dissenting.
The majority opinion equates the word “building” as used in § 24-10-106(l)(e), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A) with the word “facility,” and concludes that the presence of a defective and unguarded machine within a school “facility” renders the facility dangerous so as to come within the “public building” waiver of governmental immunity. I disagree with this analysis, and thus, I respectfully dissent.
Plaintiffs complaint asserted claims based upon allegations of negligent hiring, supervision, instruction, and improper maintenance of classroom premises by virtue of the presence and use of a dangerous jointer machine at Trinidad State Junior College. Here, unlike in Reynolds v. State Board for Community Colleges, 853 P.2d 539 (Colo.App.1992), plaintiff did not allege, assert, or argue that the jointer machine was a fixture which might be considered a part of the building which housed it.
*1256Section 24-10-106, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A), which establishes governmental immunity and creates specific statutory waivers of its application, provides:
(1) [A] public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort ... except as provided otherwise in this section. Sovereign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from:
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(c) A dangerous condition of any public building.
The term “public facility” is used only in § 24 — 10—106(1)(e), C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A) which provides a waiver of immunity for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of any “public facility located in any park or recreation area maintained by a public entity, or public water, gas, sanitation, electrical, power, or swimming facility,” and in § 24-10-106(1)©, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10A), which provides a waiver for injuries caused by the “operation and maintenance of any public water facility, gas facility, sanitation facility, power facility, or swimming facility.” It is therefore plain that the General Assembly recognized that the word “facility”'is a more comprehensive term than the word “building” and that it intended to use the words selectively rather than interchangeably.
Section 24-10-103(1), C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10A) defines only the term “dangerous condition” and does not broaden the waiver of immunity for “public buildings” to include improper activities conducted therein or dangerous equipment and machinery which might be used, housed, or stored in a public building, but which is not a part of the building itself. As our Supreme Court stated in Jenks v. Sullivan, 826 P.2d 825, 827 (Colo.1992): “The statute refers to injury arising from the state of the building itself or the use of a state of the building, but not to one arising from activities conducted within the building.” See also Mentzel v. Judicial Department, 778 P.2d 323 (Colo.App.1989).
Hence, in my view, the trial court correctly interpreted the governmental immunity statute as precluding recovery under the factual averments pled in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment entered by that court.