(concurring) — I concur in the majority opinion. The facts in this case present the question of whether the right to retired pay which will mature in the future is property to be awarded by the court to the parties in a divorce action. In Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn.2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973), a different question was decided. We there faced the question of the trial court’s power to award an interest in retired pay, the right to which matured between the time of trial below and the time of argument to this court. To avoid deciding a moot issue, the court chose to treat the question there as one involving a matured right to retired pay.
I agree with the majority insofar as it concludes the right to retired pay in this case is property. Retired pay is not a gift or gratuity as no element of discretion exists to refuse to pay benefits already earned. The fact that the federal government may increase, diminish or abolish the retirement plan does not make it a gratuity as to rights earned during the effective life of the governing statute. In re Marriage of Karlin, 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1972). Nor is retired pay compensation for duties or obligations performed or incurred after retirment. It is, as the majority notes, deferred compensation already earned. By our opinion today, we reject the view that the right to retired pay which will mature in the future is a mere expectancy. French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 778, 112 P.2d 235, 134 A.L.R. 366 (1941); In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1974). We instead hold it to be of sufficient value for judicial reeogni*371tion as property, whether a court considers its value before or after the minimum service required by the statute for retirement. As property it must be distributed by the court in the decree. RCW 26.09.080. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 43 Wn.2d 629, 262 P.2d 763 (1953).
I further agree with the majority’s extension of our reasoning in nonmilitary retired pay cases to this case, and its holding that a serviceman has a vested right with respect to retired pay benefits from the date of his enlistment. The term “vesting” is, as noted in DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wn. App. 741, 744, 491 P.2d 249 (1971), a misnomer. It is used in DeRevere and by us only in the sense that it connotes judicial recognition of its status as property.
Where the event has not yet occurred upon which payment is contingent but the employee has accrued contingent benefits by virtue of his employment while married, there is a valuable right which has been purchased with community funds or community labor and the right or interest is community property and is to be valued by what went into earning it. W. deFuniak & M. Vaughn, Principles of Community Property § 68, at 149 (2d ed. 1971); DeRevere v. DeRevere, supra. In DeRevere, at page 745, the court correctly analogized the property rights acquired by the community to those rights developed through life insurance policies. In our insurance cases we have evolved the rule that insurance proceeds are to be apportioned on the basis of the extent to which the community contributed to the total premiums. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27, 114 A.L.R. 531 (1937); In re Coffey’s Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938); Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn.2d 176, 180, 177 P.2d 391 (1947). See also In re Marriage of Wilson, supra at 854-55, and Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972). Here the community contribution was total, as the parties were married during the entire service period.
To adhere, as many courts have, to a rule that requires a fixed time for vesting coincident with either the maturation of the right to retire or retirement itself, overlooks the *372contribution of community labor and its role in building the right to retirement pay. French v. French, supra. A community that is in existence at any time during the span in which an interest is being acquired in retirement pay, contributes to the value of that property and should receive recognition at least to the extent its contribution increased the value of the right to retired pay. Its contribution should create a recognizable property right of sufficient value for judicial recognition that must be disposed of on dissolution of the community. Washington Fruit & Produce Co. v. Yakima, 3 Wn.2d 152, 100 P.2d 8, 103 P.2d 1106, 128 A.L.R. 159 (1940).
Horowitz, J., concurs with Utter, J.