(concurring specially).
I concur in the result, but do not interpret Section 59-10-25, N.M.S.A. 1953 to •deny the right to reopen a workmen’s compensation judgment merely because the judgment provides for a lump-sum payment.
Workmen’s compensation statutes are in 'derogation of the common law and arc not controlled or affected by common-law rules except as provided by the statute. Swallows v. Albuquerque, 61 N.M. 265, 298 P.2d 945. However, the second paragraph of § 59-10-25, as it appeared prior to the 1963 •amendment, expressly authorized an employer and employee, with approval of the court, to settle and compromise disputed •claims for compensation benefits both as to the amount of compensation and the manner of its payment, i. e., whether in installments or lump sum. Since such agreements, based upon accord and satisfaction, are expressly authorized by the workmen’s compensation statute, it follows that a judgment entered upon such an agreement is governed by the law applicable to those principles. And as a part of such accord and satisfaction agreement, the parties may waive the statutory right to reopen the judgment and contract for a complete release and satisfaction of all further claims as was done by stipulation in this case. See Ritter v. Albuquerque Gas & Electric Co., 47 N.M. 329, 142 P.2d 919, 153 A.L.R. 273; Tocci v. Albuquerque & Cerrillos Coal Co., 45 N.M. 133, 112 P.2d 515; Linton v. Mauer-Neuer Meat Packers, 71 N.M. 305, 378 P.2d 126. A release executed under such circumstances bars a right to reopen the judgment. Linton v. Mauer-Neuer Meat Packers, supra.
In the view I take, claimant’s right to reopen the judgment is barred in this case by reason of the release, not by reason of the fact that the judgment happened to be for payment of a lump sum. I, therefore, concur in the result.