Eugene Spring appeals from the Stevens County Superior Court's dismissal on appeal from the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals award of permanent partial disability. We hold that the trial court did not apply *916the proper standards in making its decision, and reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for retrial.
On September 28, 1970, Eugene Spring suffered a serious accident during the course of his employment with a logging company. His claim for industrial insurance was allowed and treatment provided, including surgical removal of a herniated disc. The Department of Labor and Industries (hereinafter referred to as the Department) closed Spring's claim on August 5, 1976, issuing a permanent partial disability award for 42 percent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disability. On September 28, 1976, Spring filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the Board), claiming that when his loss of physical function is considered with his age, lack of education and limited work experience, he is totally disabled.
On April 4, 1978, the Board sustained the Department order, recognizing only the loss of physical function. Spring appealed to the Stevens County Superior Court, certifying the Board record. He testified that he cannot stand or walk for very long periods of time, and that his pain is worse than when the claim was closed in 1976. He also testified that he can neither read nor write and has given up looking for work. Dr. Walter Powers, a professor of psychology and education and an employment and vocational specialist, testified that Spring is below normal in intelligence, probably dyslectic, and has little manual dexterity. Dr. Powers also testified that, in his opinion, it would be "considerably less likely than likely that he [Spring] would be able to obtain and maintain in a continuous, competitive basis gainful employment". Dr. Powers stated that he knew of no sedentary or light work that Spring could obtain and perform on a regular basis.
All four medical doctors testified that there was no medical evidence why Spring could not do light or sedentary work on a reasonably continuous basis. Some of the doctors felt that Spring merely "lacked motivation", as they found no medical basis for pain and other symptoms which he *917reported.
In Superior Court, Spring moved for summary judgment. Although there is no summary judgment order in the record, the Department's memorandum, which is in the record, stated that appellant had been unsuccessful on his summary judgment motion. The trial court dismissed Spring's appeal "on the merits, and alternatively as a matter of law", and found that
Plaintiff has not established a total inability to perform any type of light or sedentary work, and he could physically perform such gainful employment on a reasonably continuous basis on August 5, 1976.
Finding of fact No. 5.
The only expert testimony purporting to show total disability from all employment incorporates conclusions regarding plaintiff's ability to obtain work.
Finding of fact No. 6.
The court then concluded:
Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case because of failure to establish total inability to perform any type of light or sedentary work.
Conclusion of law No. 2.
The defendant did not, on the basis of this record, have any burden of showing the availability of light or sedentary work to the plaintiff.
(Italics ours.) Conclusion of law No. 3.
Plaintiff's expert testimony is legally insufficient to establish total and permanent disability because it relies in part upon plaintiff's ability to obtain gainful employment.
(Italics ours.) Conclusion of law No. 4.
The order of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals dated April 4, 1978 which sustained the order of the Department of Labor and Industries dated August 5, 1976 and closed the claim with a permanent partial disability award equal to 42% of the maximum allowable for unspecified disabilities, is correct and should be affirmed.
Conclusion of law No. 5.
*918The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Spring's appeal, holding that the trial court "reached a permissible conclusion in a trial on the merits". We disagree.
We hold that the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal, whether it was decided on the merits or, alternatively, as a matter of law. When a trial court rules as a matter of law, it must accept the plaintiffs evidence as true, and then determine whether or not the plaintiff has made a prima facie case. Roy v. Goerz, 26 Wn. App. 807, 614 P.2d 1308 (1980). In ruling as a matter of law, the court "does not make factual determinations or evaluate the credibility of plaintiff's evidence, except as may be incidentally necessary to favorably resolve conflicts appearing therein". N. Fiorito Co. v. State, 69 Wn.2d 616, 619-20, 419 P.2d 586 (1966).
A prima facie case of total disability can be made when it is established that a workman was able to work prior to injury and is unable to do so after injury because of pain and the nature of the injury; when medical experts have testified to the loss of function and limitations on his ability to work; and when vocational experts have concluded that the workman is not employable in the competitive labor market. Fochtman v. Department of Labor & Indus., 7 Wn. App. 286, 499 P.2d 255 (1972). Under Fochtman, the testimony of Spring's doctors describing loss of function, along with lay testimony and testimony of vocational expert Powers, was enough to make a prima facie case of total disability. The trial court erred in concluding that Spring had failed to make a prima facie case because of "failure to establish total inability to perform any type of light or sedentary work". Conclusion of law No. 2. The issue of total disability was a factual dispute and should have been resolved by a trier of the facts, but not as a matter of law as done by the trial court.
Alternatively, the trial court was incorrect in dismissing Spring's appeal "on the merits". RCW 51.08.160 defines "Permanent total disability" as
*919loss of both legs, or arms, or one leg and one arm, total loss of eyesight, paralysis or other condition permanently incapacitating the worker from performing any work at any gainful occupation.
(Italics ours.) This language does not mean that the worker must be absolutely helpless or physically broken and wrecked for all purposes except merely to live. Kuhnle v. Department of Labor & Indus., 12 Wn.2d 191, 197, 120 P.2d 1003 (1942). Under Kuhnle, the injured worker need not show that he cannot perform any light or sedentary work, but must prove only that he is incapable of performing light or sedentary work of a general nature.
The "odd lot" doctrine which the court failed to apply was enunciated by the Kuhnle court:
[I]f an accident leaves the workman in such a condition that he can no longer follow his previous occupation or any other similar occupation, and is fitted only to perform "odd jobs" or special work, not generally available, the burden is on the department to show that there is special work that he can in fact obtain.
Kuhnle, supra at 198-99; see also Wendt v. Department of Labor & Indus., 18 Wn. App. 674, 571 P.2d 229 (1977); 2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 57.51 (1981). This doctrine was reiterated in Fochtman, supra at 292, where the court quoted Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 230 Minn. 315, 320, 41 N.W.2d 433, 436 (1950):
An employe [sic] who is so injured that he can perform no services other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist, may well be classified as totally disabled.
The trial court's conclusion that the defendant employer did not have the burden of showing the availability of light or sedentary work for Spring is incorrect under the rationale of Kuhnle and Fochtman. Spring met the burden of proving that he could not obtain and maintain employment of a general light and/or sedentary nature. The burden then shifted to the employer to prove that odd lot or special work of a nongeneral nature was available to Spring. *920By not making the distinction between light or sedentary work of a general nature and odd lot light work, the court erroneously placed this burden on workman Spring.
The lower court's conclusion that Spring's expert testimony was "legally insufficient” to establish total disability is ambiguous and puzzling. The use of vocational expert testimony in disability cases has become increasingly prevalent over the last decade and should be encouraged. Vocational experts can often offer a more realistic appraisal of the overall ability and motivation of an injured worker, as their testimony is more likely to include an economic as well as medical analysis. In holding a vocational expert's testimony admissible and relevant, the Fochtman court stated at pages 295-96:
Although we do not exclude other testimony, we find that testimony of a vocational consultant or employment expert who would consider medical evidence of loss of function and physical impairment, his own findings obtained in testing the injured workman, facts relative to the labor market, and his conclusion as to whether the injured workman was so handicapped as a result of the injury that he could not be employed regularly in any recognized branch of the labor market, is desirable, relevant and admissible to establish total disability.
Dr. Powers testified that Spring is below normal intelligence and probably dyslectic. He also testified that, in his opinion, Spring would be unlikely to obtain and maintain employment on a continuous, competitive basis, and that he knew of no type of light or sedentary work Spring could perform on a regular basis. This testimony is of the type which is highly relevant and admissible in a total disability case. It was error for the trial court to hold that the vocational expert's opinion was "legally insufficient" and to refuse to make use of Dr. Power's testimony in determining whether or not Spring was totally disabled.
We hold that the trial court misapplied Washington law regarding the sufficiency of evidence and burden of proof in the subject case. We reverse and remand to the Superior Court for trial consistent with the principles of law set *921forth herein.
Rosellini, Hicks, Williams, and Dimmick, JJ., concur.