dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. The majority has misconstrued A.R.S. § 28-797. Brenda Nichols fell within the class of persons to whom the Alhambra School District (District) owed a duty of due care. To extend the majority holding to its logical conclusion would result in the District owing a duty to a Cordova school child injured in the crosswalk based, in part, on the District’s failure to adequately sign, while denying liability to “any person” walking beside that student who was also injured. I find this outcome to be untenable.
The District entered into an operating agreement with the Phoenix Traffic Engineering Department regarding the school crossing at the intersection of 35th Avenue and Montebello, whereby the District agreed the portable signs would be in place between the hours of 7:45 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. each day school was in session. The District had, in effect, assumed control of the crosswalk during the designated time period, and it violated A.R.S. § 28-797 by failing to have placed the signs in the street.
Contrary to the majority’s narrow interpretation of A.R.S. § 28-797 and the class of persons (Cordova school children) which they have determined the statute is intended to protect, the language contained in the statute is clear and unequivocal, leaving no opportunity for interpretation. The phrase “any person” as used in subsection (G) can be given but one meaning, and that meaning is not equivalent to “Cordova school children.”
Only where a statute is ambiguous or unclear is a court at liberty to construe its language. State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 693 P.2d 921 (1985); City of Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. 290, 394 P.2d 410 (1964). Although an ambiguity may be found to exist where there is uncertainty as to the meaning of terms in a statute, this is not the case regarding the statute now before this court. This is not a question of an ambiguous statute requiring judicial construction, but merely a matter of applying a statute that clearly demonstrates the intention of the legislature. Where the language of a statute conveys clear and definite meaning, there is no need to interpret the statute, and courts must follow its meaning as written. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 139 Ariz. 201, 677 P.2d 1309 (App.1983). See also Wasserman v. Low, 143 Ariz. 4, 691 P.2d 716 (App.1984). Therefore, this court must give effect to the statute’s unambiguous meaning. In addition, the majority mistakenly reads § 28-797(A) as restricting the scope of the District’s duty to include only Cordova school children. A closer reading of subsection (A), however, reveals it is concerned simply with the authority to establish a school crosswalk.
The District clearly owed a common law duty to Brenda even though she no longer attended the school adjacent to the crosswalk (Cordova Elementary School). Brenda, as well as other persons (including adults), were foreseeable users of the crosswalk. The District could anticipate that any person using the crosswalk on a regular basis during the hours of 7:45 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. relied on the signs being in place each school day and in a timely manner. Brenda had crossed at this crosswalk every school day for approximately three years while she attended the elementary school. Although she no longer attended Cordova Elementary School, a trier of fact could find that she relied on the signs being timely erected and the added protection the signs provided.
The District’s contention it owed no duty to Brenda because such signing is not required by the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) Guidelines is misguided. The school crossing where Brenda was injured was an elementary school crossing, not a high school crossing. The placement of school signs at the elementary school crossing is required by law.
*574The assertion that the effect of the trial court’s ruling would be to require all school districts in the state “to police the adjacent streets and be responsible for the safety of anyone crossing those streets, at any hour” and to act as “city planners and/or traffic engineers,” in addition to the cost of liability insurance “increasing dramatically” is simply unfounded. Rather, the result would be that school districts would have a duty to persons moving within crosswalks operated and controlled by the districts only during a narrowly-prescribed time period.
Finally, this court should not have accepted jurisdiction. The appellate courts of this state follow a general policy of declining jurisdiction when relief by special action is sought to obtain review of orders denying motions for summary judgment. United States v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 269, 697 P.2d 658, 662 (1985).
“In our view appeal after judgment usually is an adequate remedy if the trial court has erred on the law in denying motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.”
Id.