specially concurring.
I agree with the majority conclusion that the defendant was guilty of four separate robberies, and was subject to being sentenced on each of the four convictions. I do so because the crime of robbery, as it is now defined by statute,1 is an aggravated form of theft, as now defined,2 and supplants the crime of assault, as formerly codified in ORS 163.250. Defendant’s conduct did not constitute an assault because there was no physical harm, but his conduct "elevated” to robbery what might otherwise have been the lesser crime of theft.
Where I part company with the majority opinion is in its conclusion, unnecessary to the decision of this case, that there were four thefts, one from each of the tellers, and therefore four victims of theft. Stated briefly, I read the theft statute, together with the general definitional statute,3 as saying that it is not necessary to prove that the person from whom the property was taken was the actual owner thereof, notwithstanding the use of the word "owner” without amplification; it is sufficient to show that the person from whom the property was taken has a right to possession superior to that of the taker. The amplification of the word "owner” is covered by the general *943definitional statute. However, reference to the definitional statute is unnecessary with respect to the crime of robbery, which involves the use or threatened use of physical force upon another person with the intent of "compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver the property.”4 (Emphasis added.) The tellers in this case were the other person compelled to deliver the property.
Suppose defendant had pointed the gun at only one teller, had told the other three to move against the wall, and then compelled the teller held at gunpoint to give him the money from all four tills. The same theft has occurred, but it is at least arguable that there was only one robbery.
The question of whether there were four thefts, or four victims of theft, is not presented and ought not to be decided in this case.
ORS 164.405; 164.395.
ORS 164.015(1).
ORS 164.005(4).
ORS 164.395(l)(b).