(concurring specially) :
I concur with the affirmance of the judgment. In doing so I add the following, which I think are sound and pertinent propositions:
First, that when a doctor consults with his patient relative to the latter’s decision to undergo surgery, he has a duty to advise the patient, insofar as he can, of the risks reasonably to be anticipated;1 second, that when a genuine dispute arises as to whether he has done so, both lay and expert testimony relevant to that issue are admissible.2
In applying the foregoing to the instant case, where the evidence is that the risk of the injury that resulted was only one in a hundred, it should be ruled as a matter of law that the doctor was guilty of no breach of duty. This because where the likelihood of such a result was so minimal, reasonable minds could not fairly and reasonably conclude that this was an injury reasonably to be anticipated. Further, even if it be assumed that a doctor had failed to so advise, there would be some difficulty in such a situation concerning the problem of proximate cause, i. e., whether or not the patient would have consented anyway; and thus whether any deficiency in the advice could be found to be the proximate cause of the injury.
. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash.2d 12, 499 P.2d 1, 52 A.L.R.3d 1067; Prosser, Torts, See. 32 (4th Ed.1971).
. Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 464 F.2d 772, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 93 S.Ct. 560, 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).