The plaintiff, Great Salt Lake Authority, seeks to take by condemnation proceedings 4198 acres of land belonging to defendant, Island Ranching Company, on the north end of Antelope Island which lies along the eastern shore of Great Salt Lake. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, challenging the plaintiff’s authority to condemn its land, which motion was denied. Defendant petitioned for an intermediate appeal, urging that determination of the issue raised by its motion might eliminate the necessity of further proceedings and trial. We agreed that this is an appropriate situation for the intermediate appeal procedure provided for by Rule 72(b), U.R.C.P., and granted the petition.
The Great Salt Lake Authority was created and derives whatever power and prerogatives it has from Chapter 161, S.L.U. 1963 (now Chapter 8, of Title 65, U.C.A.). It is entitled “An act relating to the development of all of the mainland, islands, minerals and water within the Great Salt Lake meander line established by the United States surveyor general.” The defendant contends that the act is constitutionally invalid because: 1) it fails to prescribe definite limits to plaintiff’s territorial boundaries ; 2) it contains an unlawful delegation of legislative power; and 3) in any event it does not grant plaintiff authority to take defendant’s property by eminent domain.
In addressing the question of the constitutionality of this act of the legislature, we bear in mind the foundational precepts : that all presumptions favor validity; that courts will strike down such an act with reluctance and only where that is clearly necessary; and that in case of uncertainty the act should be construed so that it will be constitutional whenever that reasonably can be done.1
Limitation of territory.
In its first ground of attack on the validity of the act defendant points out that there is no express spelling out in the body of the act the limits of the territory in *48which the plaintiff shall operate. It urges that although in Sec. 1 and 6(8) the act refers to “ * * * development of the Great Salt Lake and its environs,” it is nonetheless indefinite as to geographical limits of plaintiff’s jurisdiction and the effect it would have upon the defendant’s property. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of the enactment should be considered together so as to produce a harmonious whole and to give effect to the intent and purpose to be divined from the entire act.2
Applying that principle here leaves no doubt that the phrase, “Great Salt Lake and its environs,” even though appearing in sections not specifically delineating boundaries, was intended to describe the area over which the plaintiff was to have jurisdiction. Conceding defendant’s ■further point, that the term “and its environs” may give rise to some uncertainty, we can get help by looking to the title. We are aware that in many decisions, including our ¡own, it has been stated that the title is not part of the act. This is true in the sense that it is not integrated into the operating portion of the legislation" and that it will not be .permitted to contradict or defeat a .plainly expressed intent; nor can it be used to create an ambiguity or uncertainty when the language of the body of the act is clear.3 But where such clarity is lacking it is permissible to look to the title of the enactment to shed light on and clarify the meaning.4 As hereinabove recited, the title of this act describes the area plaintiff is charged with developing as'“within the Great Salt Lake meander line established by the United States surveyor general.” The same language is recited in Sec. 65-8-6(8) of the act. This gives a sufficiently clear and satisfactory indication of what is meant by “the Great Salt Lake and its environs.”
The fact that in one small area on the west side of the lake the meander line has not as yet been surveyed and established does not affect this conclusion. It is something which is susceptible of ascertainment. Beyond this and more important insofar as the rights of this defendant are concerned, is the fact that the act in Sec. 65-8-6(10) expressly mentions Antelope Island, on which the defendant’s property is located, as land which may be acquired and developed by the plaintiff.
Delegation of legislative authority.
Defendant’s second objection to the statute is that it contains no definite stand*49ards or limitations on the authority granted to the plaintiff, but is so broad and general that the latter would be at liberty to act arbitrarily, solely in the exercise of its own judgment, in connection with the program of developing the lake and the lands in and about it. It urges that this is an unlawful delegation to the plaintiff of prerogatives which belong only to the legislature. Complaint is made particularly of the generality of the grant:
The authority shall have power to determine the policies and develop the program best designated to accomplish the objectives and purposes set out in this act.
This correlátes with Sec. 65-8-6(5) which provides:
The authority shall co-ordinate multiple use of property for such purposes as grazing, fish and game, mining and mineral removal, development and utilization of water and other natural resources, industrial, and other uses in addition to recreational development * * *.
It is argued that this grant of power is so broad that it allows the plaintiff to exercise its own judgment in such a general way that it leaves the defendant and others unable to determine what their rights are under the act and are thus left subj ect to the whim and caprice of the plaintiff.
In the 'nature of such a project as envisioned by this act it would be impractical to spell out every last detail of what must be done to carry out its purposes. We offer no defense of the act as a model of legislative draftsmanship. But when it is all considered together, it will be seen that it provides: for the establishment of the plaintiff as an administrative agency; with five “members” to be appointed by the Governor; for their terms of office and succession; who are to carry out the purposes and objectives above referred to. Its activities are limited by safeguards which prevent the arbitrary overriding of the rights of the defendant or others.5 Sec. 65-8-6(5) states that the plaintiff shall “adopt such reasonable rules and regulations as the authority may deem advisable to insure the accomplishment of the objectives and purposes of this act.” This requirement prevents arbitrary or capricious actions by the plaintiff since the standard of reasonableness is susceptible of interpretation and of affording protection in the event of claimed encroachment. The exercise of the most far-reaching power granted, that of eminent domain, of which the defendant is complaining in this action, is expressly made subject to the protections set forth in our general law governing that subject, Chapter 34, Title 78, U.C.A.1953. On this there is *50the further precaution in that Sec. 68-8-6 (1) precludes the plaintiff from pledging the credit of the state to acquire either real or personal property without the consent of the legislature. We fail to see that there is any such delegation of legislative authority to the plaintiff as to render the act unconstitutional on that ground.
Authority to use eminent domain.
Defendant’s argument that the plaintiff has no authority to take its property on Antelope Island by eminent domain is predicated upon what impresses us as a some-' what strained analysis of the pertinent sections of the statute. Sec. 65-8-6(10) provides :
The authority is authorized to take any steps that are necessary to secure such part of Antelope Island by donation, purchase agreement, lease, or other lawful means as deemed necessary for recreational use.
Defendant argues that under the doctrines of ejusdem generis and ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius, the phrase “or other lawful means” must take its meaning from the preceding words which refer only to voluntary means of acquisition. We do not think that argument is sound here. The rules of statutory construction referred to were developed to aid in determining the intent of legislation where meaning is obscure or uncertain and not to destroy that which is clearly apparent.6 We need not go beyond the act itself to learn what was intended therein by the phrase, “or other lawful means.” Sec. 65-8-6(1) provides that the Authority shall have power to acquire real and personal property “by all legal and proper means,” and goes on to further define that phrase as “including purchase, gifts, devise, eminent domain, lease, exchange or otherwise.” It seems hardly necessary to add that it is obvious that the purposes of the act could not be carried out without acquiring property, which fact the legislature was fully aware of and made provision for as just indicated. Our conclusion herein is implemented by the fact that one of the stated objectives in improving the area in question is for tourist and recreational uses; and that Sec. 65-8-6(10) expressly mentions the development of Antelope Island for those purposes.
We are not concerned with considerations as to the advisability or the practicability of this act. The question as to the wisdom of the project is for the legislature. As this court has heretofore stated, there is undoubtedly plenty of room within the limits of constitutional power for legislation which may be considered by some as ill-advised, improvident or unwise.7 But *51the legislature is the voice of the people who hold the plenary power of government except as limited by the Constitution.8
For the reasons herein set forth, we are in accord with the ruling of the trial court in refusing to hold unconstitutional Chapter 8, Title 65, U.C.A.1953, the act creating the plaintiff, Great Salt Lake Authority. The order denying the motion to dismiss is affirmed. No costs awarded, (all emphasis added).
McDONOUGH and WADE, JJ., concur.. See Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dist Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435; Reynolds v. Milk Commission of Va., 163 Va. 957, 179 S.E. 507.
. See Western Auto Transport, Inc. v. Reese, 104 Utah 393, 140 P.2d 348; Washington County v. State Tax Comm., 103 Utah 73, 133 P.2d 564.
. See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4802 (3d Ed. 1943).
.See Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dist. Corp., supra, footnote 1; 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, supra, footnote 3.
. See 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 2.08 and 2.15 (1958); Jordan v. State Board of Insurance, 160 Tex. 506, 334 S.W.2d 278; Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136.
. See State ex rel. Public Service Comm. v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P.2d 25 and eases therein cited.
. See Kimball v. City of Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1, 5, 45 L.R.A. 628.
. See statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 516.