(dissenting)—I respectfully dissent.
On October 28, 1981, a decree of dissolution was entered dissolving the 25-year marriage of Joann and Robert Max-field and dividing their property. Because the family home, valued at $170,000 and built by Mr. Maxfield during the marriage, had not been finished, the court ordered that it *709be completed and forthwith placed on the market for sale.
On July 21, 1982 Mr. Maxfield was ordered to show why he should not be punished for his willful disobedience of the decree of dissolution, for his failure to begin the necessary processes to complete the home, and why the decree of dissolution should not be amended to reflect the inequities of Mr. Maxfield's failure to perform the necessary tasks to make the home salable.
On May 24, 1983 another show cause order was entered and served personally upon Mr. Maxfield requiring him to show why he should not be required to immediately complete construction of the family home. During a meeting in late June 1983 Mr. Maxfield agreed to finish the work by the middle of August. Mr. Maxfield did not do so and the order to show cause was set for hearing on August 22. At that time Mr. Maxfield's counsel requested a continuance which was granted. On the date set for hearing neither Mr. Maxfield nor his attorney appeared. Mrs. Maxfield served a notice of presentment on Mr. Maxfield's attorney advising that a contempt order would be entered on September 16, 1983. Mr. Maxfield's attorney was present at that hearing and approved an order of contempt and judgment against his client. This order granted Mr. Maxfield the opportunity to purge himself of the contempt by completing the work by October 2, 1983. If the work was not done by that date, the order directed a bench warrant would issue and he would be subject to a penalty of $100 a day until the work was completed. The next day, September 17, Mr. Maxfield appeared at the home and started work. His efforts were sporadic and the work was not completed as required by the order. On January 20, 1984 Mr. Maxfield moved for relief from the order of contempt but the motion was denied on March 29, 1984. The work was finally completed in February 1984.
On May 16 Mrs. Maxfield moved for summary judgment for the amount of the penalty specified in the order of contempt. On May 25 Mr. Maxfield again moved to stay and set aside and/or gain relief from the September 16, 1983 *710contempt order. The trial court granted Mrs. Maxfield's motion for summary judgment, denied Mr. Maxfield's motion to stay and set aside the contempt order, and also denied Mrs. Maxfield's motion to recover maintenance and obtain a contribution for house payments, insurance and tax costs that she made while awaiting Mr. Maxfield's completion of the house. Both parties appeal.
I disagree with the majority opinion that this court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Maxfield's appeal because, in my view, the order denying his motion to vacate and set aside the September 16, 1983 contempt order was not timely.
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Glass v. Windsor Nav. Co., 81 Wn.2d 726, 504 P.2d 1135 (1973). If not done within 30 days of entry of an appealable order, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to consider it. RAP 5.2; Kelly v. Schorzman, 3 Wn. App. 908, 478 P.2d 769 (1970). Also, while a party has a right to appeal an order of contempt, if timely filed, such appeal does not bring with it the original judgment for review. Griffin v. Draper, 32 Wn. App. 611, 614, 649 P.2d 123 (1982). See also In re Marriage of Osborn, 24 Wn. App. 862, 604 P.2d 954 (1979); Rhodes v. D & D Enters., 16 Wn. App. 175, 554 P.2d 390 (1976).
Here, Mr. Maxfield did not appeal the September 16, 1983 contempt order and judgment. On January 20, 1984 he moved for relief from and vacation of the September 16, 1983 order of contempt and judgment. The court denied the motion on March 29, 1984. Mr. Maxfield did not appeal that decision. Instead, on May 25, 1984 he filed another motion to stay and vacate the September 16, 1983 contempt order and judgment. Both RAP 5.2 and res judicata principles, Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 396, 429 P.2d 207 (1967); In re Hansen, 24 Wn. App. 27, 35, 599 P.2d 1304 (1979), preclude Mr. Maxfield under the circumstances presented from attacking the September 16, 1983 order of contempt and judgment or raising any issues regarding it. Neither should he be allowed to appeal from the denial of the motion to vacate that order. Mr. Maxfield *711is not permitted by the rules of court or judicial fairness to extend the time for appeal from a denial of a motion to vacate the contempt order by filing another motion asking for the same relief.
However, even if this appeal is timely in that it is an appeal of the March 22, 1985 order and judgment which the majority decides included the appeal of the denial of the motion to vacate, I would hold the court did not err in refusing to set aside the contempt order and judgment.
It is well established vacation of a judgment under CR 60(b) is within the trial court's discretion and its decision will be overturned on appeal only if it appears its discretion has been abused. State v. Santos, 104 Wn.2d 142, 145, 702 P.2d 1179 (1985); In re Adamec, 100 Wn.2d 166, 173, 667 P.2d 1085 (1983); Kennedy v. Sundown Speed Marine, Inc., 97 Wn.2d 544, 548, 647 P.2d 30, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982). An appeal from a denial of a CR 60(b) motion is generally limited to the propriety of the denial, but a party may raise for the first time on appeal a claim either that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or issues affecting constitutional rights. State v. Santos, supra at 145-46. Also, CR 60(b)(5) permits vacation of a judgment which is void. A judgment which is entered without jurisdiction over the parties is void. Mid-City Materials, Inc. v. Heater Beaters Custom Fireplaces, 36 Wn. App. 480, 486, 674 P.2d 1271 (1984); Lee v. Western Processing Co., 35 Wn. App. 466, 469, 667 P.2d 638 (1983). See also Kennedy v. Sundown Speed Marine, Inc., supra at 548.
For a court to have jurisdiction to proceed to judgment, adequate notice must be given, i.e., the notice must apprise the party to whom it is directed that his property is in jeopardy. In re Marriage, of Campbell, 37 Wn. App. 840, 844-45, 683 P.2d 604 (1984). In Burlingame v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 106 Wn.2d 328, 333, 722 P.2d 67 (1986), the court in a lengthy discussion held that notice in a contempt proceeding is not as crucial as in the initiation of a civil proceeding, and therefore notice in a contempt proceeding is sufficient if it informs the accused of *712the time and place of the hearing and the nature of the pending charges.
The majority holds the orders to show cause and the documents supporting them, i.e., the dissolution decree, were not sufficiently clear to meet the minimal requirements of procedural due process and thus the contempt order was without foundation and void. In my view, the record supports the opposite conclusion.
Here, the show cause orders personally served on Mr. Maxfield gave the time and place of hearing and ordered him to show cause why he should not be punished for his willful disobedience of the dissolution decree for his failure to complete the home. In June 1983 after receiving the show cause orders, Mr. Maxfield admits he agreed to perform the work by mid-August 1983. When that time came and went and the work was not done, a new date was set for a show cause hearing. Service of the new hearing date was made on Mr. Maxfield's attorney pursuant to CR 5(b)(1) which allows service on a party's attorney. Thus, we conclude Mr. Maxfield was adequately notified of the hearings and the issue to be resolved.
The dissolution decree stated: "Necessary repairs to the home shall be completed forthwith" without designating who was to do the repairs. However, in his oral decision preceding entry of the dissolution decree, the trial judge made several statements pertinent to this issue: "I am going to condition this, however, if Mr. Maxfield can, and Mrs. Maxfield's parents will advance the money, that this property be completed so that it is in a salable first class value forthwith, it is to the advantage of both"; the husband, after the parties separated, never came back to finish the home, although he had the equipment to do so; there was $3,121 in hold backs reserved to finish the house but the money had to be used to make the house payments. The court also pointed out that Mr. Maxfield testified the materials necessary to complete the home would cost approximately $2,800, the work could be completed in perhaps a week, and both parties testified the husband was a *713carpenter. Reading the dissolution decree in light of the issues, i.e., division of the property which included the sale of the family home, Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp., 96 Wn.2d 708, 712-13, 638 P.2d 1201 (1982); State v. International Typographical Union, 57 Wn.2d 151, 158, 356 P.2d 6 (1960) (quoting Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17, 69 L. Ed. 150, 45 S. Ct. 5 (1924)), it is clear from the court's oral ruling and Mr. Maxfield's own testimony that he knew he was responsible for completing the work on the family home.
Furthermore, Mr. Maxfield's contention his attorney did not give him notice of the penalty imposed by the September 16, 1983 contempt order is not properly before this court. The general rule is that once a party has designated an attorney to represent him in a particular matter, the court and other parties are entitled to rely upon that authority until the client's decision to terminate has been brought to their attention. Graves v. P.J. Taggares Co., 94 Wn.2d 298, 304, 616 P.2d 1223 (1980); Haller v. Wallis, 89 Wn.2d 539, 547, 573 P.2d 1302 (1978). Here, Mr. Maxfield never advised the court or the other parties he had terminated the authority of his attorney, nor does he contend that he did so. In this situation, an attorney's knowledge is deemed to be the client's knowledge when the attorney acts on his behalf; but as between the attorney and client, there is a duty to keep the client informed of material developments in the matters being handled for the client. Haller v. Wallis, supra at 547. As the trial judge aptly stated, Mr. Maxfield's contention he did not receive notice of the terms and penalties imposed by the contempt order is a matter between Mr. Maxfield and his former attorney and not properly before the court in the present proceeding.
The majority relies on Graves v. P.J. Taggares Co., supra at 303, for the proposition an attorney is without authority to surrender a substantial right of a client unless the client grants specific authority to do so. In Graves the attorney stipulated to liability without his client's consent. See also Haller v. Wallis, supra, involving a settlement without the *714client's authority. That is not the case here. The conduct claimed to have been done without Mr. Maxfield's consent or authorization was the attorney's signature approving the September 16 contempt order and judgment. The approval of the order could mean nothing more than it expressed the trial court's decision. It was not an order based on a stipulation or agreement. Mr. Maxfield's attorney's refusal to approve the order as to form would be inconsequential, see CR 54(f), not affecting the authority of the court to enter its order of contempt and judgment. By approving the order, the attorney did not surrender a substantial right of Mr. Maxfield's nor prevent Mr. Maxfield from challenging the order of contempt had there been a timely appeal. The power of the court to enter the order of contempt is not dependent upon the signature or approval of the attorneys. Thus, I do not find Graves v. P.J. Taggares Co., supra, controlling.
For these reasons, I would hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Maxfield's motion to vacate the September 16, 1983 contempt order and judgment.
As to the cross appeal, I agree with Mrs. Maxfield that Mr. Maxfield should be required to pay one-half of the mortgage payments, taxes and insurance expenses incurred in maintaining the home while awaiting its completion.
Mr. and Mrs. Maxfield held the property as tenants in common. Fritch v. Fritch, 53 Wn.2d 496, 502-03, 335 P.2d 43 (1959); Witzel v. Tena, 48 Wn.2d 628, 632, 295 P.2d 1115 (1956). A tenant in common is entitled to contribution from his cotenant for outlays upon the common burden or liability of both of them to pay the taxes, encumbrances and other charges for the benefit of the common property. Cook v. Vennigerholz, 44 Wn.2d 612, 269 P.2d 824 (1954); Walters v. Walters, 1 Wn. App. 849, 851-52, 466 P.2d 174 (1970).
The dissolution decree provided the house payments and maintenance costs were to be paid out of certain insurance proceeds placed in a joint account. It was anticipated the *715house would sell prior to depletion of these proceeds. However, because of the failure to timely complete the home, the proceeds were depleted prior to the sale. Based on the contempt order and judgment, it is clear the delay was caused by Mr. Maxfield's neglect. Mrs. Maxfield should not be penalized for such delay. Thus, I conclude the court erred by denying Mrs. Maxfield's motion for contribution for one-half of the mortgage payments, taxes and insurance expenses incurred in maintaining the home pending its completion.
Therefore, I would affirm the denial of the motion to vacate the contempt order, but reverse as to Mrs. Max-field's cross appeal and require Mr. Maxfield to contribute one-half of the costs incurred in maintaining the home pending its completion.