In 1969 petitioner John Thomas Music was found guilty by a King County jury of one count of robbery, three counts of attempted robbery, and felony murder. This court affirmed on all counts. State v. Music, 79 Wn.2d 699, 489 P.2d 159 (1971) (Music I). The United States Supreme Court vacated the death sentence. Music v. Washington, 408 U.S. 940, 33 L. Ed. 2d 764, 92 S. Ct. 2877 (1972). At resentencing, petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, to run concurrently with the sentences on the other convictions for robbery and attempted robbery.
The facts of the crimes for which Music was convicted are contained in Music I and need not be recounted here. See Music I, at 701-03. Music, currently an inmate in the Washington State Penitentiary, seeks habeas corpus relief alleging two jury instructions at his trial when he was convicted of first degree murder violated Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979). See also Francis v. Franklin,_U.S._, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985) (extending Sandstrom to rebuttable *191presumptions). The Court of Appeals, Division One, certified this matter to us with the request this court determine whether the rule in Sandstrom and State v. Caldwell, 94 Wn.2d 614, 618 P.2d 508 (1980) should "be applied retroactively to a case where the defendant did not propose the challenged instruction and lack of intent and insanity were issues at trial."
The United States Supreme Court has recently split on the issue whether in a direct appeal an instruction in violation of Sandstrom may be considered harmless. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 74 L. Ed. 2d 823, 103 S. Ct. 969 (1983); Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 2d 1, 104 S. Ct. 1673 (1984). It has yet to speak on the issue of whether Sandstrom is retroactive in collateral review. We also decline to express our views on retroactivity, although for purposes of this proceeding, we consider there to have been error of constitutional dimension. The question then becomes whether the error requires granting of the petition. We hold it does not.
Actual prejudice must be determined in light of the totality of circumstances. This court will consider the jury instructions given, the arguments of counsel, weight of evidence of guilt, and other relevant factors in evaluating whether a particular instruction caused actual prejudice. In re Gunter, 102 Wn.2d 769, 689 P.2d 1074 (1984). The ultimate question for this court is whether the giving of the Sandstrom-offending instruction so infected petitioner's entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. In re Lile, 100 Wn.2d 224, 668 P.2d 581 (1983).
At issue are jury instructions 9 and 25:
No. 9
The court instructs the jury that the law presumes that every man intends the natural and probable consequences of his own acts. It is not necessary to establish intent by direct and positive evidence but intent may be established by inference and in the same way as any other fact by taking into consideration the acts of the parties and all the facts and circumstances of the case.
*192No. 25
The law presumes every man to be sane and mentally responsible, and to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts, until the contrary is shown.
The burden of proving insanity as a defense to a crime rests upon the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, and unless insanity is established by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the presumption of sanity must prevail.
Music claims the presumption contained in jury instructions 9 and 25 that persons intend the natural and probable consequences of their own acts violates the rule set forth in Sandstrom and Caldwell and caused actual and substantial prejudice. See In re Haverty, 101 Wn.2d 498, 681 P.2d 835 (1984).
Specifically, as to instruction 25, petitioner argues that the presumed intent phrase, in combination with the presumption of sanity instruction, caused him actual prejudice because the jury would reasonably assume, from the wording of the instruction, that petitioner had the burden of proof on intent as well as insanity.
A review of the jury instructions as a whole convinces us the jury was correctly informed of the law despite the Sandstrom error. Instructions 13 through 17 reflected almost verbatim the robbery and attempted robbery statutes from which they were derived. See Music I, at 711. Jury instruction 10 made quite clear that voluntary intoxication may be found to negate the requisite specific intent to commit a robbery. Jury instruction 11 again restated the rule of law pertaining to intoxication and specific intent. See In re Haverty, at 505-06.
In re Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982) held the petitioner in a personal restraint petition has the burden of showing any constitutional error caused actual and substantial prejudice. We hold petitioner here did not meet that burden.
Although Music on appeal challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of the charge of attempted robbery of Traice Walters, the victim *193of the felony murder, there is nothing in the record or in the personal restraint petition which is contrary to the statement made by the court in Music I, at 711:
[I]n light of other evidence introduced at trial concerning previous and subsequent activities of the appellant, we think the jury could have concluded that the incident resulting in the death of Traice Walters was part of a common scheme or plan on the part of appellant and his companions to commit robberies on the day in question.
There was abundant evidence at trial of the specific intent of Music to commit the robbery of Traice Walters. The evidence leading to petitioner's conviction was not merely circumstantial. It was composed largely of testimony by his companions. There was also substantial evidence of motive. Music I, at 701-03. Cf. State v. Caldwell, at 618. At trial, petitioner was identified as the person who attempted to steal the decedent's jacket and who fired at him. Music I, at 702. Petitioner also was identified by two other robbery victims as the person who attempted to hold them up 1 hour after the fatal shooting. Music I, at 702. On the matter of petitioner's alleged intoxication, the testimony that petitioner was so intoxicated that he could not form intent was very slight. We find nothing which gives any merit to a claim of actual and substantial prejudice because of unconstitutional instructions.
Finally, petitioner asserts he was actually and substantially prejudiced by jury instruction 25, the insanity defense instruction, since it confused the separate issues of intent and sanity. The effect of claiming insanity may be to admit the act was intentional but claim an incapacity at the time it was committed. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 36, at 269 (1972). In Connecticut v. Johnson, supra at 87, the plurality stated that in "presenting a defense such as alibi, insanity, or self-defense" the harmfulness of Sand-sirom-like errors is reduced since the fact of intention may be conceded. Even if there was no such concession under the facts of this case, there is nothing in the record which persuades us of the harmfulness of the erroneous instruc*194tion. The evidence of intent to rob Traice Walters was overwhelming.
The jury was clearly instructed that the State had the burden of proof on each element of attempted robbery and that a reasonable doubt as to any element must result in petitioner's acquittal. The jury was also instructed that the first element of attempted robbery is that defendant acted "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously". Instruction 16. In instruction 12, the terms willfully, unlawfully, and feloni-ously were defined for the jury as "intentionally and purposely". Petitioner has not met his burden to show actual and substantial prejudice.
The petition is denied.
Dore, Andersen, Callow, and Durham, JJ., concur.