Appellant Charlene Garcia appeals from the summary judgment which was entered in favor of Appellee Officer Roger Lawson on Garcia’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We affirm.
ISSUES
Garcia presents a single issue for our review:
I. Was the defendant Lawson entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or are there genuine issues of material fact which would preclude the granting of summary judgment?
FACTS
We are familiar with this case as it was previously before us on a different issue. Lawson v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 1136 (Wyo.1996). We enumerated the facts in the following way:
The following recitation of facts is based upon the undisputed facts as demonstrated by the summary judgment materials and states those facts in the light most beneficial to the nonmoving party affording that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from them. The non-moving party in this case is appellee, Charlene Garcia (Garcia). From February 22, 1990 until February 24, 1990, Garcia was held captive by her estranged boyfriend in Cheyenne, Wyoming. On February 24, 1990, Garcia escaped and eventually contacted the Cheyenne Police Department. Officer Roger Lawson (Lawson) was dispatched to investigate Garcia’s case. Garcia informed Lawson that her ex-boyfriend broke into her sister’s house, where she was house-sitting, on February 22, 1990 *1166and held Garcia against her will until February 24, 1990. Further, Garcia informed Lawson that her ex-boyfriend repeatedly raped her and physically abused her during her confinement.
The physical evidence corroborated Garcia’s claims. The back door of her sister’s home showed signs of forced entry; there was a broken statue that Garcia claimed her attacker threw at her, hitting her in the shoulder; there was a fist-sized hole in the wall; and Garcia had bruises on her arm and head. Lawson was made aware of this physical evidence. In spite of the overwhelming evidence, Lawson refused to have a rape kit performed on Garcia and further informed her that neither he nor the Cheyenne Police Department could do anything about the matter since it was a boyfriend/girlfriend situation and it would be her word against his. Lawson did not collect any evidence while he was at Garcia’s sister’s home. However, while continuing the investigation, Lawson did take the opportunity to discuss the size of a mutual acquaintance’s breasts and to invite Garcia to go out for a beer with him.
Lawson ultimately sought advice concerning how the situation should be reported, but could find no one in the Cheyenne Police Department to advise him. Unable to find an experienced officer, he performed his own research and concluded that there was no basis for felony charges. Finally, Lawson wrote a citation and complaint charging Garcia’s assailant with disturbance of the peace.
Lawson was suspended by the Cheyenne Police Department, and other officers within the department were placed in charge of the investigation. However, the charges filed with the district attorney’s office were eventually dismissed for lack of evidence. Garcia filed a complaint on February 11, 1993, and later amended that complaint to include a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Lawson violated her constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Lawson filed a motion for summary judgment claiming, among other things, that he was immune from suit pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity. The district court refused to grant that motion, and Lawson filed this interlocutory appeal.
912 P.2d at 1137-38.
In that appeal, we reversed the district court’s order, holding that Lawson was entitled to invoke the defense of qualified immunity. 912 P.2d at 1139. In this appeal, Garcia contests the district court’s order which granted Lawson’s motion for a summary judgment on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Roitz v. Kidman, 913 P.2d 431, 432 (Wyo.1996); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. JCI v. TL By TL (Paternity of TS), 917 P.2d 183, 185 (Wyo.1996). We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Scott v. Scott, 918 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo.1996). We do not accord any deference to the district court’s decisions on issues of law. Koopman By and Through Koopman v. Fremont County School District, 911 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Wyo.1996).
DISCUSSION
We first recognized the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress cause of action in Leithead v. American Colloid Company, 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo.1986). In doing so, we adopted § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of ToRts:
“Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
“(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis*1167tress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”
Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1065 (quoting Restatement (Seoond) TORTS § 46 (1965)).
Outrageous conduct is defined as “conduct which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, is regarded as atrocious, and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 721 P.2d at 1066 (citing Restatement, supra, § 46 cmt. d). Severe emotional distress is defined as distress which is “so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Id. (citing Restatement, supra, § 46 cmt. j).
In Leithead, we recognized that adoption of the intentionai-infhetion-of-emotional-distress cause of action could flood the courts with fraudulent claims and create potentially unlimited liability for every type of mental disturbance. 721 P.2d at 1065. We also noted, however, that frivolous claims can be weeded out at the summary judgment stage. 721 P.2d at 1066.
“Court and jury. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.”
Id. (quoting Restatement, supra, § 46 cmt. h).
After having examined the record in this ease in the light most favorable to Garcia, we agree that Lawson failed to complete a quality investigation and that he made two offensive remarks. Although Lawson could certainly have been more considerate in his dealings with Gareia, his conduct was at most annoying, insulting, and insensitive. His conduct was not, however, what we would characterize as being beyond all possible bounds of decency, atrocious, or utterly intolerable in a civilized community. “ ‘[T]he law does not afford a cause of action for bad taste, boorishness, condescension, obnoxiousness, or social ineptitude.’ ” Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C.1994).
We conclude that no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether Lawson’s conduct was sufficiently extreme, and outrageous to support an intentional-infhction-of-emotional-distress claim and that Lawson is, therefore, entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Having concluded that Lawson’s conduct did not sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, we do not need to address whether Garcia suffered severe emotional distress as a result of this conduct.
Affirmed.