I agree with the result. But unlike the majority, I believe the question is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 206. The majority reach their conclusion as if enacting section 206 had no effect on the court’s powers. Moreover, they omit from their discussion subdivision (b) of section 206. I would take a different approach.
Facts
It appears from the record before us that in People v. Townsel (Super. Ct. Madera County, judgment of death entered Sept. 13, 1991 (No. 8926), review pending (S022998)), a jury convicted Anthony Letrice Townsel of murdering Mauricio Martínez, Jr., and Martha Díaz, and found two special circumstances to be true: that he committed multiple murder, and that he murdered Diaz because she was a witness. Apparently the jury also found true an allegation that Diaz was pregnant, and found Townsel guilty of “attempting to prevent and dissuade a witness”—i.e., attempted coercion of a witness.
During record preparation hearings the court agreed to make available to defense counsel the jurors’ names, addresses, and phone numbers. But it also “ordered [that] there’s to be no jury contact without prior court approval. In other words, if you do come upon a juror questionnaire that you do want to contact that person, then you’ll have to petition the Court, giving forth your reasons before that would be granted.” It later stated that it would not permit posttrial juror contact unless Townsel could show “some probable cause’* or “good cause” for it. The court forbade a “fishing expedition” in conjunction with counsel’s possible desire to prepare a petition for writ of habeas corpus, *1099indicating that it would require a specific reason before counsel could contact former jurors. It gave no statutory basis for its ruling.
Discussion
I understand the trial court to have issued two commands to Townsel’s counsel: first, to proceed only through the court in attempting to contact former jurors, and second, to contact the former jurors only if counsel persuaded the court that there was a valid reason to do so. I examine the validity of each requirement in turn.
Whatever powers “the long-standing common-law rule against inquiring into jurors’ motives to impeach their verdict” (State v. Marshall (1997) 148 N.J. 89, 280 [690 A.2d 1, 96]) may have conferred on trial courts (see also Koo v. State (Ind.Ct.App. 1994) 640 N.E.2d 95, 104-105), the Legislature qualified our courts’ authority when it enacted section 206, which governs this case. (All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.)
Section 206 provides:
“(a) Prior to discharging the jury from the case, the judge in a criminal action shall inform the jurors that they have an absolute right to discuss or not to discuss the deliberation or verdict with anyone. The judge shall also inform the jurors of the provisions set forth in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).
“(b) Following the discharge of the jury in a criminal case, the defendant, or his or her attorney or representative, or the prosecutor, or his or her representative, may discuss the jury deliberation or verdict with a member of the jury, provided that the juror consents to the discussion and that the discussion takes place at a reasonable time and place.
“(c) Any unreasonable contact with a juror by the defendant, or his or her attorney or representative, or by the prosecutor, or his or her representative, without the juror’s consent shall be immediately reported to the trial judge.
“(d) Any violation of this section shall be considered a violation of a lawful court order and shall be subject to reasonable monetary sanctions in accordance with Section 177.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”1
I have not found California cases on point, but there does not seem to be a doubt that the court’s power to control the proceedings under subdivision *1100(a) of section 916 permitted it, consistent with section 206, to order counsel to proceed only through its intermediation. (Cf. United States v. Moten (2d Cir. 1978) 582 F.2d 654, 665 [“It is well established in this Circuit that in order to insure that jurors are protected from harassment, a district judge has the power, and sometimes the duty, to order that all post-trial investigation of jurors shall be under his supervision”]; United States v. Brasco (2d Cir. 1975) 516 F.2d 816, 819, fn. 4 [“ ‘post-trial questioning of jurors must only be conducted under the strict supervision and control of the court’ ”] [dictum].)
That the jurors have a right to speak about the trial (§ 206, subd. (a)), and that a defendant or counsel has a right to discuss the jury’s activities with a former juror (id., subd. (b)), does not confer on defense counsel a right to contact them in whatever manner it pleases, even if the manner is reasonable. The former juror must consent to be contacted. The court may first ascertain, if a proper basis for doing so presents itself, whether the former juror wishes to be contacted before any contact may occur.
In sum, the court’s order did not implicate subdivision (a) of section 206 at all. Contrary to any conclusion that may be inferred from the majority opinion, the order did implicate the right conferred in subdivision (b), but it did not infringe that right. That right is premised on a juror’s consent to be contacted, and the court may prescribe the means of obtaining it, as happened here. (Accord, People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 700 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351] [“the court did not overstep its authority in directing that all further communication would be through the court clerk”].) By contrast, given a defendant’s right to speak with former jurors if, but only if, the latter agree, the court would abuse its discretion if it were unwilling to contact former jurors and ask if they are willing to speak with counsel.
The court’s order requiring Townsel’s counsel to approach former jurors only through the court thus comported with the statutes governing this case. And it comported with public policy, as legislatively expressed. In sections 206 and 237 the Legislature showed its intent that the jurors be left alone after the trial unless there is good cause to disturb them. It so stated in a preamble to an amendment to section 206. “The Legislature finds and declares that jurors who have served on a criminal case to its conclusion have dutifully completed their civic duty. It is the intent of the Legislature in *1101enacting this act to balance the interests of providing access to records of juror identifying information [and implicitly access to former jurors themselves] for a particular, identifiable purpose against the interests in protecting the jurors’ privacy, safety, and well-being, as well as the interest in maintaining public confidence and willingness to participate in the jury system.” (Stats. 1995, ch. 964, § 1, italics added.)
The appellate courts have made similar observations. “[T]he very real danger that citizens will be unwilling to serve on juries if their privacy is not respected” is “a substantial threat to the administration of justice.” (Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 862, 867 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 69] (per curiam).) In People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541 [261 Cal.Rptr. 1], where an issue was disclosure of juror names, addresses, and telephone numbers, the court recognized that the courts must strike a balance between the “ ‘strong public interest in the ascertainment of the truth in judicial proceedings, including jury deliberations’ ” (212 Cal.App.3d at p. 549) and jurors’ privacy. “Our jury system . . . depends upon adherence to the public policy which discourages harassment of jurors by losing parties seeking to have the verdict set aside.” (Id. at p. 548.)
We are barely acquainted with this case’s facts. The trial court, by contrast, is well acquainted with them. It may reasonably have concluded that the circumstances surrounding the trial were too dangerous to require the jurors to fend off entreaties by themselves. It may have had good reason to require counsel to obtain its permission before contacting the jurors, who, for all we know, may have found their service on the jury terrifying, and might reasonably be expected to harbor strong fears afterward about the potential for harm.
I next turn to the other portion of the court’s ruling: the requirement that Townsel show a valid reason before counsel would be allowed to talk with former jurors.
As stated, subdivision (b) of section 206 provides that a criminal defendant or his or her counsel “may discuss the . . . verdict with a [former juror].” It contains no requirement of a valid reason. I believe the court erred in saying that counsel would have to have a specific reason beyond the desire to develop issues in a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the court would permit contact with the former jurors. A convicted criminal defendant may properly ask to contact former jurors if he or she tells the court that he or she wishes to discuss the case with them to glean information that might be useful in a new trial motion, an appeal, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
*1102The relief sought, however, exceeds the scope of the court’s error. Townsel seeks a writ restraining the court from enforcing at all its no-contact order. Thus I agree with the majority’s disposition.
Kennard, J., concurred.
Section 206 also contains subdivisions (e) and (f). They provide: “(e) Nothing in the section shall prohibit a peace officer from investigating an allegation of criminal conduct. [10 (f) Pursuant to Section 237, a defendant or defendant’s counsel may, following the recording of a jury’s verdict in a criminal proceeding, petition the court for access to personal juror identifying information within the court’s records necessary for the defendant to communicate *1100with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose. This information consists of jurors’ names, addresses, and telephone numbers. The court shall consider all requests for personal juror identifying information pursuant to Section 237.” Section 237 contains a comprehensive scheme for processing such requests, but the majority correctly concludes that it applies only to verdicts rendered after January 1, 1996. (See id., subd. (a)(4).)