(dissenting). At the outset I would emphasize the thought that *559it is too difficult to undertake to determine the constitutionality of the compulsory Unitization Act without in any manner discussing or considering the impact on this legislation of the positive provision therein which grants the unqualified veto power for sixty days to 15 per cent of the lease owners by acreage.
By that provision, considered in its necessary connection with other provisions, the act speaks for itself and thereby announces, either that it is not a necessary and proper exercise of the police power for conservation, or that it is a delegation of the police power and legislative power of the state to the will or wishes of oil operators or lessees.
In view of the positive language of this veto power provision and its direct connection as an integral part of the unitization scheme, it remains as a puzzle to me how the court can uphold the act and treat this veto power provision as some character of a separate item which may remain as a question undetermined and reserved for future determination.
It is not contended merely that this veto power provision is a separate unconstitutional part of the act. If that were all it might well be said that if compulsory unitization may be forced upon 49 plus per cent of lessees and 100 per cent lessors against their will, any possible veto power would be to that extent a welcome escape. But that is not the crux of the matter on this point at all. It is not contended merely that this veto power provision violates private rights, if it is contended at all that it violates private rights. The complete violation of private rights is accomplished by the overall, and other, provisions of the Act. As to this veto power provision, it is in fact contended that such provision is one, and an important one, of the details which demonstrate the unconstitutional attempt by this legislation to take over, for private gain, the private property rights, and private contract rights of free citizens. With this contention I agree.
In behalf of this act it is contended that the necessity to conserve oil and gas and prevent waste is the source of the state’s power to compel unitization and that such necessity authorizes and requires the state to compel unitization. But by provision of the act itself the act takes this power away from the state and lodges it in lessees, that is, first the power to initiate the proceedings, and second, the veto power for 60 days. This is a negation of the necessity of this power in the state, or an unconstitutional delegation thereof as I view it.
The compulsory unitization order here involved affected about 3,700 acres of land embracing 72 tracts under separate ownership, with numerous oil and gas lessees of separate tracts, and several hundred owners of royalty interests in the oil and gas being produced, and to be produced, from what was treated as one common source of supply. At the time of the order, distributed over most of the tracts, but not all of them, there were about 50 or more wells producing oil and gas, and some additional wells in process of drilling.
The order, over the objection of some of the lessees or operators engaged in producing oil, and over the objections of numerous landowners and royalty owners, directed the operation of the entire tract as a single unit. The result would be that a committee of the lessees would select one operator who would take over all leases and all operation of the entire acreage as to the stated source of supply, and all wells now producing oil or gas would be operated by that one operator, and all future wells would be drilled by that one operator at any or all places in the tracts, without regard to the contracted leases of the tract drilled; that all oil produced from the entire tract, or from any one or several of the 72 separate tracts would be marketed by the one operator, all expenses for op*560erating the aggregate 72 tracts deducted, and the remaining balance distributed by the operator to the various lessees and royalty owners. This distribution would be made without regard to the separate tracts from which the oil came, and without regard to any ratio of production or ratio of expense as to the various separate tracts. That is, the entire tract of 3,700 acres was to be drilled and produced, and the oil marketed, as if the aggregate tract constituted a single unit, covered by a single lease. The distribution of net proceeds was to be made according to a prearranged calculation intended to represent a computation of the present and future oil production value of each separate tract. That is, each separate tract was considered and it was assigned, or there was allocated to it, a stated percentage of the whole unit’s future production.
This appeal tests the constitutionality of the legislative act authorizing such action and the power of the Corporation Commission to make such an order, and tests the validity and fairness of the order, and the sufficiency of the evidence before the commission.
In considering this matter and making the order the Corporation Commission acted pusurant to the provisions of 52 O. S. Supp. 1945 §§286.1 to 286.17. That act proceeded as a conservation measure on the premise that it was desirable and necessary in various circumstances to authorize and provide for unitized management and further development of an oil and gas field or pool found to be a common source of supply, “to the end that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be had therefrom, waste prevented, and the correlative rights of the owners in a fuller more beneficial enjoyment of the oil and gas rights, protected.” It authorizes the Corporation Commission to supervise and administer the act and to order and compel unitized management of whatever should be the proper area of the oil field or pool under consideration. The jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission, however, could not attach unless and until “lessees of record of 50% or more of the area . . . sought to be unitized” should file petition therefor. Then after giving notice in accordance with requirements of general oil and gas conservation statutes, and hearing all parties who desired to appear either for or against the petition, the Corporation Commission should go forward and order the unitization if it was found that.such unitization was proper, and necessary in the interest of conservation, and if the unitization plan suggested by the petitioners or approved by the Corporation Commission was thought to be or was found to be for the common good and to result in general advantage to the owners of the oil and gas rights. Provision was then made that a committee of the oil and gas lessees would select a single operator who would thereafter operate the area involved as a single unit and distribute the net oil production according to the predetermined percentage to the various separate tracts of land involved, or to the lessees and royalty owners of each separate tract. It was then provided, sec. 286.6, supra, that at any time within 60 days after the entry of the order creating the unitization unit, lessees of record of 15 per cent of the unit area might file written protest against the creation of the unit and thereupon it should become the mandatory duty of the Corporation Commission to vacate the action theretofore taken and dismiss the proceedings for the creation of such unit. And lessees whether they did or did not join in the original 50- per cent petition could join in this 15 per cent protest and destroy the unitization and accomplish dismissal of the proceedings, provided only that such action was taken within 60 days of the creative order of the Corporation Commission, and as stated in the majority opinion, any owner of land in the area not leased for oil and gas was to be classified as a “lessee” of his land for all purposes of the act. I deem it unnecessary to set out fur*561ther detail provisions of the act except such as are stated here, and such as are generally referred to in other paragraphs of this opinion.
The petition to the Corporation Commission in this instance was signed by lessees of more than 50 per cent of the area sought to be unitized, and said petitioners attached thereto a complete plan of unitization set out in great detail and at great length, With their statement of a percentage division or allocation to each separate tract of a stated interest in the future oil production from the aggregate area. And petitioners alleged they considered their stated plan and division to be fair, reasonable and equitable, all as required in section 286.4, supra.
Both lessees and royalty owners appeared and protested, but after notice and hearing the Corporation Commission made findings in favor of the petitioning lessees that unitized management of this area was proper and reasonably necessary for the purposes set out in the act, and that such unitized management would probably result in greater ultimate oil production. And the Corporation Commission approved the detailed plan of unitization presented by petitioning lessees, and ordered unitization over the objection and protest of those operators and owners of royalty interests who appeared in opposition to unitization as aforesaid.
The unitization act makes special provision for appeal to this court from such an order, sec. 286.7, supra, and such appeal is authorized under the general oil and gas conservation statutes. 52 O. S. 1941 §§111, 112, 113 and 136, as those sections are referred to in the present act in section 286.7 thereof.
While other serious questions are presented, I think the constitutional attack is controlling. Appellants in effect and in final analysis point out a number of provisions of the act, and objections thereto as it is here applied, which they urge demonstrate several violations of constitutional provision and of individual constitutional rights. We list them as follows:
1. The act, though purporting to be necessary, and justifiable under police power, for conservation, may only be brought into operation by petitioning lessees of 50 per cent or more of the area involved.
2. That after hearing and determination by the Corporation Commission that unitized management is necessary, and will prevent waste, and will probably result in greater recovery at no increase in net costs, and that the unit-ization is for the common good and to the best advantage of all; and after the Corporation Commission has ordered the unitization plan into effect, and after unitized operation has commenced, the order may in effect be “vetoed,” and the unitization vacated and abolished by the mere protest against it in 60 days of lessees of 15 per cent of the unit area affected.
3. That the act recognizes only lessees in the formation of the unit, in the percentage that has the veto power in 60 days, and in the committee manage.ment of the unit, to the exclusion of any participation therein by the landowners lessors and all others who have fixed interests in the oil being produced and thereafter to be produced.
4. That the act purports to authorize abrogation of contract rights and relieve lessees of contract liabilities and that the unification does abrogate or supersede all contracts between landowner lessors and their chosen lessees, and that is accomplished upon, or by, action of the lessees alone.
5. The same objections as affecting others than original lessors, who have theretofore acquired fixed interests in the oil production.
6. That the act authorizes contingent operating expense liens against royalty interests which theretofore by express contract had been protected against *562any such liens and against any share or portion of operating expenses.
7. That by the fixed purpose of the act, and by the unitization, no lessee can get that for which he contracted, that is, his full portion of the oil produced from the tract on which he took his oil and gas lease.
8. That by the fixed purpose of the act, and by the unitization, no landowner lessor can count on receiving that for which he contracted, that is, his fixed share of the oil and gas produced from his land, and the result must be that oil taken or produced from one man’s land is used in part to pay royalty to another who owns other and separate land in the unit area.
9. The same objection as applies to others than landowner lessors who have acquired fixed interests as royalty or shares of production.
10. That the act and unitization plan abrogates or nullifies various specific provisions of lessor lessee contracts such as the right to receive delay rentals, rights to free gas for individual use, rights of lessor as against excessive surface use for pipe lines, or such excessive use for tank construction.
11. That as to objecting lessees the act operates to take the oil and gas leases acquired by them and assign or set over such leases to the unit for unitized operation for the benefit of all, thus in direct effect taking private property for private use and private gain without consent of the owner.
12. That as to land in the so-called unit area not leased for oil and gas operation, the act operates to compel the owner to submit his land to drilling operations whether he wishes to do so or not, and that for direct benefit to other private persons or corporations, and that as concerns the owner of any such land the act operates in effect to coerce and compel him to engage with others in the oil production business whether he wishes to do so or not.
To state the above numbered objections would seem to demonstrate that the legislative act and the unitization plan do transgress constitutional provision and do violate constitutional rights.
As to objection number one, the proponents of unitization contend that the act is justified under the police power and as a conservation measure. But that justification and purpose loses much force by the 50 per cent provision above noted. If the state may compel unitization under its police power and for conservation, then why should not such power be exercised without depending upon the will and wishes of 50 per cent of the lessees of the area affected? It would seem that if there is such justification it would exist as well where a majority objected to commencement of the proceedings as in the case where 50 per cent were willing to move forward as petitioners On this point the proponents cite cases upholding “proration” and “spacing.” But when the state, acting through the Corporation Commission, exercises those powers, there is no dependence in the first instance upon the assent of 50 per cent.
What we have just said applies with even more force to objection number two. It is a most unusual kind of exercise of police power and exercise of the power of conservation to provide that after the Corporation Commission has investigated and made solemn findings as to necessity, feasibility, applicability to prevent waste, general benefits and common good, and has put into operation the exercise of the police power for conservation, that the whole thing may be nullified by the mere written protest of holders of 15 per cent of the lease rights affected. I am not impressed with the argument that a regulation is so necessary for conservation and of such urgent character as to justify such drastic action under the police power of the state, *563and yet be under such control of the persons most affected as to be subject to veto by 15 per cent after it has been implemented by all of the hearings, findings and orders employed to put it into effect.
On this point the proponents of unit-ization cite cases upholding the Barbers’ Act and • the Dry Cleaners’ Act where prices are fixed by percentage of those most affected. But in those cases the prices fixed are not maximum but are minimum prices and the individual operator is left to operate his own business. In those instances there is no taking over of the individual business and the operation of all such businesses as a unit by one operator, for the so-called general good of all interested parties.
It seems to me that in objections one and two there is demonstrated entirely too much delegation of the legislative power, or perhaps it is better stated, too much delegation of the police power of the state to persons financially interested in the regulation itself, and that on account of such delegation the act and the unitization plan cannot find constitutional sanction.
As to the third objection, while the oil and gas lessees may be said to be the persons most interested in the application of unitization, the landowner lessors and other royalty owners have a fixed interest in the oil being produced and to be produced, and it is pointed out that the act and the plan are so framed as to allow such generous consideration of the lessees with no consideration or participation whatever by lessors or royalty owners. The oil field or source of supply may only be brought into the jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission for application of the state’s police power and conservation power by action of 50 per cent of the lessees. When the unitization plan is put into effect it is operated and managed by a committee composed exclusively of the lessees. The advance calculation of the various interests to govern distribution of production was set up by the petitioning lessees. And during the first 60 days of operation of the unit it is to the stated percentage of lessees that the veto power is given. The interests of the lessors and lessees differ only in degree, that is, in percentage of ownership of the production. Equal protection of the law would seem to dictate that such exclusive control could no more be given to the lessees to the exclusion of the lessors than could such exclusive control to be given to the lessors and royalty owners to the exclusion of the lessees. Therefore, the constitutional right to equal protection of the law is violated.
As to objection number four, of course, the act authorizes and the plan effectuates almost complete abrogation of the lease contracts between lessors and lessees. About the only provision of the lease contract which is preserved is the provision as to the ratio of sharing between lessor and lessee, and that provision is not fully preserved if the lease provided for a royalty of more than one-eighth of the oil produced. That provision is not fully sustained for the further reason that in unitization the lessor does not continue to receive the contracted share of the oil produced from his land, but, instead, he receives the contracted share of the percentage of the overall production which is allocated to his land. This may, of course, be more or it may be very much less than the oil produced from his land. Although the overall purpose of the act and of the plan is to increase ultimate production, we cannot say with certainty that every lessor will receive as much compensation or compensation of equal value to him under unitization, as he would under separate drilling and production of his land as he contracted for with his selected lessee.
What I have said also applies to objection number five. And as to both objections four and five it appears that even the royalty share which the owner *564was entitled by contract to receive may be reduced by operation of the unitization plan, or at least there may be or may come into existence a lien on some part of the royalty share for operating expenses. Such a lien, or the probability of such a lien, is specifically provided by section 9 of the act, which is section 286.9 supra, and is carried forward by express provision of the unitization plan submitted by the petitioners, and approved by the Corporation Commission.
I observe, of course, that functioning of the well-spacing law or of the pro-ration law operates in some measure to affect the contracts between lessor and lessee. But such effect is only upon what might be the desire of the lessee to drill more wells or the desire of both lessor and lessee to produce oil more rapidly. As to those operations there is nothing like the taking over of contract rights which is here evident. We observe the authorities justifying the abrogation of contract rights in the interest of or in subservience to the police power of the state. But we do not observe authority for such an abrogation of contract rights as is here evident by action of the lessees for their own individual interest. And we are convinced that this act and the unitization plan impair and obrogate contracts and contract rights far beyond any constitutional authorization.
What we have said above disposes somewhat of objection number six, but we should emphasize it with this further suggestion. Though royalty owners, by express contract with the original lessee operator, might be specifically entitled to receive the agreed share of production as royalty, without any part of the operating expense, yet, if the aggregate royalty share exceeds 12 1/2% or l/8th, the excess would be subject to being burdened with liens for operating expenses if they were not paid by the lessee operator who agreed to pay them. It is pointed out that in case any such royalty owner should be compelled to pay any portion of operating expenses that by subro-gation he would have a claim therefor against his contract party who agreed to pay them, but in that I see no fair substitution for the contract right to receive the royalty free of any charges for operating expense.
As to objection number seven, it is clear from the act and the unitization plan that no lessee is to receive the agreed portion of the oil which he may produce from his leased premises. Any plans he may have made for his drilling campaign and production and marketing procedure are necessarily cast aside. In lieu thereof the operator, chosen by a majority of the committee, will develop the lessees’ premises as much or as little as they determine. The lessee will be paid not his share of his production or the production from his leased premises, but his share of the predetermined percentage which the calculated productivity of his lease tract bears to the aggregate predetermined productivity of the entire area.
In this action I observe, of course, that if such lessee controls sufficient area he may veto the act and the plan if he does so within 60 days. And in considering purely the economics of the act and plan, it might seem that if more than 85 per cent find the plan wholesome and profitable and desirable, the remaining less than 15 per cent should not be heard to complain. But it has ever been true that constitutional rights have not been sustained or withheld depending upon the service or advantage thereof to majorities. Most often constitutional prohibitions or constitutional rights have been enforced in favor of and for the protection of minorities, no matter how small the percentage so occupied by the minority in question.
What I have said as to objection number seven applies with equal force to objection numbers eight and nine considered in behalf of landowner lessors and .other royalty owners. It is. inevitable that in many instances the *565royalty received must be substantially less than the fixed royalty share of the production from the individual tract of land. It necessarily follows that oil produced from one man’s land would be taken in part to pay royalty to another who owned a separate tract of land in the unit area. While this might be justified under some proper type of exercise of the state’s police power for conservation, I think clearly it cannot find constitutional sanction in the manner undertaken by this act and this plan as aforesaid.
. As to stated objection numbered ten, the rights specially mentioned are rights of value. In Wise v. Tabor, 201 Okla. 428, 206 P. 2d 970, this court recently considered the rights of a surface owner or lessee as against exces-. sive surface use by the oil operator in the construction of storage tanks, and that right was held to be of substantial value, so that a threatened invasion of such right could be prevented by injunction.
As to stated objections numbered eleven and twelve, it must be conceded of course that this taking of private property is accomplished without consent of the owner and results in private use and private gain. But the proponents of this unitization would say that the taking resulted in or was for the joint use and gain of the owner and the others interested' in the unit, and that the taking resulted in no loss to the owner, but, on the other hand, resulted in gain to him. That is nothing more or less than to argue that the taking was not without adequate compensation. But the Constitution, in art. 2, sec. 23, prohibits such a taking with or without compensation. Thus a violation of this provision cannot be measured by, or condoned on account of, compensation, no matter if the compensation is wholly adequate or even exceeds the value of the property taken. The constitutional inhibition is against such a taking without consent. I submit that a taking in violation of this constitutional provision for the private gain of others jointly with the owner, or such a taking which inures to the benefit of others along with the owner, but against his consent, is just as much a violation as it would be if the taking produced gain solely to others than the owner.
We observe the extensive argument of the overall benefits of the unitized operation of an oil field or a common source of supply. It may be that in the aggregate the production expense would be reduced and the ultimate recovery of oil be increased. It might be that ultimately each lessee would receive as much money or profit as any one of them could receive by regular private operation. It might be that ultimately each contract would return as much in royalty payment as any one contract would return under private operation. We do not understand that it is contended to be certain that every lessee and every lessor will receive as much or more under unitization than he might receive under ordinary separate tract or individual management. If it were so contended it would be based somewhat on theory or speculation. In any event, while those items are interesting they are not controlling on the constitutional question. The most we can say here is that a large percentage of the lessees believe this plan to be wholesome and good, and profitable and desirable; that the percentage of lessees who find and believe the plan unprofitable as to them, and grievously undesirable, and think it to be discriminatory and detrimental to their property interest, is a small percentage ’ comparatively, yet it is a percentage of large financial investment and of large potential oil value. Likewise, the royalty owners who find the plan objectionable and believe it to be unfair, and find the original calculation of percentage of interest to be discriminatory against them and to be inequitable, represent rights and interests which in the aggre*566gate run into a large sum. Indeed, the royalty interests of some of the landowners may mean more to them than the oil company investment in this area would mean to any one of the companies who as lessees initiated this proceeding, calculated percentages of ownership, and who operate the unit.
This is a large oil field. It appears that the interests owned even by small royalty interest owners may be of substantial value. Certainly the interest of every protesting lessee and of every protesting lessor or royalty owner merits full protection. That full protection under our Constitution seems to me to require that each landowner and his lessee be permitted to manage their own premises in drilling for and producing oil therefrom, subject only to reasonable and necessary regulation by the state under its police power. At least, that must be our conclusion as concerns any application of this effort to take over this area under the unitization act and plan here considered.
In this jurisdiction we have always gone forward in the conservation of oil and gas and in the protection of correlative rights. The state, through the Corporation Commission, has extensive power in the prevention of waste. I consider it right that the state should have great power to exercise necessary controls in the production and withdrawal of this natural resource. But surely individual enterprise should be encouraged, and individual property rights and contract rights should be upheld. The state should have much power to regulate, and, insofar as necessary, to restrict and control the production of oil and gas. But it should hot be necessary that the state take over production theretofore carried on by landowner and lessee. Much less should it be necessary for the state to authorize a majority group of lessees to take over the operations of other lessees, to the objection and detriment of minority lessees, and over the objection of all royalty owners. We do not mean to say that in this case all of the royalty owners object to this act, or to this plan of unitization, but as we read the act it would make no difference if every royalty owner did object and complain.
On this point it is somewhat significant that some lessees and some royalty owners desire this unitization while other lessors and other lessees object and protest. It would seem inevitable that in final analysis some lessees will obtain a greater return by unitization than they would without it, and that inevitably some lessees will receive less return with unitization than they would without it. The same applies exactly to landowner lessors.
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 80 L. Ed. 1160, the court considered the Federal “Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935” and held the act unconstitutional for some of the objectionable features which find parallel in the state act here considered. In the opinion (L. Ed. 1189) the court said:
“The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.
This language applies with force to the provisions of this Act which confer power upon the majority in the first instance to say whether the Corporation Commission shall ever acquire jurisdiction. If that is legislative delegation in a very obnoxious form, then how would we characterize the more obnoxious delegation to 15 per cent of the operators to nullify the whole proceedings by a mere protest in 60 days? This protest they may make without showing any reason therefor, or for any reason or for no reason.
In Washington ex rel. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 73 L. Ed. 210, the Supreme *567Court considered an ordinance in reference to the location of a philanthropic home for children or old people when two-thirds of the owners of property within 400 feet should consent. The superintendent who passed upon applications for building permits denied the application to build such a home solely because of the applicants’ failure to furnish such consents, and in reference to the ordinance the court said, on page 214 L. Ed., as follows:
“The superintendent is bound by the decision or inaction of such owners. There is no provision for review under the ordinance; their failure to give consent is final. They are not bound by any official duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily, and may subject the trustee to their will or caprice. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 366, 368, 30 L. Ed. 220, 225, 226, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064. The delegation of power so attempted is repugnant to the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143, 57 L. Ed. 156, 158, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1123, 33 Sup. Ct. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192; Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 70 L. Ed. 330, 46 Sup. Ct. 141.”
Applying that rule to the act before us, the Corporation Commission is bound in the first instance by the decision or inaction of 50 to 51 per cent of the oil operators or lessees. The state, acting through the Corporation Commission, may not take an initial step toward this exercise of the police power for conservation of oil until and unless 50 per cent of the operators will it to be so. Thus, 51 per cent or 50 per cent plus, may in every instance prevent even the inception of a proceeding looking toward conservation of oil and gas by unitized operation.
And as to continuing jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission and as to continuation of the operation under unitization, the Corporation Commission is bound for 60 days by the decision or inaction of lessees of 15 per cent of the area. The lessees or operators above mentioned, in exercising their preference or their will in the instances above stated, are not bound by any official duty, but are free to act or withhold action for private or selfish reasons or arbitrarily, and to the extent just noted they may in fact subject the unitization proceedings to their will or caprice.
It seems clear to me that this court should conclude this delegation of power so attempted to be repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Eubank v. City of Richmand, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. Ed. 156, the Supreme Court considered a city ordinance enacted under a statute of Virginia, which ordinance provided, in substance, that when the owners of two-thirds of property abutting on any street should request it, a committee on streets should establish a building line not less than 5 nor more than 30 feet from the street line, with provision for penalty for violation of such property line establishment. The state court upheld the legislation, but the United States Supreme Court held that it violated the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution in that such enactment amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law, and denied equal protection of the law.
Applying that rule here, I must conclude that this act is equally invalid. It deprives operators and landowners of property without due process of law, and it likewise deprives some operators and all of the landowners or owners of royalty interests of equal protection of the law.
While the original 50 per cent petition requirement, standing alone, would not or might not invalidate the act, it must be considered along with the other provisions as to the 15 per cent veto power, and as to complete exclusion of all others than lessees. When so considered the 50 per cent petition provision is some indication or demonstration of the overall length to which the act goes. And when all provisions of the act .- are considered, we must *568hold that the length to which it goes transcends legal and constitutional authority.
As touching upon these points our attention is directed to various provisions included in our statutes under the title on “Waters and Water Rights.” (Title 82 O. S. 1941) Those provisions deal with the making of various property improvements, such as irrigation, drainage, flood prevention, stream channel control, land reclamation, and the like, and the construction of public water works. Since the cost of such improvements must be borne by the property owners or persons interested, they are given voice as to whether the project shall exist or not. Those provisions bear np strict analogy to the act here involved. Those provisions are more nearly analogous to principles or provisions of general government where the will or wishes of the people govern, as in the creation of some of our municipal subdivisions or the voting of bonds for improvement or utilities.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the act violates art. 2, sec. 7, of the Constitution, in that said act operates to deprive persons of property without due process of law, and said act violates art. 2, sec. 15, of the Constitution, in that it operates to impair the obligation of contracts, and said act violates art. 2, sec. 23, of the Constitution, in that it operates to take or damage private property for private use, and specifically authorizes the taking and using of private property for private gain without consent of the owner, and said act violates art. 2, sec. 24, of the Constitution, in that its operation purports to take private property for public use without just compensation, and said act violates art. 4, sec. 1, and art. 5, sec. 1, of the Constitution, in that it purports to accomplish an unauthorized delegation of the legislative power and of the police power of the state.
It is suggested the conclusion that this compulsory Unitization Act is unconstitutional might destroy or deny or in some manner impinge upon the power of the Legislature generally to regulate the coequal rights of owners or operators to take oil and gas from a common source of supply. However, such result would in no sense be accomplished or indicated or intended. The' Legislature does have such power, including the power to make private contracts conform to or submit to the necessary police power of the state, and has well exercised that power in providing for “well spacing” and “pro-ration,” and in making the various other provisions under which the taking of oil and gas by any and all persons entitled to take it is regulated. This case concerns only the authority of the Legislature to deal with such conservation and such rights in the manner in which this act deals with such subjects. In that consideration the test is whether the act is violative of constitutional provisions. This court must not substitute court views for legislative views as to methods of conservation or protection of coequal rights, but this court must discharge its duty to measure this act by the constitutional requirements as to the protection of all rights.
No decision is cited which has upheld such an act or anything like it.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Vice Chief Justice LUTTRELL, and Mr. Justice DAVISON and Mr. Justice O’NEAL concur in this dissent.