I concur with that portion of the majority opinion that concludes that the matter must be remanded to allow the trial court to decide whether the Pasadena Police Officers Association (PPOA) is entitled to injunctive relief on the ground that the City of Pasadena (City) had a practice of preinterrogation disclosure of reports and complaints. However, I am not in accord with the remainder of the majority’s opinion and, accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
In my view, fairness and Government Code section 3303, subdivision (f) (hereafter section 3303(f))1 entitle an accused officer to preinterrogation disclosure of nonconfidential reports and complaints made by investigators or other persons. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Section 3303(f) provides that: “The complete interrogation of a public safety officer may be recorded. If a tape recording is made of the interrogation, the public safety officer shall have access to the tape if any further proceedings are contemplated or prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time. The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons, except those which are deemed by the investigating agency to be confidential. No notes or reports which are deemed to be confidential may be entered in the officer’s personnel file. The public safety officer being interrogated shall have the right to bring his own recording device and record any and all aspects of the interrogation.”
My analysis starts from the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154]; People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40 [127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322].) In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute. (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 218-219 [188 Cal.Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317].) When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for statutory construction and the courts should not indulge in it. (Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1007-1008; Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1008.)
Section 3303 sets forth a detailed exposition of the manner and method by which investigations and interrogations are to be conducted. Section *5823303(f) is primarily concerned with an officer’s right to have a record of his or her interrogation and access to nonconfidential documents. The section clearly provides that if a tape recording is made of the proceedings, the officer “shall have access to the tape if any further proceedings are contemplated or prior to any further interrogation at a subsequent time.” {Ibid.) The statute, however, does not specify the timing of the required disclosure of investigatory notes, reports, statements and complaints in the same language as the provision regarding tape recordings. In my view, the words themselves, therefore, provide no determinative answer as to when these materials are to become available to an officer.
It is a well-recognized principle of statutory construction that every word, phrase and provision employed in a statute is intended to have meaning and to perform a useful function. (Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233 [273 P.2d 5].) Moreover, “[ijnterpretive constructions which render some words surplusage . . . are to be avoided.” (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844 [157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].)
As the City points out, there are three contexts in section 3303, apart from section 3303(f), in which the timing of certain conduct and behavior of law enforcement agencies is explicitly set forth.2 The City argues that had the Legislature intended to entitle a police officer to investigatory materials before the initial interrogation of the officer, it would have expressed that intention in terms as clear and unmistakable as it did in section 3303, subdivisions (b), (c), and (g). This position is accepted by the majority in its opinion.
The City’s argument is not without logic, but, as the Court of Appeal noted, a closer examination of section 3303 reveals it is fallacious. For example, section 3303, subdivision (e), provides, inter alia, that “. . . an officer refusing to respond to questions or submit to interrogations shall be informed that failure to answer questions directly related to the investigation or interrogation may result in punitive action.” Although there is no explicit requirement that this admonition be given before interrogation, no reasonable person would argue that because of the omission of the words “prior to the termination of the interrogation” the Legislature intended *583such an admonition to be given only after the interrogation has concluded, a time when it would be of no benefit to a suspected officer. Similarly, the Legislature’s silence regarding the timing of the disclosure at issue in the instant case does not convincingly indicate a legislative intent to have the disclosure follow the interrogation. On the contrary, it would be most reasonable to assume the legislative silence was attributable to the Legislature’s belief that the timing of the disclosure, being a condition to interrogation, was self-evident.
The majority advances its interpretation of section 3303(f) as an attempt to “harmonize” the statutory treatment of “reports and complaints” with that of “recordings and notes.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 575-576.) The majority relies, however, on the flawed premise that because such recordings and notes memorialize the interrogation, “[i]t follows, therefore, that access to them would be after the interrogation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 576.) Contrary to the majority’s reasoning, it is possible to grant access to recordings and notes as soon as they are made, which certainly might be well before the investigation has concluded. A “harmonious” interpretation that recognizes this fact would require disclosure of reports and complaints at the same time, i.e., at the time they come into the physical possession of the investigators, whether that is before, during or after the investigation has formally concluded.
In sum, I would find that the City has not demonstrated that its reading is the only reasonable interpretation of the statutory language. To discern and effectuate the Legislature’s intent we therefore must look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. (People v. Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1008; People v. Shirokow (1980) 26 Cal.3d 301, 306-307 [162 Cal.Rptr. 30, 605 P.2d 859]; Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149 [118 Cal.Rptr. 14, 529 P.2d 46].)
The purpose of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act was articulated by the Legislature in section 3301, which provides: “The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the rights and protections provided to peace officers under this chapter constitute a matter of statewide concern. The Legislature further finds and declares that effective law enforcement depends upon the maintenance of stable employer-employee relations, between public safety employees and their employers.”
This court has determined that the general purpose of the act was “to secure basic rights and protections to a segment of public employees who *584were thought unable to secure them for themselves.” (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 140 [185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874].) Specifically, there “can be no doubt that the act is concerned primarily with affording individual police officers certain procedural rights during the course of proceedings which might lead to the imposition of penalties against them, . . .” (White v. City of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681 [183 Cal.Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191].) These procedural protections, which encompass the initial interrogation as well as all subsequent disciplinary proceedings, serve the legislative goal of stable employer-employee relations, for “[ejrroneous action can only foster disharmony, adversely affect discipline and morale in the workplace, and, thus ultimately impair employer-employee relations and the effectiveness of law enforcement services.” (White v. City of Sacramento, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 683.)
The majority argues that preinterrogation disclosure of an investigator’s notes would compromise the truth-finding process by impairing the reliability of the investigation. I am not persuaded.
While there is no guaranty that an officer under investigation will not attempt to prevaricate, the investigating agency is vested with an array of tools to ferret out the truth. The investigating agency controls the resources to be expended on the investigation, the range of charges to be considered, the timing of various phases (including interrogations), and has the power to order the accused officer to answer questions under the threat of discipline. Section 3303, subdivision (e) provides that an officer who refuses to respond to questions or submit to interrogations is subject to punitive action by his employer. (See Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822, 827 [221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329].)
I believe that preinterrogation disclosure may in fact further the truth-finding purpose of the investigation. Interrogations may take place weeks or months after the alleged misconduct. It is not difficult to envision an officer having trouble remembering the events surrounding the conduct in question. As the Court of Appeal properly noted: “Access to this information may properly refresh an officer’s recollection regardless of whether the information is favorable to his position. Rather than impeding the defendant’s search for truth, informing a suspected officer of the information provided by others will permit him to meet the charges head on.”
The majority argues that only by reading section 3303(f) as entitling an officer to an investigator’s notes after the interrogation will the proper balance be struck between the interest in reliable investigations and the interest in fairness to officers under investigation. As the legislative history *585demonstrates, however, the Legislature itself sought to, and did, strike the balance between the public’s interest and the police officer’s individual rights by providing police agencies the right to withhold confidential reports and complaints while at the same time giving police officers access to a wide range of nonconfidential documentary evidence.
The first version of Assembly Bill No. 301, 1975-1976 Regular Session, which resulted in the enactment of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act, was introduced on December 19, 1974. It did not provide the employing agency with any protection for confidential documents, stating only that; “The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes by a stenographer or to any reports made by investigators.” On August 25, 1975, proposed section 3303(f) was amended to provide: “The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports made by investigators, except those which are deemed by the agency to be confidential No notes or reports which are deemed to be confidential may be entered into the officer’s personnel file.” (Sen. Amend, to Assem. Bill No. 301 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 25, 1975, italics added.)
The final amendment to proposed section 3303(f) was made in conference in August of 1976. It maintained the basic structure of the section but expanded the material to which the public safety officer was entitled. Thus the final amendment provided: “The public safety officer shall be entitled to a transcribed copy of any notes made by a stenographer or to any reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons except those which are deemed by the investigating agency to be confidential.” (Conference Amend, to Assem. Bill No. 301 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 12, 1976.)
The amendments during the legislative process reflect the Legislature’s express concern with balancing the competing interests implicated by the statute. The public’s interest in a well-disciplined police force is protected by allowing a police agency to withhold matter it deems confidential. On the other hand, such matter may not be entered into the officer’s personnel file and the officer’s procedural rights are protected by entitling him or her to discover a wide range of documentary evidence. I therefore cannot agree with the City’s contention that the timing of disclosure is critical to a proper balancing of the competing interests. Nor do I agree that preinterrogation disclosure of an investigator’s documents will unduly hamper or burden employing police agencies.
The legislative purpose of the act, which is remedial, and prior case law call for a liberal construction of the rights guaranteed by section 3303(f). *586(See Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d 128; Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 40 Cal.3d 822; White v. City of Sacramento, supra, 31 Cal.3d 676.) A statute must be construed “in the context of the entire statutory system of which it is a part, in order to achieve harmony among the parts” (People v. Shirokow, supra, 26 Cal.3d 301, 307; see also Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224]), and any doubt that the Legislature intended a more restrictive reading of section 3303(f) is dispelled by reference to the act as a whole.
The introductory paragraph to section 3303 provides: “When any public safety officer is under investigation and subjected to interrogation . . . which could lead to punitive action, such interrogation shall be conducted under the following conditions . . . .” (Italics added.) Following this introductory paragraph, there are nine subparagraphs articulating in considerable detail the conditions under which a public safety officer may be interrogated. Review of the nine subdivisions together with the introductory paragraph reveals that the language specifies what is to occur before or during the interrogation of the police officer. One of these, section 3303(f), sets forth that the officer “shall be entitled to” any nonconfidential reports or complaints made by investigators. The interpretation suggested by the City, that a public safety officer is entitled to such reports and complaints only after the interrogation, when it would be of little use to him or her, would make little sense and would be contrary to the structure and the purpose of the section and the act as a whole. Such an incongruous interpretation should be avoided. (Nunn v. State (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 624-625 [200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846].)
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that a police officer is entitled under section 3303(f) to preinterrogation disclosure of nonconfidential reports or complaints made by investigators or other persons.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.
Section 3303, subdivision (b): “The public safety officer under investigation shall be informed prior to such interrogation of the rank, name and command of the officer in charge of the interrogation, Section 3303, subdivision (c): “The public safety officer under investigation shall be informed of the nature of the investigation prior to any interrogation . . . .” Section 3303, subdivision (g): “Ifprior to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense, he shall be immediately informed of his constitutional rights.” (Italics added.)