Defendants seek reversal of a decree of the district court which directed them to honor a permit previously issued authorizing the plaintiffs to establish and operate “The Provo Canyon School” northeast of Provo in Utah County.1
Plaintiffs had previously made an abortive attempt to establish a similar school in Mapleton. After the failure of that attempt, they acquired a building and about four acres of the land, which had been used as a country club, to convert into this school. On January 8, 1973, the Utah County Planning Department issued a permit. On January 25, protesting property owners in the area filed an appeal to the Board of Adjustment. Pursuant to notice and hearing thereon the board agreed with the contention of the protestants: that the plaintiffs’ institution was not a “school” within the meaning of the county ordinance and ordered the permit revoked. Plaintiffs filed this action in the district court to challenge that order. After a plenary trial, including an inspection of the institution, the court found that it was a “school” and directed the defendants to honor the previously issued permit.
Commendably the parties are in agreement in identifying the issue involved here as: whether the institution known as “The Provo Canyon School” as established and operated by the plaintiffs is a “school” within the meaning of that term as used in the zoning ordinance of Utah County.
The ordinance authorizes in this zone buildings, structures, and uses of land: . . .
C. Schools, churches, public parks and playgrounds, arboretums, public buildings . . .2
The argument of the defendants is that although plaintiffs’ establishment has some of the attributes of a “school,” it “has an additional and paramount purpose that far transcends school attributes” so that it cannot properly be so characterized, but is in reality a detention and correctional institution. In support of this they point out that plaintiffs’ advertising is designed to attract maladjusted boys with mental or emotional problems, who need detention and control in connection with their education and training; that they will take “failing students in a fantasy world,” or who are “adversely influenced by drugs,” boys with “brain damage,” with “schizophrenia symptoms.” Plaintiffs’ school offers “residential treatment with a therapeutically designed round-the-clock living program” including “medical care,” psychiatry,” and “professional discipline,” along with other aspects of education. It is shown that during past operations the plaintiffs have found it necessary in some instances to use forcible restraints such as chains and manacles on some of the boys and/or keep them in locked rooms to detain them.
We agree that it is not the name used that determines the character of an institution, but this is to be ascertained from what it actually consists of and its method of operation. The term “school” is a generic one which has numerous meanings. As a noun, it is used to denote various types of institutions of learning, or *198specialized schools within such institutions; and in a broader sense, to symptoms of thought, or of doctrine, philosophy, music or the arts; and also to denote certain groups of fish, or animals, or people; and as a verb in the sense of, to teach, train or control; and also as an adjective to so characterize many of the nouns.3
The foregoing is said to show how versatile and various some words can be in their meanings, and to demonstrate the wisdom and the necessity of the rule applicable here: That where there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of terms, they should be analyzed in the light of the total context of the ordinance (or statute or instrument) ; and also in relation to the purpose, and the background circumstances, in which they are used.4
The soundness of this doctrine is illustrated by cases cited and relied on by the defendants themselves. For example, they cite In the Matter of Townsend5 for the proposition that a special school for nurses was held not to be a “school” as that term is generally used in statutes. The issue arose under a New York law which prohibited the issuance of liquor licenses for locations within 200 feet of a schoolhouse. Inasmuch as it was shown that the age of the nurses was 23 years and over, it was reasoned that this was not the type of school intended to be protected by the statute, but rather elementary and intermediate schools attended by children and youth. Similarly, the case of Granger v. Lorenzen,6 also relied on by defendants, involved a statutory prohibition of saloons within given distances from “schools.” The institution in question was a business college for adults.
In the case of Devereux Foundation 7 the ordinance which permitted buildings for educational and religious uses had a provision specifically excluding cemeteries, hospital, homes, sanitarium, correctional institution or structure or other place for accommodating the insane or other persons mentally deficient, weak or abnormal. The court found that the school in question came within the quoted exclusion, which was a valid exercise of the zoning prerogative.
It will thus be seen that the cases referred to are not in discord, but rather are in harmony, with the idea of looking to the context, the background and the purpose in which the term “school” is used in order to determine the meaning and intent of the ordinance. In accord with that doctrine and more closely analogous to our case is Wiltwyck School, etc. v. Hill.8 The institution was a special one for the care and instruction of delinquent, neglected and maladjusted boys, who were referred there because of their failure to get along in society, and where many needed special discipline and psychiatric care. A challenge was made similar to that urged here: That it was not a “school” within the meaning of the zoning ordinance. Upon a lucid discussion of the terms: education, training and school, as applying even to the maladjusted, delinquent and mentally handicapped, the court concluded that their education and training came within the meaning of “school” where there was no qualification or limitation upon that term.
Looking at the circumstances shown in our case in the light of what has been said above, we think it was reasonable and proper for the trial court to take the view that the meaning of “schools” as used in the ordinance in question was in the sense it is most commonly used and understood in that locality: institutions for education and training.9 The requisites of *199such a school are: some physical facility, teachers, a curriculum for study or training, and students who are the objective thereof.10 If these requisites are met, the status of the institution is not changed because of variation in methods of teaching or of training, or of discipline or control. These are all present in greater or lesser degree in practically all schools; and they may vary greatly without preventing one from being properly so characterized.
In regard to the point upon which the defendants place ' special emphasis: that because of elements of forcible restraint and severe methods of discipline, this is in reality a detention and correctional institution: there is this very significant difference: the boys are sent to this school by a voluntary choice of their parents; and they can similarly be withdrawn. There is not, nor can there be, any absolute right of detention in the sense there is in public penal or correctional institutions.
Consistent with what has been said, it is our opinion that the trial court was justified in concluding that the plaintiffs’ institution is a “school” within the meaning of that term as used in the zoning ordinance of Utah County, and in ordering defendants to honor the permit heretofore issued.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
CALLISTER, C. J., and ELLETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.. This case is sequel to Crist v. Mapleton City, 28 Utah 2d 7, 497 P.2d 633, wherein plaintiffs were prevented from establishing and operating this institution as “The Oak Hills School” in Mapleton, Utah County.
. Utah County Ordinance No. 02.0970.02.
. Webster’s New International Dictionary, 3d Ed., contains more than two dozen definitions and uses of the term “school.”
. Cf. Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870.
. 195 N.Y. 214, 88 N.E. 41.
. 28 S.D. 295, 133 N.W. 259.
. 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744.
. 11 N.Y.2d 182, 227 N.Y.S.2d 655, 182 N.E.2d 268.
. See 47 Am.Jur., Schools, Sec. 2, p. 297; and Sec. 220, p. 459; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts Sec. 1, p. 605.
. Cf. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Vol. 2, p. 130.