dissenting.
ORS 656.382(2) provides that attorney fees may be awarded to a claimant when an employer initiates a request for review “and the Administrative Law Judge, board or court finds that the compensation awarded to a claimant should not be disallowed or reduced.” The Supreme Court has construed the statute to apply only when review of the matter actually is exercised and there is a decision on the merits that the award *119of compensation should not be disallowed or reduced. We similarly have held that the statute requires a finding on the merits as a predicate to recovery of attorney fees. That did not happen in this case, in which the employer merely withdrew her appeal and stipulated to her responsibility. The majority nevertheless holds that such a stipulation, and the acceptance of it by an ALJ, constitutes the required “finding” that compensation should not be disallowed or reversed and, on the basis of such an approved settlement, awards claimant attorney fees in this case. I disagree.
Claimant’s entitlement to fees turns on the meaning of the statutory phrase, “and the Administrative Law Judge, board or court finds that the compensation awarded to a claimant should not be disallowed or reduced.” To determine the meaning of that phrase, we examine its language, in context, and, if necessary, legislative history and other aids to statutory construction. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Also relevant to the task are prior judicial decisions concerning the meaning of the statute and related provisions. State v. Sullens, 314 Or 436, 443, 839 P2d 708 (1992).
We begin with the language of the statute and, in particular, its requirement that the “Administrative Law Judge, board or court find” that compensation should not be reduced. Ordinarily, the word “find” or “finding” refers to a judicial or quasi-judicial determination on the merits after hearing the relevant evidence and arguments on a matter. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 852 (1976) (“to determine a case judicially or quasi-judicially by a verdict or decision”); Black’s Law Dictionary 569 (5th ed 1979) (“A decision upon a question of fact reached as the result of a judicial examination or investigation by a court, jury, referee, coroner, etc.”); The Random House College Dictionary 494 (1973) (“to determine after judicial inquiry * * * to pronounce as an official act”).
Examination of the relevant case law construing ORS 656.382(2) reveals that the Oregon courts uniformly have held that the legislature intended the statutory reference to the “find [ing] ” of an ALJ, board or court to mean what it ordinarily means in common parlance. In SAIF v. Curry, 297 Or 504, 686 P2d 363 (1984), the Supreme Court held that, when that court *120denies review of a workers’ compensation decision awarding compensation, the denial of review does not constitute a “find[ing]” within the meaning of the statue. The court held that the legislature intended ORS 656.382(2) to apply
“ ‘only when this court actually allows an employer’s petition for review and decides that theretofore awarded compensation should not be disallowed or reduced.’ ”
Id. at 510.
Similarly, in Agripac, Inc. v. Kitchel, 73 Or App 132, 698 P2d 69 (1985), we held that, when an employer’s petition for judicial review is dismissed on the claimant’s motion, the claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees, because there has been no finding on the merits as to compensation. Id. at 135. We followed that decision in Terlouw v. Jesuit Seminary, 101 Or App 493, 790 P2d 1215, rev den 310 Or 282 (1990), in which the employer voluntarily dismissed its own petition for Board review. We held that, without “a decision on the merits,” there is “no authority to award attorney fees under ORS 656.382(2).” Id. at 494. To the same effect is our decision in Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. McKellips, 100 Or App 549, 550, 786 P2d 1321 (1990), in which the employer withdrew its request for Board review. We held that claimant was not entitled to an award of attorney fees under ORS 656.382(2), because “the Board did not make the finding that the statute requires to support an award of fees.”
In this case, employer voluntarily withdrew its request for a hearing by an ALJ. The AU did not have occasion to decide whether, on the evidence in the record, employer’s position was well taken. There was no “finding” on the merits, therefore, and claimant was not entitled to attorney fees any more than the claimants were in Curry, Kitchel, Terlouw and McKellips.
The majority concludes that, in this case, there actually was a “finding” on the merits as to compensability, based on the fact that the AU “approved” a stipulated dismissal of the proceeding. The majority does not explain how approving a stipulation to withdraw a request for a hearing constitutes *121a “finding” on the merits as that term is commonly understood and has been construed in the foregoing cases.1 Instead, the majority takes a more indirect route. It begins with OAR 438-09-005(4), which provides that approval of a settlement stipulation “is a determination of all matters included within the terms” of the stipulation. The majority then reasons that, because approval of the stipulation
“ ‘determines the matter,’ it is the equivalent of an order the ALJ would have issued at the conclusion of the hearing and is a decision on the merits.”
145 Or App at 116. I remain unpersuaded.
To begin with, OAR 438-09-005(4) provides that, “[flor purposes of ORS 656.289(l)-(3),” a referee’s approval of a settlement stipulation is a final determination of the matter. ORS 656.289(1) through (3) provide:
“(1) Upon the conclusion of any hearing, or prior thereto with concurrence of the parties, the Administrative Law Judge shall promptly and not later than 30 days after the hearing determine the matter and make an order in accordance with the Administrative Law Judge’s determination.
“(2) A copy of the order shall be sent forthwith by mail to the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services and to all parties in interest.
“(3) The order is final unless, within 30 days after the date on which a copy of the order is mailed to the parties, one of the parties requests a review by the Workers’ Compensation Board under ORS 656.295. When one party requests a review by the board, the other party or parties shall have the remainder of the 30-day period and in no case less than 10 days in which to request board review in the same manner. The 10-day requirement may carry the period of time allowed for requests for board reviews beyond the 30th day. The order shall contain a statement *122explaining the rights of the parties under this subsection and ORS 656.295.”
Those provisions clearly describe the effect of the AU’s decision and the process by which review of it may be sought. It is for that purpose that approval of a settlement stipulation is a “determination of all matters,” viz.: with the approval of the settlement, the dispute is concluded. Neither the text of OAR 438-09-005(4) itself nor the statutory context to which it explicitly refers suggests that the “determination” involves “findings” on the merits as to any issue.
To the contrary, approval of a settlement or stipulation by an AU, the Board or the courts generally involves no more than a determination that the disposition is “reasonable.” ORS 656.236(1)(a), for example, provides that the parties to a claim “may make such disposition of any or all matters regarding a claim,” except for medical services, and that the proposed disposition shall be approved as long as it is not “unreasonable as a matter of law” or was not procured by “intentional misrepresentation of material fact.” Similarly, ORS 656.289(4)(a) provides that, when there is a dispute over compensability, the parties may, with the approval of the AU, the Board or the court, “by agreement make such disposition of the claim as is considered reasonable.” The majority cites no rule or statute that calls for a different level of review of the stipulation in this case. In my view, merely reviewing for reasonableness is not “the equivalent of an order the AU would have issued at the conclusion of the hearing,” 145 Or App at 116, nor does it in any way suggest what the AU in this case would have found had he decided the issues before him on the evidence presented.
The majority insists that the approval of the stipulated settlement is sufficient, because Board decisions reveal that the Board itself considers the approval of such stipulations as having the effect of ending the dispute. 145 Or App at 117-18. That the Board considers settled claims to be at an end comes as no surprise; that is precisely what ORS 656.289(3) says. It simply does not follow, however, that merely because a stipulation terminates a controversy and results in an award of compensation it also constitutes a “finding” on the merits as to any issue.
*123Aside from that, the rule itself does not support the majority’s conclusion in this case. OAR 438-09-005(4) provides that the approval of a stipulated settlement is a final determination only as to “matters included within the terms of the settlement stipulation.” In this case, the only “matter” that was the subject to the stipulation was that employer withdrew her request for a hearing and, as a consequence of the withdrawal, chose not to contest SAIF’s acceptance of the claim. At oral argument, counsel for claimant conceded that the language in the settlement stipulation accepting responsibility did no more than state the legal effect of withdrawing the request for a hearing. There was, in other words, no final determination on the merits as to any disputed matter, even assuming the rule has the effect the majority proposes.
In my view, there has been no “finding” within the meaning of ORS 656.382(2) that the compensation awarded to claimant should not be disallowed or reduced. There is, therefore, no basis for awarding claimant attorney fees under that statute, and from the majority’s contrary conclusion I respectfully dissent.
The majority declares that Curry, Kitchel, Terlouw and McKellups are “inapposite,” because they did not involve stipulated settlement orders. The asserted distinction, however, is beside the point, which is that the courts defined in those cases the sort of “findings” that are required to trigger an award of attorney fees under ORS 656.382(2) and did so in a manner that cannot be squared with the majority’s holding in this case.