Defendants appeal from a judgment n.o.v. or in the alternative a new trial.
On January 20, 1973, a physician gave the defendant, Jack Lewis, an anti-nauseant injection in the arm for treatment of a flu condition. Defendant left the physician’s office, got in his car and while driving home he blacked out. His car left North Crestline Street in Spokane and crashed into a house owned by the plaintiffs, James E. and Barbara J. Presleigh, causing substantial damage.
The evidence shows that on January 19, 1973, the defendant, while at work, began feeling ill and thought he was *213suffering from the flu. His physician prescribed medication and advised defendant to come to his office the next morning. At that time, he received an injection in the arm. He testified that his physician warned him the shot could affect his driving:
Anyway, he gave me the shot and I put my shirt on and started to put my coat back on, and he said “Where are you going”, and I said, “I am going home, I am sick,” and he said “The reason I asked is because I don’t want you to drive downtown or out on the freeway or someplace where you are going to be in traffic because this shot could have a tendency to make you drowsy, some people it does, some people it doesn’t, and I said, “Is it okay if I drive home,” and he said “Oh yah, fine, but watch for drowsiness, if you feel like you are getting sleepy, pull over, roll the window down, make sure you are okay, and go on home,” and so I said “Okay,” and didn’t think much more about it then.
On his way home, defendant went by his sister’s house for about 5 minutes and then proceeded towards home. He stopped at a red light and when the light turned green he went through the intersection and “that’s the last thing I remember.” He was awakened in his car by someone knocking on the window and when he opened his eyes he saw a pile of debris on the hood of his car.
The trial court, in granting judgment n.o.v., relied upon Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wn.2d 461, 398 P.2d 14, 401 P.2d 350 (1965). While the facts are different here, the pronouncements in Kaiser direct the decision here. In Kaiser, a driver of a bus lost consciousness and struck a telephone pole, causing injury to a passenger. The driver had been taking a drug prescribed by his doctor for treatment of a nasal condition. He claimed his doctor gave him no warning as to possible side effects of the drug. A few miles before the accident," he felt groggy and drowsy and blacked out or went to sleep shortly before the bus left the road. The passenger sued the driver and the bus company who, in turn, cross claimed against the doctor and his employer. The doctor and his employer were dismissed because the *214evidence showed no standard of care to which the doctor-was bound and even if negligent in not warning, the driver’s negligence in proceeding after he became drowsy was an intervening cause. A verdict was directed against the bus driver and the bus company. All parties appealed. On appeal, the court said, at page 469:
We are convinced from this record . . . that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability against either the bus company and the driver, or Group Health and the doctor, or both, depending upon certain factual determinations by the jury which we hereinafter specify in our directions for remand.
The court then held:
The judgment of the trial court entered upon the jury verdict is reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues subject to the following:
The jury should be directed that ... (c) in the event the jury finds that a warning of the side effects of the drug was given to the bus driver, then the verdict shall be against the bus company and the driver only.
(Italics ours.)
Thus, the issue presented is whether the defendant, having been warned that he might become drowsy, is liable as a matter of law when he “blacks-out” or goes to sleep while driving without first becoming drowsy.
It is obvious that an automobile may become a dangerous instrumentality. One who undertakes to drive his automobile has a duty to drive it in a reasonable manner so as to not injure another in his person or property. The defendant breached that duty as a matter of law when he undertook to drive his automobile knowing his ability to drive in a reasonable manner might be affected. The fact that he did not know the precise way in which his driving might be affected and he did not in fact become drowsy before he blacked out or went to sleep does not relieve him from a breach of this duty. Thus, defendant was negligent as a matter of law for driving after he was warned that his driving could be affected by the injection and must be held *215liable for the damages resulting therefrom. Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., supra; see W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 29 (3d ed. 1964); 28 A.L.R.2d 12, 40 et seq. (1953); Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W.2d 140, 143-44 (1962); Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 263 Wis. 633, 58 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1953).
We are mindful of the rule that in granting a judgment n.o.v. all of the evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. It is undisputed that defendant was warned that his driving might be affected. The fact that he and his physician believed it was safe for him to drive home does not relieve him from his duty not to drive when he knew his driving might be impaired by the injected drug. Defendant gambled and lost.
In view of our holding, the assignments of error raised with respect to instructions given or proposed need not be considered.1
Affirmed.
Munson, J., concurs.In granting judgment n.o.v., the trial court held that plaintiff’s proposed instructions relating to RCW 46.61.510 should have been submitted to the jury. That statute provides:
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in RCW 46.61.515 for any person who . . . under the influence of any narcotic drug or who is under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a vehicle to drive a vehicle within this state. The fact that any person charged with a violation of this section is or has been entitled to use such drug under the laws of this state shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this section.
See also RCW 46.61.506(1) :
*216It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor or of any narcotic drug to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state.