dissenting.
I agree with the exposition of law on the subject of waiver of counsel contained in the majority opinion. There is a constitutional right to counsel, but there is also a right to waive counsel.' However, any such waiver must be determined to be voluntary by the trial court and it may not be presumed. Indeed, the court must indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a waiver. To test the validity of a waiver, the trial court must consider the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant. King v. People, 728 P.2d 1264 (Colo.1986).
I differ from the majority in applying these rules of law to the facts in this case, and in contrast to their conclusion, I would hold that considering defendant’s background, the trial court correctly interpreted the defendant’s conduct as having constituted a waiver of his right to counsel. Thus, I find this case distinguishable on its facts from King v. People, supra.
Defendant’s conduct caused two attorneys to withdraw before appointment of the third lawyer. Then defendant was given the choice of either representing himself or having that attorney serve as an advis- or, or as co-counsel. When this arrangement was unsatisfactory to defendant, the court finally granted the third attorney’s motion to withdraw and declined to delay the trial by appointing yet a fourth lawyer. In my view, the trial court properly concluded that, under these circumstances, defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he chose to proceed.
Under the majority’s holding, our courts are placed at the beck and call of unreasonable, dilatory, obstreperous defendants who choose to play games at the expense of the judicial system. The trial court’s handling of this intransigent defendant was proper and that court’s ruling should be upheld. See People v. Litsey, 192 Colo. 19, 556 P.2d 974 (1976).