I dissent.
Our text in this case is Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (hereafter section 664.6). Our purpose is statutory construction. Section 664.6 provides: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally on the record before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”
As a general matter, this court grants review in order to “secure uniformity of decision or the settlement of important questions of law . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(a).) In this proceeding, the majority secure neither. Quite the contrary. They unsettle the law as it stands today and sow the seeds for a harvest of conflict in the future. Previously, section 664.6 had consistently been construed in accordance with the plain meaning of its express terms to impose a formal requirement that parties to pending litigation must orally settle “before the court.” Now, the majority remove this requirement or at least deprive it of its substance. Here, they determine that, in light of the peculiar facts disclosed by the record, husband and wife must be deemed to have orally settled “before the court.” Hereafter, each and every court facing the issue will have to determine the question in light of the peculiar facts disclosed by the record therein. The majority transform *913what the Legislature had evidently intended as a “bright line” rule into no rule at all. They do so without my support.
I
Because the Court of Appeal below satisfactorily addressed and resolved the issue in this proceeding, its opinion, prepared by Justice Dibiaso, merits quotation at length. But first, the history of section 664.6 should be set out.
Section 664.6 was originally enacted in 1981: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in writing or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Stats. 1981, ch. 904, § 2, p. 3437.)
Section 664.6 was amended in 1993 through the addition of the italicized words: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally on the record before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Stats. 1993, ch. 768, § 1 [No. 9 West’s Cal. Legis. Service, p. 3459], italics added.)
It is section 664.6 as originally enacted that is applicable to this proceeding.
At the outset, the Court of Appeal stated the facts and the procedural background.
“On June 13, 1990, the day originally set for trial of their marital dissolution action [in the Fresno County Superior Court], Shirin D. Assemi, the wife, and Farid D. Assemi, the husband, reached a stipulation bifurcating the trial and consenting to the entry of a judgment of dissolution of marriage as to status only. A comprehensive stipulation concerning joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the couple’s two minor children was also reached. The trial date was taken off calendar. In addition, the parties agreed to set the case for ‘binding arbitration’ and to select a retired judge to resolve the remaining disputed issues between them.
“The arbitration hearing was scheduled for October 1,1990, at the offices of the retired judge chosen by the parties under their agreement [viz., Leonard Irving Meyers]. Shortly before the arbitration hearing began, the parties undertook settlement negotiations and informed the retired judge that *914they might be able to arrive at a complete resolution of their controversy. The retired judge consented to the parties’ request to postpone the hearing, with the understanding that if the case was not settled the contested proceeding would begin immediately.
“The parties, their attorneys and their [certified public accountants] spent nearly the entire day in negotiations. All remaining issues were discussed. Late that afternoon, a compromise settlement was concluded, and the retired judge was called into the room where the parties orally recited the terms of the settlement, which were recorded and later transcribed by a certified shorthand reporter. Under questioning by the retired judge, both parties acknowledged that they understood their agreement constituted a complete settlement of all of their grievances and that they understood and consented to the terms of the settlement. The retired judge stated that, as arbitrator, he accepted the settlement and that he was satisfied the parties understood it. He also explained that an order based on the arbitration was unnecessary ‘because we haven’t had an arbitration.’
“Although the parties, through their respective counsel, had considerable communications concerning a formal written settlement agreement, no such instrument was ever executed.1 Ultimately, . . . husband noticed a motion requesting entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6 and demanding attorney fees as sanctions pursuant to [former] Civil Code section 4370.6. The motion was heard on Miarch 6, 1991. After lengthy arguments, the court ordered enforcement of the settlement pursuant to section 664.6. It found that the binding arbitration was a ‘judicially supervised proceeding,’ the importance and solemnity of which were understood by the parties. The court also determined that the parties understood and consented to the terms of the settlement agreement, understood it was intended to resolve the action, and understood it was to ‘be a binding agreement for both of them.’ ”
At this point, the Court of Appeal turned to its discussion of the law.
“[Section 664.6], which took effect on January 1, 1982, provides an expedient and cost effective means of enforcing settlement agreements. (Estate of Dipinto (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 625, 630 [231 Cal.Rptr. 612].) Before its enactment, parties often brought nonstatutory speaking motions to implement alleged settlement agreements. This device maintained a questionable and checkered legal standing. Though there was some support for its use, most courts criticized the procedure. (Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 992-993 [203 Cal.Rptr. 356].) By the enactment of section *915664.6, the Legislature endorsed and expanded speaking motions to enforce settlement agreements. (Corkland, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 994; Richardson v. Richardson (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 91, 96 [225 Cal.Rptr. 370].)
“[Wife] contends the trial court erred when it enforced the oral agreement because the settlement was neither in writing2 nor made ‘before the court.’ She claims the retired judge was not a judicial officer within the contemplation of the statute. [Husband] counters that the proceeding before the retired judge had all the indicia of a formal proceeding and therefore satisfied the spirit and intent of section 664.6.
“In Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1168 [222 Cal.Rptr. 658], during the taking of a deposition of a witness held in a private law office, the parties reached an apparent settlement of the litigation. The agreement was recorded and later transcribed by the court reporter present for the deposition. Both parties stated on the record that they understood the terms of the settlement and agreed to be bound by them. (Id. at p. 1170.) When one of the parties later refused to sign a formal written document reflecting the settlement arrived at during the deposition, the other party brought a motion under section 664.6. The trial court entered an order enforcing the oral agreement.
“After reviewing the extant authorities, the appellate court reversed, holding in part that ‘an oral stipulation made before the court must be just that: a statement made on the record at a judicially supervised proceeding.’ (Datatronic, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 1173.) Although the appellate court acknowledged the general policy favoring pretrial settlement of lawsuits, it was of the view nonetheless that an oral settlement made at a judicially supervised proceeding ‘protects] the interests of the parties to the agreement and ensure[s] their full appreciation of the nature and finality of such settlement proceedings.’ (Id. at p. 1174.) The court concluded that the deposition where the settlement agreement was orally recited was not a judicially supervised proceeding. (Ibid.)
“A panel of this court faced the same issue in a similar factual context in City of Fresno v. Maroot (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 755 [234 Cal.Rptr. 353], There, an oral settlement stipulation in a condemnation action was taken and transcribed by a certified shorthand reporter during a deposition. A written agreement was never executed by all the parties. (Id. at pp. 756-757, 760.)
“The Maroot court found Datatronic's reasoning to be sound, and reversed the trial court’s order enforcing the oral stipulation. ‘Unless the [settlement] *916agreement is judicially supervised or in writing and signed by the parties, the intent of the parties when they verbalized the settlement is vulnerable to conflicting interpretations and the summary procedure authorized by section 664.6 should not be available.’ (189 Cal.App.3d at p. 762.)
“We agree with the literal interpretation placed on section 664.6 by Datatronic and followed by Maroot. In most instances, the words ‘court’ and ‘judge’ are used synonymously in statutes, and will be construed as such when it is necessary to carry out the obvious purpose of the Legislature. (See Mabee v. Nurseryland Garden Centers, Inc. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 420, 424 [152 Cal.Rptr. 31]; Newby v. Bacon (1922) 58 Cal.App. 337, 339 [208 P. 1005]) In general, a ‘judge’ is ‘a public officer, appointed to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice.’ (Black’s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990), p. 841; see also Elec. Code, §§ 28 & 29.) We find nothing which suggests the Legislature meant anything different when it used the word ‘court’ in this statute. Accordingly, ‘before the court’ means precisely what it says; an oral settlement agreement is not enforceable under section 664.6 unless it has been recited on the record before a judge of a court of this state authorized to act as such under the laws of this state.
“We need not determine whether the parties’ stipulation3 in this case was one for general arbitration under [the General Arbitration Act at] Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 et seq., which applies to arbitration conducted pursuant to a private agreement between the parties, or instead one for judicial arbitration under [the Judicial Arbitration Act at] Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.10 et seq.,4 which applies to arbitration under the auspices of the judicial system.5 Regardless of which arbitration scheme this agreement fell into, the parties were not ‘before [a] court’ when they recited their settlement before the retired judge.
*917“Judicial arbitration has little connection to the courts. It has been described as a ‘sabbatical from the courthouse.’ (Nanfito v. Superior Court (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 315, 319 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 876].) ‘ “Judicial arbitration” is obviously an inapt term, for the system it describes is neither judicial nor arbitration. The hearing is not conducted by a judge,[6] and the right to a trial de novo[7] removes the finality of true arbitration. “Extrajudicial mediation” would be closer to correct.’ (Dodd v. Ford, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 426, 432, fn. 7.)
“While the trial court may retain some jurisdiction over cases it has ordered to judicial arbitration (see, e.g., Nanfito v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 319-320[]), this does not mean the proceedings before the arbitrator are ‘judicially supervised.’ The opposite is the case. When a timely arbitration takes place as ordered, the court will not have occasion to deal with the action unless there is a proper request for a trial de novo. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1141.23.) If atrial de novo occurs, the award will be relevant only with respect to the fixing of costs. (See Code Civ. Proc., § [1141.21].) In addition, the fact that the California Rules of Court provide detailed provisions concerning the selection of arbitrators (see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1601-1609) and the conduct of the hearings (see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1610-1614) only makes the process subject to those rules; it does not make the process subject to direct judicial supervision. We find nothing in the Judicial Arbitration Act which discloses a legislative intent to treat judicial arbitrators as judges for purposes of the application of section 664.6.
“General arbitration (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.) has even less connection to California courts. A general arbitration agreement is independently enforceable, and ‘has a life of its own outside the judicial system [. . .] .’ (Byerly v. Sale (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1312, 1316 [251 Cal.Rptr. 749].)8 The involvement of the trial court is limited to ‘hearing motions to compel arbitration and enforce any award.’ (Dodd v. Ford, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 432.) The rules pertaining to the selection of arbitrators and *918the conduct of the hearings are matters almost entirely subject to the mutual desires of the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1282.2; Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d 396, 402, fn. 5.) For example, general arbitration proceedings may be conducted by anyone selected by the parties, such as a nonlawyer with special expertise in a particular field. (Gear v. Webster (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 57, 63 [65 Cal.Rptr. 255] [real estate agents and real estate brokers]; Hope v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 147, 150, 154-155 [175 Cal.Rptr. 851] [members of the New York Stock Exchange].) The policy underlying section 664.6 cannot favor a construction of the statute that would equate a general arbitrator with a public judicial officer or the general arbitration process with a judicially supervised proceeding.
“The lack of any requirement that a formal record be kept of judicial or general arbitration proceedings is also crucial. The Judicial Arbitration Act does not make any provision for reporters. California Rules of Court, rule 1614(b), expressly prohibits a record of the proceeding except as directed by the arbitrator for his or her personal use only. Under the General Arbitration Act, the use of court reporters is a matter left to the agreement of the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1282.2.) In the absence of a formal record, where the recollections or personal notes of the attorneys, parties, or arbitrator are the only means by which the trial court on a motion under section 664.6 may determine the terms of the purported settlement, ‘the intent of the parties when they verbalized the settlement is vulnerable to conflicting interpretations [. . .].’ (City of Fresno v. Maroot, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 762.) Use of a summary procedure in such circumstances is inappropriate. (Ibid.)
“That the parties in this case may have included provisions in their agreement which modified procedures otherwise applicable to judicial or general arbitration, or both, is immaterial. For example, the fact the parties consented to give binding effect (except for appellate review) to the retired judge’s decision, or that the parties elected to employ a court reporter who was present to record the oral settlement agreement, does not transform what is not a proceeding before a court into one that is before a court. The key under section 664.6 is the identity of the officer who supervises the proceeding where the oral settlement is recited. For the same reason, it is also immaterial that the proceeding was ‘solemn’ or that the parties may have understood the terms and intended binding effect of the settlement agreement.
“We recognize, as did the court in Datatronic, that pretrial settlements are favored and are to be encouraged. (Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc., supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1173-1174.) We also recognize the parties could have taken steps which might have made the settlement effective and *919enforceable, such as immediately returning to the trial court and placing the agreement on the record before a family court judge or stipulating before the retired judge that the agreement become the award of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceedings. However, they did no such thing and we are not called upon here to determine whether any action of that sort would have been efficacious. On the facts before us, we cannot refuse to apply a specific statute such as section 664.6 according to its plain meaning in order to carry out some purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute. (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182-183 [217 P.2d 1].) The Legislature is certainly free to amend section 664.6 if it wishes.
“There is no other basis in this record upon which to conclude the parties were before a court when they recited the oral settlement agreement. The retired judge was not acting in the capacity of a temporary judge under Article VI, section 21 of the California Constitution or California Rules of Court, rule 244. The parties did not stipulate to the appointment of a judge pro tem[pore]. They stipulated instead to have a retired judge act as an arbitrator to resolve the issues remaining in dispute between them. There is no evidence of an order for the appointment of a temporary judge executed by the presiding judge of the Fresno County Superior Court. There [is] no evidence the retired judge took or subscribed to the oath of office of temporary judge, and no written, executed oath was attached to the parties’ stipulation. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 244.)
“It is true the strict requirements of [California Rules of Court,] rule 244 are not jurisdictional. (In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 90 [284 Cal.Rptr. 305, 813 P.2d 1335].) California case law has recognized for some time that voluntary participation before a subordinate officer who lacks authority in that capacity may be tantamount to an agreement that he or she act as a temporary judge. Thus, in a matter tried before a referee of the superior court, it has been held where the parties acted in accordance with the rulings of the referee, strict compliance with rule 244 is not necessary. (In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171, 178-180 [193 Cal.Rptr. 165, 666 P.2d 22].) Similarly, a court commissioner may conduct a trial in a capital case where no oral or written stipulation of the parties authorized the commissioner to sit as a temporary judge but where defense counsel, knowing the officer was a court commissioner, proceeded to trial without objection. (In re Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 91-93.) However, this tantamount-to-a-stipulation rationale has thus far been applied to cases involving official court referees and commissioners before whom proceedings were conducted without adequate written stipulations. (In re Mark L, supra, 34 Cal.3d 171, 178-179.) Here, it is undisputed the retired judge was not an appointed and sworn commissioner or referee of a court of this state, and he did not purport to be acting as a temporary judge of the superior court.
*920“Finally, the evidence does not support a conclusion that the retired judge was a special master appointed by the Superior Court or that he acted in an official capacity as a retired judge assigned by the Chief Justice of California to perform the duties of a judge of the Fresno County Superior Court. (See Article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution and Government Code section 68543.8.)” (Fn. omitted.)
The Court of Appeal disposed of the matter of sanctions in short order.
“At the hearing on the motion under section 664.6 the trial court also entered an order, at. . . husband’s request, awarding him sanctions under [former] Civil Code section 4370.6. The propriety of this order is also raised by . . . wife as an issue on appeal.
“We need not decide the merits of the parties’ respective contentions on this subject concerning the scope and application of [former] Civil Code section 4370.6. . . . [H]usband’s request for sanctions was only ancillary to his motion to enforce the oral agreement. The trial court’s decision on sanctions was based upon its determination that the oral agreement was enforceable; it is obvious the court would not have made an award of fees and costs had it denied . . . husband’s section 664.6 motion. Our reversal of the enforcement order therefore necessitates reversal of the sanctions order. [Headings omitted from quoted opinion.]”
The Court of Appeal rendered judgment accordingly.
II
The majority are contrary to the Court of Appeal. Their reasoning is different. So is their result. They are wrong.
As originally enacted in 1981, section 664.6 had consistently been construed in accordance with the plain meaning of its express terms to impose a formal requirement that parties to pending litigation must orally settle “before the court”—specifically, before the judge presiding over the action or at least before a settlement conference judge. (See, e.g., City of Fresno v. Maroot (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 755, 760-762 [234 Cal.Rptr. 353]; Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1168,1171-1174 [222 Cal.Rptr. 658] (per Arguelles, P. J.).) The provision had also been construed to impose a supporting formal requirement that parties to pending litigation must orally settle “before the court” on the record. (See, e.g., Nicholson v. Barab (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1671, 1683, fn. 4 [285 Cal.Rptr. 441]; Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc., supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 1173.)
*921Early in 1993, the Court of Appeal below gave the Legislature an all but express invitation to abrogate section 664.6’s formal “before the court” requirement if it so chose.
In amending section 664.6 later in 1993, the Legislature declined this invitation. It did the opposite. It reenacted the formal “before the court” requirement in its original words. At the same time, it expressly added the supporting formal “on the record” requirement.
In parts of their opinion, the majority appear simply to remove section 664.6’s formal “before the court” requirement. This, of course, they cannot do. They cannot repeal statutory provisions.
In other parts of their opinion, the majority appear “merely” to deprive section 664.6’s formal “before the court” requirement of its substance. They do so by rewriting the phrase in question as “before the court or a ‘quasi-court' ” (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 909 [stating that the retired judge “was empowered to act in a quasi-judicial capacity” (italics added)]) or “before the court or an arbitrator” (see id. at pp. 906-911). Neither can they do this. They cannot amend statutory provisions.
The majority’s rewriting of “before the court” as “before the court or a ‘quasi-court’ ” deserves little comment. It is tantamount to repeal.
The majority’s rewriting of “before the court” as “before the court or an arbitrator’ ” deserves comment only slightly more extensive. They assert that the “1993 amendment. . . was part of’ a bill that “related primarily to . . . arbitration . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 905, fn. 5.) Had the Legislature intended what they claim to discover, it would surely have spoken the word “arbitrator” or one of its cognates. It did not. Its silence is deafening. Section 664.6 expressly covers only “parties to pending litigation.” Persons in arbitration need not be, and often are not, litigants the one against the other. The majority’s rewriting of “before the court” as “before the court or an arbitrator” leads inexorably to a rewriting of “parties to pending litigation” as “parties to pending litigation or arbitration” which would allow a person in arbitration to obtain entry of judgment even if there is no underlying litigation. The majority imply that they seek to avoid “anomalous result[s].” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 911.) But how else to characterize what follows from their own analysis? It is surely untenable for them to assert that an “anomalous result” would occur if “before the court” is read as “before the court” and not “before the court or an arbitrator.” (Ibid.) That a person who has agreed to general arbitration may usually be held to the arbitrator’s decision (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8-13 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, *922832 P.2d 899]) plainly does not compel, or even support, the conclusion that he must always be held to his own words.
The illegitimacy of the majority’s efforts to remove section 664.6’s formal “before the court” requirement or at least deprive it of its substance becomes evident through the following illustration.
When parties to pending litigation enter into a settlement, they enter into a contract. Such a contract is, of course, subject to the general law governing all contracts. (Cf. T.M. Cobb Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 273, 277-283 [204 Cal.Rptr. 143, 682 P.2d 338] [speaking of offers by a party to compromise under Code Civ. Proc., § 998].) Part of that general law is the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624; see Nicholson v. Barab, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1682 [holding that settlements are subject to the statute of frauds]; Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt (9th Cir. 1991) 939 F.2d 794, 799-800 [same, applying California law].) The statute of frauds declares certain contracts invalid “unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 1624.) Such contracts include, among others, “agreement[s] ... for the sale [or transfer] of real property, or of an interest therein” (id., § 1624, subd. (c)). Agreements of this kind are commonly implicated in settlements. Such is the case here. In the oral settlement in this proceeding there is a provision for the transfer by husband to wife of an interest in real property, specifically, the family residence.
Obviously, the Legislature may exempt settlements otherwise within the coverage of the statute of frauds from invalidity thereunder. It may do so expressly. It may apparently also do so impliedly, to the extent that such settlements are “enforceable” under section 664.6. (See Nicholson v. Barab, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1683, fn. 4 [declining to “address the issue of whether . . . settlement agreements, made orally on the record before the court, in compliance with . . . section 664.6 need also comply with the statute of frauds”].)
Just as obviously, however, a court may not make any similar exemption. It may not do so expressly. It may not do so impliedly, by construing section 664.6 beyond the plain meaning of its express terms, as the majority do here. What the court said in Nicholson v. Barab, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at page 1683, is pertinent: “We note that there is a well-established policy in the law to discourage litigation and favor settlement. Pretrial settlements are highly favored because they diminish the expense of litigation. ... [f] In spite of [this] policy . . . , however, we can find no reason to exempt settlement agreements from the statute of frauds where the statute of frauds would otherwise be applicable.”
*923It must be emphasized that to construe section 664.6 in accordance with the plain meaning of its express terms to impose the formal “before the court" requirement is not to frustrate the policy of discouraging litigation and favoring settlement. That is because the “statutory procedure for enforcing settlement agreements under section 664.6 is not exclusive. It is merely an expeditious, valid alternative statutorily created. [Citation.] Settlement agreements may also be enforced by motion for summary judgment, by a separate suit in equity or by amendment of the pleadings to raise the settlement as an affirmative defense.” (Nicholson v. Barab, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1681.)
On one point at least, the majority are right. To construe section 664.6 in accordance with the plain meaning of its express terms to impose the formal “before the court” requirement might arguably yield untoward consequences in certain cases. But any formal requirement whatsoever might lead to such outcomes. The Legislature imposed the requirement by enacting and amending the provision as it did. It must have been aware of the possibility of varying outcomes. It must also have found such a possibility tolerable. Whether or not this court agrees is simply immaterial.
Ill
For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Baxter, J., concurred.
“There is no evidence in this record to support a determination that the oral settlement was subject to the condition subsequent that it be reduced to writing.
“[Husband] does not dispute this assertion.
“The agreement to submit the remaining disputed issues to a retired judge for a final decision was contained in a written ‘Stipulation and Order,’ which covered, in addition to the provisions concerning arbitration, a number of subjects, including the vacation of the trial date, the joint legal and physical custody of the minor children of the marriage, and the bifurcation of the trial and the entry of a judgment of dissolution of the marital status. The portion of the document comprising the stipulation was signed by the parties and their respective attorneys. The portion comprising the order was signed by Judge [Harry N.] Papadakis, acting judge of the superior court.
“For purposes of this opinion, we do not consider the effect, if any, of California Rules of Court, rule 1600.5, which exempts family law actions from judicial arbitration.
“The provisions of the two statutory schemes are independent and mutually exclusive. (Porreco v. Red Top RV Center (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 113, 118-119 [264 Cal.Rptr. 609].) Private arbitration is by its essence binding while judicial arbitration offers the opportunity for a de novo trial after the arbitration has been completed. (Porreco, supra, 216 Cal.App,3d at pp. 118-119; see also Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 402 [212 Cal.Rptr. 151, 696 P.2d 645, 48 A.L.R.4th 109]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1141.20, 1141.30, 1285.)
“Whether an agreement is one for general arbitration or one for judicial arbitration is to be determined in accord with the standard rules which apply to the construction of all contracts; *917the decisive factor is the parties’ objective intention at the time the agreement was entered into. (Porreco, [supra,] 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 119.)
“A judge may, however, serve without compensation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1141.18[, subd. (a)].)
“It has been held that this right may be waived without taking the parties’ agreement outside the scope of judicial arbitration. (See Porreco v. Red Top RV Center, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 119; compare Dodd v. Ford (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d [426,] 431-432 [200 Cal.Rptr. 256].)
“As we earlier noted, we take no position about whether the provision in this case for binding arbitration before the retired judge made the parties’ agreement one for general as opposed to judicial arbitration. (See Dodd v. Ford, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at pp. 431-432 and Porreco v. Red Top RV Center, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 119.)”