dissenting:
The majority concludes that, absent the consent of the parties, Colorado law requires that trial proceedings be recorded contemporaneously by the court reporter. The majority’s opinion is based upon a motion (see Appendix A) alleging previous violations by the court and a C.A.R. 21(a) petition alleging that similar rulings will be made in a case in which the trial has not commenced.
I dissent because the motion and petition are based on speculation as to rulings the trial judge may enter in the future, and are based on alleged rulings of the trial judge in the past that were not appealed or are pending on appeal. I believe that an opinion in the Stephen Jones case is premature. The petition for relief under C.A.R. 21(a) is based on hypothetical facts, making our opinion advisory in nature. Tippett v. Johnson, 742 P.2d 314-15 (Colo.1987); Kemp v. Empire Savings Building and Loan Association, 660 P.2d 899 (Colo. 1983); People v. Campbell, 196 Colo. 390, 589 P.2d 1360 (1978).
The limited record on the motion hearing indicates that the court would have made contemporaneous records if requested by counsel:
THE COURT: I don’t want to talk any further about last week. If you have grounds for appeal, you have grounds *533for appeal. We are dealing with this Motion, and I am willing to trust Mr. Callum, as a respected member of the bar in this Courtroom, to indicate if he thinks something absolutely needs to have a contemporaneous record made, and I will do that.
The trial court, in granting the defendant’s motion in part and denying it in part, properly acknowledged that, upon request, it would make a contemporaneous record of bench conferences.1 The trial judge, in denying in part the hypothetical portion of the motion, reserved to the court its discretion in the conduct of the trial. Standard 6-2.41, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed. 1980).
The majority agrees at page 530 of its opinion, holding that applying Standard 6-2.41, “the trial judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, cut off further argument. Whether or not to permit further argument at a later time is also within the trial judge’s discretion.”
In my opinion the absence of a ruling by the trial court on a current objection or offer of proof by counsel during trial renders the opinion advisory. Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70, 104 S.Ct. 373, 374, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983) (to satisfy case or controversy requirement litigant must have suffered some actual injury that can be addressed by a favorable judicial decision); MCI Cellular Tel. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 738 F.2d 1322, 1333 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“the mere potential for future injury ... is insufficient to render an issue ripe for review.”) (emphasis and elipses in original) (quoting Alascom, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 727 F.2d 1212, 1217 (D.C. Cir.1984)); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1291 (D.C.Cir.1982) (dismissal for lack of ripeness appropriate where nothing in record shows that appellants have suffered any injury thus far, and the law’s future effect remains wholly speculative). The lack of a trial record reflecting trial court rulings in this case requires the reviewing court to speculate as to whether the trial court would or would not abuse its discretion. See People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo.1982) (trial courts have broad discretion in controlling mode and extent of presentation of evidence, and absent a clear abuse of discretion rulings thereon shall not be disturbed on review). The petitioner’s motion prior to trial is hypothetical at best and provides no valid, reviewable record to render a judgment as to whether the trial court abused its discretion. I would discharge the rule as improvidently granted.
. The majority opinion concludes that, if counsel so requests, the court must make contemporaneous records of objections which it sustains.