State of Iowa v. Steven Robert Wildman

Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
Date filed: 2023-08-09
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                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                No. 22-1720
                            Filed August 9, 2023


STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

STEVEN ROBERT WILDMAN,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________


      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County, DeDra L.

Schroeder, Judge.



      A defendant appeals his sentence following a guilty plea. AFFIRMED.



      Karmen R. Anderson of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.



      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
                                        2


GREER, Presiding Judge.

      Steven Wildman signed and filed a written guilty plea for one charge of

intimidation with a dangerous weapon—a class “D” felony. Between entering his

guilty plea and the sentencing hearing, Wildman violated the conditions of his

pretrial release when he was arrested for charges in Howard County. During his

bond review hearing, he pointed to issues with his mental health and substance

abuse that converged and led to the violation.

      At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a five-year suspended

sentence, probation for two to five years, and a suspended $1250 fine in

accordance with the plea agreement; Wildman argued for a deferred judgment.

The sentencing court imposed a five-year suspended sentence and placed

Wildman on probation for five years. As part of his probation, the court ordered

Wildman to complete a six-month residential treatment program while remaining

in the county jail and to receive mental-health and substance-abuse evaluations

and follow through with their recommendations. As a part of its reasoning, the

sentencing court stated:

             I have a concern. I released you [on pretrial release]; and I
      know you haven’t been convicted, but you’ve pled guilty to some
      other charges which were fairly serious. I want to make sure that
      you’re successful on probation.
             ....
             I’m not granting your request for a deferred judgment. Based
      upon the nature and circumstances of this offense and based upon
      your age and everything I’ve learned about you through the file and
      through the presentence investigation [(PSI)] report, I just don’t
      believe it’s appropriate in this case.
                                          3


       Wildman appeals his sentence.1 He argues the sentencing court’s chosen

sentence did not account for his time incarcerated before he was sentenced and

that the sentencing court did not adequately explain its decision to not impose a

deferred judgment. “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular

sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor,

and [it] will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of

inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). We

review a criminal sentence within the statutory limits for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 385 (Iowa 2020). “An abuse of discretion will

not be found unless we are able to discern that the decision was exercised on

grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Formaro,

638 N.W.2d at 724.

       As for Wildman’s argument that the court did not properly consider his

presentence jail time as a mitigating factor, the PSI report detailed the time of his

incarceration, and the court explicitly stated it considered the PSI report. And while

the sentencing court did not mention his time served in its sentencing order, this

court has recognized that a sentencing court need not “specifically acknowledge

each claim of mitigation urged by a defendant.” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11

(Iowa Ct. App. 1995); see also State v. Mathews, No. 17-0519, 2018 WL 2084831,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018) (“Additionally, the district court need not

specifically state every possible sentencing factor.”).


1 Wildman pled guilty but has good cause for this appeal.
                                                        See State v. Damme,
944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that good cause exists to appeal from
a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her
sentence rather than the guilty plea.”).
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      Wildman’s next argument, that the sentencing court did not adequately

explain its decision not to grant a deferred judgment, also fails as “a sentencing

court need only explain its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed and need

not explain its reasons for rejecting a particular sentencing option.”    State v.

Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 171 (Iowa 2018). Rather, the reasons for a particular

sentence may be “terse and succinct” as long as “the reasons for the exercise of

discretion are obvious in light of the statement and the record before the court.”

State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015). Wildman maintains the

sentencing court failed to give a rational basis for what he argues is a harsh

sentence. But we find that the sentencing court here gave us adequate reasoning

to enable our review, citing Wildman’s rehabilitation, protection of the community,

deterrence of others from committing similar offenses, the nature and

circumstances of this offense, Wildman’s age, and what the court learned in

Wildman’s file and PSI report.

      We find no abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion, and so we affirm.

      AFFIRMED.