This is an application in this court for permission to take the bar examination. The application recites that the board of governors has denied his previous application upon the ground that he was “not a man of good moral character.”
The applicant has been a resident of this state since 1946. He is a citizen of the United States and is fifty years of age. In 1933, he graduated from Columbia University law school, which is approved by the American bar association. He was admitted to practice law in the state of New York in 1934.
The finding that the applicant is “not a man of good moral character” is predicated upon his conviction of a *67felony for which he served approximately twenty-two months of a three-year sentence in a Federal penitentiary. The facts in his case are stated in Brooks v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 134, as follows:
“The appellant, a citizen residing within the Southern District of New York, whose age made him subject to classification under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, duly registered with his local board and, having established his status to be that of a conscientious objector under § 5 (g) 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 305(g), was classified as IV-E. He was examined as to his mental and physical fitness and, having been found fit, was ordered to report, for transportation to Civilian Public Service Camp No. Ill at Mancos, Colo. He then refused to report for that purpose and so notified his local board. Having persisted in such refusal, he was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced under § 311 of the Appendix to Title 50 U. S. C. A. and has appealed.
“The constitutional questions now raised are not new and have uniformly been decided adversely to the contentions of the appellant in cases like Weightman v. United States, 1 Cir., 142 F. 2d 188, and Heflin v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 142 F. 2d 798. The federal government in the exercise of its undoubted power to raise and maintain armed forces for the protection of the country could have disregarded the appellant’s conscientious scruples against participating in such service and conscripted him for any military service for which he was mentally and physically fit. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622, 623, 51 S. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302. Having respected his conscientious objection to all such service, even to the extent of granting him exemption from non-combatant duty, Congress could in the exercise of its incidental power do whatever was reasonably necessary and appropriate to raise and maintain armed forces provided that those who were given exemption from such service be required to perform such work of national importance as they were able to perform under reasonable rules and regulations. There are many good reasons which may have led Congress so to provide but it is enough that such action may have been considered needed during a great national emergency for its effect upon the morale of those who do serve in the armed forces. As was said in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 651, 49 S. Ct. 448, 450,' 73 L. Ed. 889, ‘The influence of conscientious objectors against the use of military force in defense of the *68principles of our government is apt to be more detrimental than their mere refusal to bear arms.’ See also Kiyshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 99, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 87 L. Ed. 1774.”
The board of gpvernors made the finding:
“That if the applicant, Robert Boland Brooks, be found to be a man of good moral character, he has otherwise complied with all of the requirements necessary to entitle him to take the bar examination as a general applicant.”
The act of the board of governors in finding that the applicant is not a man of good moral character, is not arbitrary or capricious. We adopt its finding that “The acts of the applicant . . . were unjustifiably defiant of the laws of the United States.”
No one has contended that this court should overrule the board of governors and admit a person to practice while he is feloniously refusing noncombatant service in aid of his country’s war effort. Instead, the theory presented is that the applicant’s defect of character is of a temporary nature and does not survive an elapse of time sufficient to end the war and the national emergency. This temporary defect is considered as having no future implications because the applicant is most unlikely, at his present age, to have another opportunity to set personal example of resistance to the Nation’s war efforts. It is therefore considered immaterial that there has been no substantial change in his felonious principles to which he adheres, by his own statements, to this very day.
We are not inclined to adopt a transitory theory as to the applicant’s character. Age alone has not reduced his potential for war resistance to zero. Personal example is neither the only nor most effective way of exemplifying his felonious principles. An old lawyer can impede his country’s war effort in many ways as well as a young one.
It should go without saying that we are not here concerned with any additional punishment of the applicant for his past felony. He has served his sentence and he is permanently at large. Nevertheless, his character, with his fixed refusal to aid a war effort, is directly and neces*69sarily in question when he seeks admission to practice law.
On the credit side of applicant’s character is his laudable preoccupation with civil liberties. Indeed, the rights of individuals, as such, are the very essence of liberty as we know and seek to implement it.
On the debit side of the ledger is his felonious denial of any duty related to the enjoyment of these individual liberties. A loyal and discerning citizen is aware of his great heritage of liberty and acknowledges his duty to do his share in preserving it. Without a sense of duty, the applicant does not measure up to the standard of citizenship rightly expected of an attorney at law.
We are not prepared to find that the board of governors acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
The application is denied.
Ott, J., concurs.
Weaver, C. J., Donworth, and Hunter, JJ., concur in the result.