On appeal is the judgment of the district court awarding $6,000 to D. Land' Title Company against James C. Sandberg, dba Sandberg Engineers. We affirm.
Plaintiffs, the Bushnells, brought an action against the Sillitoes alleging an encroachment upon their land. Bushnells joined D. Land, which had constructed the home and sold it to Sillitoes, and Sandberg Engineers. Sandberg was responsible for surveying the property. Bushnells allege that Sillitoes were trespassing on their tract; and that the survey was done in a negligent manner, by D. Land and Sand-berg. Damages, and an order to remove the encroachment were prayed.
D. Land cross-claimed against Sandberg, alleging it had employed Sandberg to survey and stake' the boundaries of the tract, and incorporated in the pleadings the engineer’s certificate of survey. A further allegation, in the cross-claim, was that D. Land had relied solely on the engineer’s services, and had constructed the home in compliance with the survey and the boundaries staked. D. Land prayed judgment against Sandberg for any and all damages awarded to Bushnell.
Subsequently, all parties entered into a stipulation, which was incorporated in the *1285judgment, whereby Bushnells’ action was dismissed with prejudice; upon the payment by Sillitoes and D. Land the sum of 13,000 each to Bushnells. Upon receipt of the $6,000 Bushnells were to deliver a warranty deed to Sillitoes for 15.8 feet of their tract. The judgment specifically reserved the determination of liability alleged in the cross-complaint. A trial to the court produced a judgment, which is here on appeal,
The court found that immediately prior to the construction of the home, D. Land employed the services of Sandberg to survey and stake the perimeter of the tract; that Sandberg negligently located the east line of the property at a point 25 feet east of the true line; as a result of this error, the home improvements were staked in such a way as to produce an encroachment of 9 feet 4 inches into the Bushnell tract; that D. Land reasonably relied upon the location of the stakes; that Bushnells’ claim was settled for $6,000, which was reasonable compensation for their damages; and this sum limits the liability of Sandberg to D. Land.
Sandberg’s appeal is predicated on the theory the judgment on the cross-complaint produces contributions among joint tort-feasors; that prior to the enactment of 78-27-39, U.C.A. in 1973, there was no right to such contribution.1 Thus, according to Sandberg, since the alleged negligence in surveying the property occurred in 1969, 78-27-39 is not applicable.2
The principal defect in the joint tort-feasor theory here is that the defendants were not joint or concurrent tort-feasors. Sandberg owed no duty to the adjoining landowners, the Bushnells. Sand-berg’s duty arose out of a contract to survey the premises, and its express representation on the certificate that the plat was correctly described, by a survey made under its direction.
The general principle is set forth in 35 A.L.R.3d 504, 507, Sec. 3:
It is clear that in the practice of his profession, a surveyor may be found liable in damages resulting from his mistake or misrepresentation in the survey of realty, where he does not perform his duties with a reasonable degree of care and' skill.
Where contractual relations never existed between the plaintiff and the surveyor the question has arisen as to the applicability of the 'general rule that no cause of action in tort can arise from the breach of a duty existing by virtue of contract unless privity of contract existed between the defendant and the person injured. While the rule has sometimes been applied so as to relieve a surveyor from liability, it has also been held that the lack of direct contractual relationship between the parties is not a defense in a tort action.
A situation in which recovery was allowed, without a direct contractual rela*1286tionship is found in Rozny v. Marnul.3 The court held a surveyor liable on the theory of tortious misrepresentation for an inaccurate survey, although there was a lack of direct contractual relationship between the parties. The plaintiff there was the vendee of the person for whom the survey was made. The opinion states the ruling is not one fraught with an overwhelming potential of liability, because the class of persons who might foreseeably use the plat is limited to those who might deal with the property as purchasers or lenders.
In the instant matter, Bushnells are not within the class of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied by Sand-berg.4
Thus, Sandberg could not be held liable to Bushnells. By the same token, since Sandberg was found by the court to have located the east line of the property in a negligent manner, while employed by D. Land to survey the property for the purpose of constructing a home, Sandberg was liable to D. Land.
This court has never ruled as to whether there must be privity of contract between a surveyor and a party who sustains damage, because of a surveyor’s negligent misrepresentation. It is likely, for this reason, the record shows D. Land contracted to indemnify its grantees, Sillitoes ($3,000), for their loss; and D. Land proceeded above in its cross-complaint.5
Because this action is not one for contribution, the claim that the judgment should be limited to $1,500 is without merit.
.HENRIOD, C. J., and TUCKETT, J., concur.. Hardman, v. Matthews, 1 Utah 2d 110, 262 P.2d 748 (1953).
. 78-27-39 provides: “The right of contribution shall exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the common liability or more than his prorata share thereof.
In Augustas v. Bean, 56 Cal.2d 270, 14 Cal. Rptr. 641, 363 P.2d 873 (1961), the court observed that the statutory system for contribution did not concern the relationship of tort-feasors to the one injured, but dealt with the relationship of tort-feasors to each other; when, after entry of judgment, one of them discharged the common liability. The time which is significant is when the judgment is entered and payment made to the injured party, not the date of the tort. Since a contribution statute, if applied where an accident antedates its enactment, does not retroactively increase the liability existing at the time of injury; but merely provides a method of limiting liability of each of the tort-feasors to his prorated share of the judgment the statute may not be deemed to have impaired a vested right. Therefore, in an action under a statute providing for contribution the date of the original injury is not important.
. 43 Ill.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656, 35 A.L.R.3d 487 (1969).
. Restatement of Torts, Sec. 552: One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the information if (a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and (b) the harm is suffered (i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied, and (ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical therewith.
.In Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co. (Utah), 529 P.2d 806 (1974), this court held that lack of privity is not a defense, where an accountant who is aware of the fact that his work will be relied on by a party or parties who may extend credit to his client or assume his client’s obligations. That opinion, however, confines the liability to those who could reasonably be foreseen as a third party who would be expected to rely on the financial statement prepared by the accountant.