dissenting: In my opinion the court has reached an erroneous conclusion in this case and therefore I respectfully dissent.
The statute involved, G. S. 1949, 7-104, reads in full:
“Any regularly admitted practicing attorney in the courts of record of another state or territory, having professional business in the courts or before any board, department, commission or other administrative tribunal or agency, of this state, may, on motion be admitted to practice for the purpose of said business only, in any of said courts, tribunals or agencies, upon taking the oath as aforesaid and upon it being made to appear by a written showing filed therein, that he has associated and personally appearing with him in the action, hearing or proceeding an attorney who is a resident of and duly and regularly admitted to practice in the courts of record of this state, upon whom service may be had in all matters connected with said action, hearing or proceeding, with the same effect as if personally made on such foreign attorney, within this state, and such foreign attorney shall thereupon be and become subject to the order of, and amenable to disciplinary action by the courts, agencies or tribunals of this state: Provided, That in all actions before a court of record, said associate attorney shall be a resident of and maintain his law office within the judicial district in which said action is filed or pending. No such court, agency or tribunal shall entertain any action, matter, hearing or proceeding while the same is begun, carried on or maintained in violation of the provisions of this section: Provided, Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any party from appearing before any of said courts, tribunals or agencies, in his own proper person and on his own behalf.”
The law of the case, as stated in the syllabus, is that the provisions of this statute do not apply to an attorney who has been admitted to the bar of this state and resides therein.
On first impression that statement appears to be entirely logical and sound, but I believe it is stated too broadly and that its fallacy lies in its practical application.
We are dealing here with a statute which is somewhat uncertain in meaning in several respects, due, perhaps, to the fact it has been *446amended several times down through the years. In Bradley v. Sudler, 172 Kan. 367, 239 P. 2d 921, it was said:
“In its application to certain isolated instances the statute may be somewhat ambiguous in that it is silent on the matter of residence of such ‘foreign’ attorney, and as to its application to a ‘foreign’ attorney who is also admitted to the practice of law in Kansas.” (p. 371.)
A statute which is clear and unambiguous requires no “construction” — it speaks for itself. But, where the language is uncertain in meaning it is necessary to resort to ascertainment of the legislative intent behind its enactment. Here, I believe, the intent is obvious. It is to protect the interests of those in need of legal representation. In Felton v. Rubow, 163 Kan. 82, 179 P. 2d 935, it was held:
“A nonresident attorney, unfamiliar with our statutes and the jurisdiction of our courts, may sacrifice his client’s interest by not complying with our statute respecting appearance in the courts of this state by a nonresident attorney. . . .” (Syl. 2.)
and said:
“Counsel for appellant is a nonresident of this state. Obviously he is not familiar with our statutes pertaining to the estates of deceased persons nor with the jurisdiction of our courts pertaining to such estates. He ignored our statute (G. S. 1945 Supp. 7-104) which required him to have an attorney in this state associated with him.” (pp. 84, 85.)
Rule No. 54 under G. S. 1949, 60-3827, provides that an attorney residing outside of this state in good standing as an attorney at the place of his residence' may be recognized as an attorney by the courts of this state for any action or proceeding in court, but only if he has associated with him as attorney of record in such action an attorney of this state residing within this state upon whom service may be had in all matters connected with such action proper to be served upon an attorney of record. Rule No. 55 requires that any pleading filed in any action in any of the courts of this state shall have written or printed thereon the name and post-office address of the attorney filing the same. These rules are of course to be read in conjunction with the statute under consideration, and there is no doubt in my mind that Rule No. 55 has reference to an attorney’s office address rather than that of his home. For these purposes courts are not concerned with where an attorney and his family “reside.”
When one considers the obvious practical purpose of the statute and the rules referred to it is clear to me that the words “foreign at*447torney” as used in the statute, “An attorney residing outside of this state” as used in Rule No. 54, and “a nonresident attorney” as used in Felton v. Rubow, supra, have reference to an attorney who maintains his office in another state and who practices there, all without reference to the fact he may “reside” in Kansas and previously may have been regularly admitted to practice in this state. The geographical location of the place where an attorney sleeps at night after a hard day’s work in his office, or the fact that years ago he may have been regularly admitted to the bar of this state (but never practiced here) — should not be the controlling factors. Lawyers and courts know what is meant by a “foreign attorney” or a “nonresident attorney.”
I readily concede that as an abstract proposition “an attorney who has been admitted to the bar of this state and resides therein” of course should be allowed to practice in the courts of Kansas without the association of “local counsel.” I also take note of the fact that a vast majority of “Kansas practicing attorneys” reside in Kansas, and that a vast majority of the attorneys “residing” in Kansas practice in Kansas. Obviously the statute has no- application to them, but on the record before us the attorney in question is not a “Kansas practicing attorney” even though he “resides” in Kansas.
To illustrate the point I am attempting to make, let us consider a not-too-improbable situation:
A resident of Kansas is graduated from one of our local law schools and takes the Kansas bar examination. He passes it and is admitted to practice. He immediately moves to Philadelphia and takes the Pennsylvania bar examination. He passes it and is admitted to the bar of that state. After practicing in Philadelphia for twenty-five or thirty years he decides to return to the midwest and “locates” in Kansas City, Missouri. He is admitted to the Missouri bar and practices law in Kansas City, Missouri. The home he purchased when he returned to this area, however, and where he now resides with his family — is “just across the state line in Kansas.” In the meantime, through all the years, he has never set foot in a Kansas courthouse, has never “practiced” here, and is unfamiliar with our law and procedure. Yet, under the rule announced in this case, he could file and maintain a lawsuit in Kansas for a client simply by mailing (from his Kansas City, Missouri, law office) a petition, praecipe for summons and cost deposit to the clerk of *448the proper district court without having associated with him a local attorney who resides and maintains his law office within the judicial district in which the action is filed, as required by the statute.
On the other hand, let us consider another practical and not-improbable illustration:
A regularly admitted Kansas attorney actually “resides” in the geographical bounds of Missouri. He maintains his law office and practices law — say in Atchison, Leavenworth, Kansas City, Kansas, Olathe, Fort Scott, Pittsburg, or in any of our other so-called “border cities.” Ry the same line of reasoning my thought is that-he, for all practical purposes, under the statute and Rule No. 54, is a “Kansas practicing attorney” and is authorized to appear in any of the courts of this state without the association of “local counsel.”
It is a matter of common knowledge, and this court recognizes the fact that in recent years, with the development of eastern Johnson County, many “Kansas City, Missouri, attorneys” actually “reside” in Kansas and that many of them previously have been regularly admitted to the bar of this state. No one would deny their right to practice in Kansas, but, in my opinion, the statute and rule require that in order to do so they must have “local counsel” associated with them.
Ry way of summary, therefore, my thought on the proposition before the court is that until the legislature, in plain and unambiguous language, clears up the uncertainty in the statute as it now exists, the only realistic and practical application of the statute is that it refers to and prohibits “foreign attorneys” — that is, those, who, in the commonly-understood acceptance of the term, are engaged in the “practice of law” in a state other than Kansas — from practicing in our courts without the association of “local counsel.”
In the case before us the attorney was in truth and in fact a “Missouri practicing attorney” with his law office in that state. The fact that he “resided” in Kansas and listed his residence address on the petitions, and that some time in the past he had been regularly admitted to the bar of this state — are, in my opinion, immaterial to the real question before us. The petitions were filed in May, 1957. The motions to strike them were filed in October. In November the attorney moved for the record to show that he had associated local counsel. In other words, for a period of six months these actions were “begun, carried on or maintained” in violation of the statute, and under its very provisions the court was expressly prohibited *449from entertaining them — that is, from receiving and considering them.
Under the admitted facts the trial court correctly struck each of the petitions, and I would affirm its orders.