I dissent. As has been pointed out by this court on innumerable occasions (see, e.g., In re Plotner, 5 Cal.3d 714, 716 (1) [97 Cal.Rptr. 193, 488 P.2d 385]), the burden is on petitioner to show that the disciplinary board’s recommendation is erroneous or unlawful. In my opinion, petitioner has not met this burden.
The majority state: “Insofar as the first three counts are concerned, petitioner admittedly gave Wolden approximately three-fourths of specified fees paid him by Glidden, General Foods, and American Home Products, but in our opinion it was not adequately proven that petitioner did so with the corrupt intent of influencing Wolden’s action regarding assessments upon property in San Francisco to the benefit of those companies or that petitioner even knew at the time he was representing those companies that they had property in San Francisco that was subject to assessment by Wolden.
“The State Bar’s evidence consists primarily of the prior testimony of Newstat and petitioner’s own testimony. Although the evidence discloses a number of suspicious circumstances, petitioner’s explanations, if believed, exonerate him of the charges.”
As I see it, additional suspicious circumstances, not pointed to by the majority, amply warrant the findings made by the disciplinary board, as *512a result of which the board’s recommendation of disbarment should be followed.
Petitioner testified that Wolden introduced him, to the particular individuals from the corporations. In an exhibit to his answer to the original notice to show cause, petitioner lists the corporations’ representatives with whom he dealt, as follows:
1. Glidden Company.
All of [petitioner’s] dealings were with Donald E. Erskine, controller, 900 Union Congress Building, Cleveland, Ohio.
2. General Foods Corp.
Most of [petitioner’s] dealings were with John Reynaud, manager of the property tax department, 250 .North Street, White Plains, New York. The contract signed with this Company was handled by Mr. Farrington of the tax department.
3. American Home Products.
[Petitioner] dealt with Robert Greenlaw, now treasurer and formerly head of the tax department. Also, Assistant Charles Canevari, manager of the tax department, 685 Third Avenue, New York City, New York.
4. Standard Brands Inc.
[Petitioner] dealt with Ed S. Short, who would visit him a couple of times a year. Mr. Short is now retired, residing at R.F.D. 2, Oyster Bay, Soundview and Harbor Road, New York.
In the points and authorities filed by petitioner with the local committee, he alleges, as follows: “It also appears from Newstat’s testimony that the following companies were represented by tax men from the East, who visited here [in San Francisco] with Wolden:
I. Glidden — Mr. Erskine, Koberg (pg 602)
II. General Foods — Mr. Reynaud (pg 628)
IV. Standard Brands — Mr. Short (pgs 554, 562)” (Italics
added.)
It is inconceivable to me that representatives from these corporations would have contacted Wolden in person in San Francisco for the sole purpose of obtaining a recommendation from him of an attorney to handle matters for them elsewhere in California. They were all apparently *513from the East or Mid-West; and their coming to San Francisco and having personal meetings with Wolden would suggest to the normal person, I believe, that at least some of them had business dealings with him on behalf of the corporations they represented with respect to property owned by the corporations in San Francisco. Furthermore, in view of petitioner’s very close relationship to Wolden and his acknowledging that Wolden introduced him to the representatives with whom he later dealt, it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner was aware of the fact that the above named persons visited in San Francisco with Wolden and undoubtedly had business dealings with him regarding the assessment of property owned by the respective corporations there and that part of the so-called, “referral fees” petitioner turned over to Wolden constituted a bribe to him to give favorable tax treatment to the corporations involved. ■
In his answer to the amended order to show cause, petitioner specifically alleges that “Glidden Company was not filed for by [petitioner], but by Mr. Erskine, and Mr. Hoberg. . . .
“As To General Foods, the evidence is that a Mr. Reynaud came out here from the East and had many discussion's with Wolden and he had actually filed for General Foods.” (Italics added.)
It will be noted that two of the persons who, according to petitioner’s allegations, filed on behalf of Glidden and General Foods in Wolden’s office for property belonging to those corporations in San Francisco (one of whom he admitted “had many discussions” with Wolden) were two of the persons petitioner testified he dealt with in the tax matters he handled for Glidden and General Foods.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the record shows that during 1963 through 1965 petitioner handled a franchise tax matter for Glidden in Sacramento, receiving fees totaling $25,200, of which he paid Wolden $17,500; that during 1962 through 1964 he. handled tax matters for General Foods relating to the company’s personal property in Alameda County, receiving fees totaling $22,500, of which he paid Wolden $18,250; and that during 1961 through 1964 he handled tax matters for American Home Products relating to that company’s personal property in Alameda County, receiving fees totaling $30,000, of which he paid Wolden $23,000.
With respect to his work relating to the personal property tax matters in Alameda County, petitioner testified: “The Chairman: In other words, your work consisted then entirely of what you did in your own office which included any contacts with the clients. The Witness: Yes, and pre*514paring the figures and the deductions and that. The Chairman: And the preparation of the pertinent documents? The Witness: Yes, sir.” Petitioner further testified that when he completed his work, he would telephone Wolden, who would direct petitioner to send the papers to him and would tell him he would “take it from there.” Petitioner said that Wolden had Bill Brothers do the actual filing.
According to petitioner’s testimony, he made no effort to find out what action Wolden took or what results were achieved in Alameda County on behalf of his clients. Thus, he testified: “The Chairman: And he [Wolden] stated to you that he would attend to them [the General Foods and American Home Products personal property tax matters] personally? The Witness: He said, T will take it from there,’ was his expression. The Chairman: Did you follow up on them at all or check to see what the outcome was? The Witness: No, sir. The Chairman: Did you learn anything afterwards as to what the result was of the application? The Witness: Yes, I did, as far as American Home is concerned. The Chairman: Who advised you about those results? The Witness: What happened on that was when Bill Brothers was being investigated by the Grand Jury in Alameda County—The Chairman: Just before this came up, did you learn about what the results of the assessments were? The Witness: No, sir. The Chairman: You did not know about it at all until after the case broke, as it were? The Witness: Yes, sir. The Chairman: Did you make any inquiry to find out what action Wolden had taken on the assessments? The Witness: No, sir.” (Italics added.)
Petitioner further testified: “The Chairman: Is it your testimony that at no time did you know of or were you made aware of the reduction of the assessment for any of these clients that you had represented? The Witness: In Alameda County? The Chairman: In Alameda County. The Witness: The only thing I knew were the deductions which we worked up which we felt they were entitled to, in other words, deductions from total cost of inventory. They were legitimate deductions that they were entitled to, and that is all I knew.” (Italics added.)
Petitioner also testified that he forwarded Wolden $18,250 of the $22,500 paid to him by General Foods and paid Wolden $23,000 of the $30,000 paid to him by American Home Products, because in those two cases he kept track of the time he had spent working on the clients’ matters and retained an amount sufficient to compensate him for his time, turning the balance over to Wolden. As hereinabove indicated, petitioner made no effort to find out how much work, if any, Wolden did. This fact would suggest to the normal person that petitioner did not want to have personal knowledge of how very little work Wolden apparently spent on *515the cases,1 so that he could hide his head in the sand, so to speak, and deny that he knew that Wolden, although receiving approximately three-fourths of the fees, actually did almost none of the work.2
I find it unthinkable that a reputable attorney would do the rather minimal amount of work performed by petitioner, as described by him, with respect to the personal property tax matters, seeking reductions in behalf of a client, and then have the audacity to bill the client in substantial amounts for his services (a total of $22,500 for work on one client’s assessment matters for three years and a total of $30,000 for work on another client’s assessment matters for five years) without ascertaining what results had been accomplished in the client’s behalf.
Accordingly, in my opinion, petitioner has shown himself unworthy of belief; and the disciplinary board properly concluded that, in spite of his denials, he had knowledge (1) that Glidden, General Foods, and American Home Products were required to file in San Francisco and (2) that they received substantial reductions in their assessments there after petitioner had forwarded “referral fees” to Wolden, allegedly for the latter’s share of fees received by petitioner from the corporations relating to work in Sacramento or Alameda County.
The position of the disciplinary board is fortified by factual determinations of the trial court in the Wolden criminal case and by the Court of Appeal in People v. Wolden, 225 Cal.App.2d 798 [63 Cal.Rptr. 467]. In the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, the basic issue was not sufficiency of the evidence as to the guilt of Wolden, but whether this petitioner and three other witnesses required corroboration under Penal Code section 1111 because they were accomplices. Presiding Justice Draper for a unanimous court noted that another attorney “and Skelly had full title to the fees from which they paid defendant and could be found to intend the payments to influence his official actions toward their clients, thus maintaining the flow of fees to them . . . [they] exemplified both characteristics of the bribe giver—each paid his own funds and each sought *516a personal benefit from the official action sought to be induced by the gift. Any inference that any of the three acted from motives of philanthrophy or friendship would be completely unreasonable on all the evidence.” In sum, the Court of Appeal found that this petitioner was not an accomplice and did not need to be corroborated, because he was a bribe giver, not a bribe taker, and “the two crimes require different motives” (id., p. 804). We are here concerned not with a crime per se but with the moral turpitude of a member of the bar, and in this context the moral deficiency of the bribe giver is little different from that of the taker.
Under the circumstances, I would order petitioner’s disbarment, in accordance with the recommendation of the disciplinary board.
Mosk, J., concurred.
The disciplinary board found, among other things, that “Russell L. Wolden performed little, if any, work in connection with said cases.”
Again inconceivably, petitioner denied knowledge of what results had been achieved with respect to the personal property tax matters he handled for two clients on whose behalf he sought reductions in the assessments against them in San Francisco and from whom he received fees which, admittedly, he did not share with Wolden. In this respect, he testified: “The Chairman: When did you learn, however, that their assessments had been reduced? The Witness: I don’t know if the assessments were reduced. The only thing I knew is what Newstadt testified to. Now, what the reductions were or what the deductions were they were entitled to, I don’t know anything about it.”