot quarrel with that statement, but unless we are to assume that the trial judge had left the bench at the relevant times, he was of course aware of the voir dire examination which preceded the challenges to Jennings, Goodwin, Olds and Brown. Thus the majority’s mandate that the comparison be before the trial court was amply fulfilled. While it was the prosecution’s burden to show that its challenges were triggered by specific bias, I know of no rule which prohibits it from letting the record speak for itself.
(4) The majority opinion states that “ [t]he district attorney exercised peremptory challenges to remove six Hispanics from the jury after asking them few if any questions on voir dire.” (Ante, p. 687.) In so stating, the majority overlooks the fact that the Witherspoon examination is an integral part of voir dire. During the Witherspoon examination, Faller questioned Alex Fació, Robert Guerrero, Justina Gonzalez, and Gloria Longoria. The only Spanish sumamed prospective juror that he did not question was Mary Silvas. The majority’s observation is, therefore, incorrect.
Further, the majority’s reliance on the fact that the prosecutor did not engage many of the Hispanic jurors in extended questioning is misleading in another respect. Faller was, of course, not the only one to question the jurors on voir dire. In this case, each juror was first questioned by the court and each of the two defense counsel, before the voir dire questioning passed to Faller. There is obviously nothing improper in an attorney exercising a peremptory challenge on the basis of impressions gained from a potential juror’s responses to questions posed by the court or by other counsel. The record here discloses that Faller declined to pose additional questions to many of the potential jurors—both non-Hispanic and Hispanic—and that he exercised peremptory challenges with respect to a number of the non-Hispanic jurors whom he did not personally question. Thus, the trial court could reasonably have found that no inference of group bias arose from the fact that Faller excused some jurors without lengthy questioning.
With these preliminaries out of the way, I review the reasons Faller gave for peremptorily challenging the six Spanish surnamed jurors. I do not propose to rely on any bases for challenging the six prospective jurors other than those adduced by Faller.
*702 Alex Fació
The majority concedes that this prospective juror was challenged for specific bias. It is, however, important to note that the reasons for challenging Fació were consistent with those given with respect to other prospective jurors. In brief, Fació had relatives charged with serious crimes and he was “soft” on the death penalty. Several non-Hispanics who were challenged shared similar attributes.
Catalina Martinez
Fuller said he excused Martinez because he felt he did not have any strong opinions on anything and gave the impression that he would simply go along with the other jurors rather than form his own opinion and because Martinez went drinking with friends who steal. The majority apparently agrees with the Court of Appeal that the reasons given for his exclusion are “suspect” (ante, p. 692), but does not explain why.2 The reasons are legitimate.
Martinez admitted that he had friends who steal. He said he went drinking with them. The special circumstance charged in defendants’ murder trial was felony murder: it was alleged the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery. Martinez did not know whether his friendship with thieves would interfere with his ability to decide the case fairly. He conceded that it was “tough to project what you are going to do.”3 In so doing, he was admitting a specific bias.
Even though Martinez eventually responded to defense attorney questioning in such a way as to give the appearance that he could control his bias, the trial court could have determined that Fuller was justified in doubting Martinez’ neutrality. The fact that Martinez admitted he might be biased provides a valid ground for challenge.
*703Faller’s second reason for dismissing Martinez—that Martinez would simply go along with the other jurors rather than form his own opinion—is also a valid ground for challenge, and the trial court could legitimately have accepted this justification as well.
Robert Guerrero
Faller indicated that he excused Guerrero because he sat with his arms folded during the voir dire—which Faller felt indicated a closed relationship—and because Faller did not believe Guerrero was sincere in his answers. The majority holds that “excluding Robert Guerrero based on his body language and mode of answering certain questions, is particularly untenable in light of Wheeler’s requirement of a showing of specific bias.” (Ante, at p. 692.) In so holding, the majority has—apparently inadvertently—substantially changed the law surrounding peremptory challenges.
We recognized in Wheeler that “a prosecutor may fear bias on the part of one juror because he has a record of prior arrests or has complained of police harassment, and on the part of another simply because his clothes or hair suggest an unconventional lifestyle. . . . Indeed, even less tangible evidence of potential bias may bring forth a peremptory challenge: either party may feel a mistrust of a juror’s objectivity on no more than the ‘sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another’ (4 Blackstone, Commentaries *353) . . . .” (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275, italics added).
We recently reaffirmed this proposition in People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 170 [197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854], where we held that “A prosecutor may act freely on the basis of ‘hunches,’ unless and until these acts create a prima facie case of group bias, and even then he may rebut the inference.” Clearly, therefore, an attorney may excuse a prospective juror because of a gut feeling. When an attorney does so, his concern is that the juror may be biased against his client.
The majority’s rejection of body language as a basis for specific bias points up another reason why its evaluation of the trial court’s ruling is quite unfair: the prosecutor was, of course, never asked to explain why he challenged 15 prospective jurors who were not Spanish sur named. We have no way of knowing how many of those 15 exhibited unacceptable body language just as we have very few clues as to the other reasons why they were excused. The majority therefore expresses doubts about the sincerity of the prosecutor’s explanations without knowing whether his reasons for *704challenging non-Hispanics were perhaps entirely consistent with those he gave for challenging the Spanish surnamed jurors.4
Faller also felt that Guerrero’s answers were evasive and indicated that he had “something else on his mind regarding these subjects which he was not expressing, ...” The trial court, which found this explanation to be credible, had had an opportunity to observe the prospective juror during voir dire—an advantage not shared by the majority which nevertheless feels that it is in a better position to judge Faller’s credibility. The trial court could properly find that Faller had sustained his burden of justification for dismissing Guerrero.
Justina Gonzalez
Faller stated that he had excused Gonzalez because she was young, because she was defensive and lacked confidence, and because he did not think she could “cooly analyze the evidence.”
In explaining his challenge to several jurors, Faller expressed his desire to have a jury “a bit more mature in basic overall age” because he did not want to risk juror sympathy based on age identification with the defendants. The majority does not suggest that a juror’s potential age identification with a particular defendant cannot give rise to specific bias, but simply rejects the prosecutor’s professed reliance on this factor as insincere, in large part, apparently, because the prosecutor did not explicitly question the jurors as to their age. (Ante, at p. 691.) It is hardly unusual, however, to make a rough judgment about age on the basis of appearance, and the trial court— who viewed the jurors in question—evidently did not find the prosecutor’s explanation suspicious.
In addition, the majority disbelieves Faller’s explanation that he excused Gonzalez because she was defensive. The majority states that “the district attorney condemn[ed] Longoria for expressing herself ‘rather haltingly,’ then [took] the opposite approach and criticizefd] Gonzalez’ perceived verbosity.” (Ante, at p. 692.) This is not true.
Faller never criticized Gonzalez’ verbosity. On the contrary, he stated, apparently with approval, “[Gonzalez] was very verbose and very interested *705in expressing her views on a great variety of subjects, [f] Yet at the same time when approached even by defense counsel in regards to certain questions, she would say, ‘No, I don’t want to answer that,’ or T want to talk to you in private,’ and appeared to have a lack of confidence in her own ability to form opinions and to express herself.” (Italics added.) Characterizing this as a criticism of her verbosity is simply incorrect. From the record it appears that Faller could have concluded in good faith that Gonzalez, while outwardly verbose, was actually defensive and lacked confidence. The trial court, of course, could find that he sustained his burden of justification in dismissing her on this ground as well.
Mary Silvas
Faller explained that he had excused Silvas because she was female, had a child about the age of one of the defendants, and had not even thought about the death penalty—which Faller felt indicated a lack of commitment to consider seriously what she would do during sentencing. Although the majority simply rejects each of these reasons as disingenuous, the trial court could reasonably have found that at least the last two reasons demonstrated that Faller had not excluded her because she was Hispanic. As discussed above, Faller excluded other jurors who he thought might feel undue sympathy for the defendants because of age identification and he excused at least one non-Hispanic juror, Jill Moffitt, who—like Silvas—had children of about the defendants’ age. In addition, throughout the voir dire Faller utilized peremptory challenges frequently with respect to jurors who indicated either that they would not or might not vote for the death penalty.5 The trial court could have found that Faller did not want to take a chance that Silvas— who stated that she had not even thought about the death penalty—might decide that she could not impose such a penalty when called on to consider the issue during trial.
Gloria Longoria
Faller informed the court that he had excused Longoria because he felt she was an equivocal juror during the Witherspoon examination and because she expressed herself rather haltingly. Faller explained that he was concerned that Longoria would be unable to reach a verdict independently or to consider seriously and vote for the death penalty. He also stated that he had excused her because she was female and younger than he would have preferred. In criticizing these explanations, the majority attacks only the *706last two—dismissal because of age or sex. The opinion omits any consideration of the merits of the other reasons Faller gave for dismissing Longoria. Certainly Faller could legitimately excuse a juror he felt was equivocal during the Witherspoon examination. Similarly, Faller’s concern that Longoria would have been unable to form an opinion independently and reach a verdict was a valid ground for dismissal.
Conclusion
So that there will be no misunderstanding, I should make it clear that this dissent is not intended as a “jury argument” in favor of the prosecutor’s professed reasons for challenging the six Hispanics. If the trial court had concluded that the prosecutor’s explanations were not genuine and had found that the peremptory challenges to the six Hispanic jurors had been exercised because of supposed group bias, I would have no reason to quarrel with that determination. The trial court came to the opposite conclusion, however, and given its ability to view the prosecutor and the potential jurors in person and to evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor’s explanations from that perspective, I submit that it is inappropriate—and contrary to the teaching of Wheeler and Hall—for us to brush aside the trial court’s finding and substitute our own view of the matter.
Trevino raises other issues besides the Wheeler claim. I express no opinion with respect to any of them.
To be fair, the majority also concedes that “possibly” Catalina Martinez was excluded for the reasons stated by Fallen
The following colloquy took place during the general voir dire: “Mr. Martinez: I have a lot of friends that, you know, they were Mexican friends and they used to go out and steal and all that, and I would just know them, you know. I used to go out drinking with them. That’s all I can remember. [H] Q Do you feel that that may interfere with your ability to fairly decide this case? [1f] A I don’t know. [H] Q It’s a tough question. [f] A Yes. [H] Q It’s tough to project what you’re going to do. [f] A Right. [K] Q If during this trial the thoughts about your friends or your past, or whatever, comes up in your mind do you think that you would be able, knowing yourself, to push-aside and say to yourself [these are] not my friends, these are not the same circumstances, and I’m going to do the best I can to decide this case on the evidence that’s presented to me? Can you do that? [K] A Yes.”
I have my own hunch that what is really behind the majority’s rejection of hunches, gut-feelings and body language is a fear that prosecutors will insincerely attempt to justify group bias with such reasons and that trial judges, some of whom are perceived as being unsympathetic toward the Wheeler rule, will rubber-stamp their explanations. I submit that if we cannot trust trial courts to do their job fairly, we might as well close up shop and that we, ourselves, were insincere when, in Wheeler, we professed our faith in the “good judgment” of the trial bench.
Faller peremptorily challenged every juror who would not vote for the death penalty or who might be unable to shoulder the responsibility of imposing the death penalty. He also challenged Dorothy Lawrence and Mary Krider, both of whom stated they would be inclined to impose life without possibility of parole over the death penalty.