dissenting, with whom CARDINE, C.J., joins.
Like Chief Justice Cardine, I am persuaded that this case is erroneously decided. Consequently, I join in his dissenting opinion and add these comments.
It is important to remember that this is the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming. While our oath of office calls us to *1353support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America, our primary obligation still is service to the citizens of this state. Their interests deserve priority in this court so long as it is possible to serve them without contravening the Constitution of the United States of America.
In this instance, I detect a sense by the majority that somehow it is compelled to refuse to include cattle that are intended to simply pass through the state of Wyoming within the phrase “import into” because of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America. I do not believe that compulsion is present and, consequently, I would include the cattle that are involved in these facts within the reach of the legislation and the executive order. It is important to remember that, even though the cattle are intended to simply travel through the state of Wyoming, fortuitous events may cause them to come to rest here. A breakdown or wreck of a truck or a train, bad weather, or, perhaps, even the seizure of the cattle as evidence are all examples of fortuitous events that could cause diseased cattle to come to rest within this state. Perceived in that light, I am satisfied that the requirement for a health certificate for such animals is not such a burden on interstate commerce that it cannot be justified as a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state.
In Duckworth v. State of Arkansas, 201 Ark. 1123, 148 S.W.2d 656 (1941), the court held, in essence, that “into” includes “through.” The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and that concept was affirmed. The court addressed the commerce clause from the perspective that exercise of the police power may be invoked to regulate matters of local concern. Duckworth v. State of Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 62 S.Ct. 311, 86 L.Ed. 294, 138 A.L.R. 1144 (1941). It would not seem to make any difference that the subject matter of the transportation is cattle and the local concern is health matters relating to livestock, rather than liquor. Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Company, 137 F.2d 274 (10th Cir.1943), aff'd, 321 U.S. 383, 64 S.Ct. 622, 88 L.Ed. 814 (1944), is authority for the requirement of a permit for the transportation of liquor in interstate commerce through the state. The state of Oklahoma was upheld in the exercise of a reasonable restriction on transportation through the state that was found not to be an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
The events in this case are not significantly different from those in the cases cited, and I would hold that the phrase “import into” includes livestock that are intended to simply pass through the state of Wyoming to another destination. Viewed from that perspective, I would find the evidence in this case to be sufficient to affirm the conviction of Mendicoa.