with whom FABE, Justice, joins, dissenting.
In my view Dixon is not entitled to relief under either Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or (6). Where a change in conditions is reasonably foreseeable at the time of judgment Rule 60(b)(5) relief must be denied. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is unavailable to undo a party’s deliberate litigation choice. That Dixon was not the father of C.D. was not only foreseeable at the time of trial, it was pled. Dixon made a deliberate litigation choice to contest Pouncy’s claim that he was not C.D.’s father. Therefore Dixon does not qualify for relief under either section.
The principles on which this case should be decided are well illustrated by our decision in Dewey v. Dewey, 886 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1994). Dewey was a stepfather who entered into a settlement stipulation in which he agreed to pay child support. Later, when payments got too burdensome, he moved for relief from this obligation. We held that relief was not available under Rule 60(b)(5) or (6).
Concerning Rule 60(b)(5), we wrote that the change in conditions on which the motion is based must not have been reasonably foreseeable when the judgment was entered. Id. at 627.
With respect to Rule 60(b)(6), we stated that this subsection does not afford relief from a party’s deliberate litigation choices: “Relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(6) is inappropriate when a party takes a deliberate action that he later regrets as a mistake.” Id. at 628 (citing Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636, 645 (Alaska 1989)).
It was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the divorce that Dixon was not the father of C.D. He alleged in his complaint that C.D. was “bom the issue of this marriage.” In her answer Pouncy specifically denied this allegation. With the issue thus joined Poun-cy demanded blood tests. After the superior court entered a judgment for sanctions against her for violating a visitation order, Pouncy relented and stipulated to Dixon’s paternity. Given this history a reasonable person in Dixon’s position would believe that there was a serious question about his paternity. It follows that such a person should reasonably anticipate the possibility that his assertion of paternity was wrong and his wife’s assertion that he was not the father was right. Therefore Dixon has not met the requirement of Rule 60(b)(5) that changed conditions not be reasonably foreseeable at the time of judgment.
Dixon chose to contest his wife’s denial of his paternity. His choice was deliberate, and he prevailed. He therefore cannot meet the absence of deliberate choice requirement of Rule 60(b)(6).
*528I would affirm the decision of the superior court on the above grounds. But there are two additional reasons why Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) relief is not available.
First, relief under Rule 60(b)(5) requires a significant change in either factual conditions or in law. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Obviously there has been no legal change. It seems wrong to consider the DNA test as a factual condition. The relevant factual condition in this case is Dixon’s nonpaternity. It has not changed since the judgment. The DNA test is merely newly discovered evidence of this condition. Relief on the grounds of newly discovered evidence is available on a Rule 60(b)(2) motion only if the motion is filed within the one-year time limit and the evidence could not have been discovered before trial by due diligence. Relief on the grounds of newly discovered evidence is not available on a Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) motion.1
Second, Dixon’s claim is essentially that of mistake. He thought he was C.D.’s father, but he was wrong. Relief on the grounds of mistake is available under Rule 60(b)(1) and is subject to a one-year time limitation. It is not available under Rule 60(b)(6). We made this point in Deivey and it seems applicable here as well:
Relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(6) is inappropriate when a party takes a deliberate action that he later regrets as a mistake. Here, Michael deliberately agreed to support Tisha but now regrets the conse-quences_ Michael is essentially alleging a “mistake.” Post-judgment relief for a mistake is governed by Civil Rule 60(b)(1), and is time-barred if not brought within one year.
886 P.2d at 628 (footnote and citation omitted).
. Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 637 N.E.2d 914 (1994), supports these propositions. The court held that a genetic test establishing nonpa-ternity was newly discovered evidence, but no relief from the decree was available because the motion was made more than one year after the judgment. Relief was not available under the Ohio counterparts to Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) because they do not apply to newly discovered evidence claims. The Ohio court stated the policy rationale for its decision in terms that are also applicable here:
We are not unaware that our decision in effect declares as static a state of facts that reliable scientific evidence contradicts. Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons that support such a decision. A claim under Civ. R. 60(B) requires the court to carefully consider the two conflicting principles of finality and perfection. In Knapp v. Knapp, 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 493 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (1986), this court declared,
[£]inality requires that there be some end to every lawsuit, thus producing certainty in the law and public confidence in the system's ability to resolve disputes. Perfection requires that every case be litigated until a perfect result is achieved. For obvious reasons, courts have typically placed finality above perfection in the hierarchy of values.
Finality is particularly compelling in a case involving determinations of parentage, visitation and support of a minor child.
Strack, 637 N.E.2d at 916.