dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from part I of the majority opinion.
The majority concludes that after an adequate advisement of a defendant’s right to testify mandated by People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.1984), the defendant may waive this right without any statement of waiver by him appearing on the record. The majority premises the existence of that waiver here on the absence of any objection by defendant to his attorney’s representation to the court at a bench side conference that defendant would present no testimony.
I agree with the majority that the advisement of defendant’s right to testify met the criteria of Curtis and that, although the advisement was given to defendant prior to the prosecution resting, this timing does not require reversal. However, I disagree that the absence of any objection by the defendant to his counsel’s representation to the court, which was outside his hearing, could effectively demonstrate a waiver of his right to testify.
“[T]he trial court has a duty to question the defendant on the record to ascertain whether the waiver of the right to testify is made with a complete understanding of his rights
[[Image here]]
By placing the elements of intelligent and competent waiver on the record at the time of trial, the trial court can accurately determine whether waiver was indeed intelligent and competent, and that determination will be readily reviewable on appeal.” People v. Curtis, supra (emphasis supplied).
A fair reading of this language in Curtis necessarily leads tó the conclusion that the *20defendant’s waiver must appear on the record and that the court must inquire of the defendant, after a full advisement, not only whether he understands his right to testify but also whether his waiver of that right is voluntary, knowing, and intentional.
I would therefore reverse the defendant’s judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.