(dissenting) — The majority opinion accurately identifies rehabilitation and punishment as the twin goals of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, RCW 13.40. The majority result, however, jeopardizes the rehabilitation of many juveniles in the name of punishing a few adults. For this reason, and those set out below, I dissent.
The majority interpretation of the statute allows an adult who has served "hard time" to be institutionalized with juveniles. This result cannot be reconciled with RCW *96013.04.115 which provides:
No court or magistrate shall commit a child under sixteen years of age to a jail, common lock-up, or police station; but if such child is unable to give bail, it may be committed to the care of the sheriff, police officer, or probation officer, who shall keep such child in some suitable place or house or school of detention provided by the city or county, outside the inclosure of any jail or police station, or in the care of any association willing to receive it and having as one of its objects the care of delinquent, dependent or neglected children. When any child shall be sentenced to confinement in any institution to which adult convicts are sentenced, it shall be unlawful to confine such child in the same building with such adult convicts, or to bring such child into any yard or building in which such adult convicts may be present.
(Italics mine.) See also State ex rel. Sowders v. Superior Court, 105 Wash. 684, 179 P. 79 (1919).
RCW 13.04.115 represents a clear statutory recognition of the fact that comingling adult criminals with juveniles has a negative impact on the rehabilitation process. Comingling exposes the juveniles to the older convicts' disrespect for the law and greater knowledge of methods for avoiding detection of criminal activity. In short, the adult's age and experience presents a criminal role model for the juveniles which can only lead to an acceleration of criminal activity.
The majority dismisses this statute by noting that "Smiley is probably not an 'adult convict' as contemplated by the statute". (Majority opinion, at 956.) This argument is without merit. Smiley has reached the age of majority, has been convicted of an adult crime and has served time in an adult facility for that crime. In every sense of the term, he is now an adult convict. He cannot go back to being a juvenile offender simply by being placed back at the Maple Lane School. Indeed, such a result directly contradicts RCW 13.40.020(10) and (11). These sections define "Juvenile" as "any individual who is under the chronological age of eighteen years and who has not been previously transferred to adult court;" and "Juvenile offender" as "any *961juvenile who has been found by the juvenile court to have committed an offense, including a person eighteen years of age or older over whom jurisdiction has been extended . . (Italics mine.)
Although the second portion of RCW 13.40.020(11) does allow an adult to be considered a juvenile offender, it does not permit that definition to apply to one who, like Smiley, has been transferred to adult court.
The majority also attempts to avoid the plain language of this statute by arguing that this interpretation would encourage juveniles to commit adult crimes to avoid punishment for those committed as a juvenile. (Majority opinion, at 956.) This argument ignores reality. The conditions in adult facilities are such that juveniles attempt to avoid being transferred to them at all costs. In fact, Smiley himself vigorously objected to the initial transfer.
Finally, the majority's concept of concurrent jurisdiction between the juvenile court and the adult court cannot be reconciled with the statute. The only reasonable interpretation of this statute is that juvenile courts have jurisdiction over juveniles only until they transfer that jurisdiction to an adult court. This interpretation is supported by the definition of "juvenile" and "juvenile offender" (see discussion above) and by RCW 13.40.300(3). That section provides that " [notwithstanding any extension of jurisdiction over a person . . . the juvenile court has no jurisdiction over any offenses alleged to have been committed by a person eighteen years of age or older". This section and others have led commentators to conclude:
Once [jurisdiction is] declined, the offender is thereafter treated as an adult as to all future offenses. Therefore it is a misnomer to continue to label the juvenile as such for juvenile offense purposes, regardless of his age, because the law of Washington no longer recognizes him as being a member of that class.
(Footnote omitted. Italics mine.) Patrick & Jensen, Changes in Rights and Procedures in Juvenile Offense Proceedings, 14 Gonz. L. Rev. 313, 322 (1979).
*962Smiley is no longer a juvenile. I would grant his personal restraint petition. For this reason, I dissent.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Dore, J.
Reconsideration denied April 26, 1982.