dissenting in part and concurring in part.
Michael Kossler appeals from an order of summary judgment, entered by the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, dismissing his state and federal malicious prosecution claims against Donzi’s Bar and Police Officer Steven Crisanti. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
To prove an action for malicious prosecution brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that the “criminal proceeding ended in plaintiffs favor.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir.2003); Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir.2000). Within this Court is a good faith disagreement as to whether Kossler has satisfied this element. The majority concludes that because Kossler was found guilty of disorderly conduct, it cannot be said that he met the “favorable termination” requirement of Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir.2002). I disagree. My conclusion is premised on an understanding of the jurisprudential anatomy of Pennsylvania’s criminal offenses in general, and the summary offense of disorderly conduct in particular. In light of the substantial differences between a felony and a summary offense, I would not allow conviction of a summary offense to impede a malicious prosecution claim premised on acquittal of a felony, even where the two charges arose from the same incident.10
In our current struggle to determine the proper rule of law, we must remain true to our polestar that a rule of law is a “detailed legal consequence [attached] to a definite, detailed state of facts.” Roscoe *196Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 Tul. L.Rev. 475, 482 (1933). In short-sleeves language this means that this case is fact-specific, limiting the issue to situations where a defendant is acquitted of a felony but convicted of the summary offense of disorderly conduct.
It is beyond cavil that the criminal charges of disorderly conduct and aggravated assault emanated from the same event — an altercation that took place in a parking lot near a Pittsburgh bar. On appeal, Kossler challenges only the dismissal of his malicious prosecution claims premised on aggravated assault. Reduced to its essence, then, the issue we must decide pertaining to the favorable termination element is very limited: May we conclude that the criminal proceeding against Kossler ended in his favor where he was acquitted of aggravated assault under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2702, a felony, but was convicted of disorderly conduct for “engaging] in fighting,” under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat Ann. § 5503, a summary offense? 11 My answer is yes. My reasons follow.
A.
Conviction of a summary offense does not “carr[y] a presumption that the underlying events leading to the conviction actually occurred,” Phoenixville Area Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 141 Pa.Cmwlth. 555, 596 A.2d 889, 892 (1991); does not entitle a defendant to a jury trial, Rule 454(B), Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure; is inadmissible in a subsequent civil proceeding, Folino v. Young, 523 Pa. 532, 568 A.2d 171, 173-174 (1990); and, in the case of disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace, does not count toward a criminal history calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c).12 Summary offenses are usually punished “only by fine” and “justifiably should be summarily handled.” Commonwealth v. Koch, 288 Pa.Super. 290, 431 A.2d 1052, 1054 (1981). By contrast, aggravated assault is a felony for which a term of imprisonment of more than ten years may be authorized. 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 2702(b), 106(b).
B.
I add that my views on the consequences of acquittal of a felony and conviction of a summary offense are admittedly at odds with the majority’s thoughtful analysis of the relationship between these two offenses. See Majority Op. Section III-A (“[A] finding in federal court that the defendants maliciously prosecuted Kossler for the same conduct underlying the aggravated assault ... eharge[ ] does indeed conflict with Kossler’s state court conviction [of the summary offense of dis*197orderly conduct].”). Unlike my colleagues of the majority, I am impressed by and accept the reasoning of cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In Janetka v. Dabe, 892 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.1989), the court was faced with a scenario similar to ours — an appeal of a denial of a malicious prosecution claim premised upon an acquittal of resisting arrest and a conviction of disorderly conduct. As a prelude to its discussion of the merits, the general comments of the court deserve our attention:
Favorable termination is not so much an element of a malicious prosecution claim as it is a prerequisite to commencement of the action. See Munoz v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 6, 10, 218 N.E.2d 527, 529, 271 N.Y.S.2d 645, 649 (1966) (“It is a kind of pre-condition to the later action, the sine qua non ....”); see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton On Torts § 119, at 874 (5th ed.1984). The requirement of favorable termination ensures against inconsistent judgments. It also permits a finding that probable cause was lacking.
Id. at 189 (internal citations omitted). I associate myself completely with Janetka’s reasoning:
To hold that an acquittal does not constitute a favorable termination would be particularly inappropriate in this case, where the charge for which [the appellant] was acquitted was more serious than the one for which he was convicted. Resisting arrest is a “misdemeanor,” see N.Y.Penal Law § 205.30 (McKinney 1988), punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one year, see N.Y.Penal Law § 10.00(4) (McKinney 1987). Disorderly conduct is a “violation,” see N.Y.Penal Law § 240.20 (McKinney 1989), punishable by a maximum prison sentence of 15 days, see N.Y.Penal Law § 10.00(3). Allowing police officers to add unwarranted misdemeanor charges to valid violation charges may force an accused to go to trial on the misdemeanor when he otherwise would plead to the violation. If the dispositive factor is whether, as the district court held, the charge resulting in acquittal “arose out of events that occurred on the same occasion” as a charge resulting in conviction, then police officers could add unsupported serious charges to legitimate minor charges with impunity.
Id. at 190.
Similarly, in Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.1991), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “we should not allow a finding of probable cause on [the charge of disorderly conduct] to foreclose a malicious prosecution cause of action on charges requiring different, and more culpable, behavior.” Id. at 100. Although Posr addressed the probable cause element of malicious prosecution rather than the favorable termination element at issue here, the stated rationale is significant:
If the rule were [otherwise], an officer with probable cause as to a lesser offense could tack on more serious, unfounded charges which would support a high bail or lengthy detention, knowing that the probable cause on the lesser offense would insulate him from liability for malicious prosecution on the other offenses.
Id. 13
Where there has been acquittal of a felony and conviction of a summary offense *198of disorderly conduct arising out of the same event, this constitutes the necessary favorable termination element of a subsequent malicious prosecution claim.
II.
My analysis of the favorable termination element, however, does not end my analysis of this case. To prove malicious prosecution, Kossler must also show that “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; ... (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d at 521.14
Donzi’s contends that it did not initiate the proceeding, and the District Court dismissed the malicious prosecution claims against Donzi’s on this alternate ground. Kossler predicates his malicious prosecution claims against Donzi’s on vicarious liability. This Court has held:
A defendant in a [federal] civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988) (internal citations omitted). Because Kossler does not allege participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence on the part of Donzi’s, I would affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Kossler’s federal malicious prosecution claim against Donzi’s and, in this respect, express my agreement with the majority. But I cannot go further.
A.
Unlike the federal malicious prosecution claims, it appears that liability for malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law may be imposed on the basis of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Butler v. Flo-Ron Vending Co., 383 Pa.Super. 633, 557 A.2d 730, 737 (1989); Randall v. Fenton Storage Co., 121 Pa.Super. 62, 182 A. 767, 768 (1936); Riddell v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 80 Pa.Super. 176 (1922). Donzi’s contends that Crisanti did not initiate the criminal proceeding against Kossler, and relies on Gatter v. Zappile, 67 F.Supp.2d 515 (E.D.Pa.1999), where the district court dismissed a malicious prosecution claim against two police officers, observing, “Generally, it is the prosecutor, not the police officer, who is responsible for initiating a proceeding against a defendant.” Id. at 521. The court in Gatter, however, proceeded to explain that “[a]n officer may ... be considered to have initiated the criminal proceeding if he or she knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the prosecutor’s informed discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The facts of this case can be distinguished from those of Gatter, where the two police officer defendants “had no input into the decision to prosecute Gatter....” Id.
Here, the argument is that Crisanti, the police officer, did in fact file criminal charges. Kossler alleges that “Crisanti, although he did not have probable cause or any reasonable suspicion to believe that *199Michael Kossler had committed the criminal offenses of aggravated assault and public intoxication, nevertheless filed criminal charges against Kossler for such criminal offenses.” App. 37a.
The District Court entered summary judgment against Kossler. Drawing all inferences in favor of Kossler, however, I am unable to agree that no genuine issue of fact exists (a) as to whether Crisanti initiated the proceedings against Kossler and (b) whether Crisanti was no longer acting in the scope of his employment with Donzi’s when he initiated the proceedings against Kossler. These are issues for a fact-finder proceeding and are not appropriate for resolution at summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, together with the majority, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment that dismissed Kossler’s federal malicious prosecution claim against Donzi’s. I would reverse, however, the grant of summary judgment dismissing Kossler’s state malicious prosecution claim against Donzi’s, as well as his federal and state malicious prosecution claims against Crisanti.
. We note that under Pennsylvania law the summary offense of disorderly conduct is not a "lesser included” offense of aggravated assault.
. Under § 5503, the offense of disorderly conduct may also be a misdemeanor of the third degree "if the intent of the actor is to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he persists in disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist.” 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5503(b). Here, however, Kossler was convicted only of the summary offense of disorderly conduct.
. The majority notes in response to my examination of the characteristics of summary offenses that the element of favorable termination requires disposition " ‘in a way that indicates the innocence of the accused.' ” See Majority Op. Section III-A (quoting Gavin, 280 F.3d at 383). I do not mean to suggest that conviction of a summary offense "indicates the innocence of the accused.” My suggestion is more modest: acquittal of a felony offense — which standing alone would be considered favorable termination — should not be rendered unfavorable merely because of a conviction of a summary offense, which does not carry the presumption that the underlying events leading to the conviction actually occurred.
. Of course, there is an obvious distinction between the terms "lesser offense” and “lesser included offense.”
. The fifth requirement is unique to malicious prosecution claims made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.