specially concurring.
I agree with all that is said in the majority opinion except that with respect to the proposition of the right of control over the performance of services I would go even further than the majority. Were I one of the drivers for Laramie Cabs, Inc., I would be quite certain that if I did not comply with the desires of the owner the lease would not be renewed for the next twenty-four-hour period. I believe that pragmatically the lease must be perceived as furnishing to the owner the equivalent right of control that is to be found in any employment at will. Furthermore, under the appropriate standard of review, while differ*409ent arbiters might reach different conclusions, the record contains substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that the owner had preserved an effective right of control.
ROONEY, Justice, dissenting, with whom CARDINE, Justice, joins.
Although I agree with much of that said in the majority opinion, I believe that the substantial evidence before the commission established the status of the taxicab drivers to be that of independent contractors rather than that of employees of appellee. The letter opinion of the district court judge, the Honorable Arthur T. Hanscum, properly analyzed this relationship, and I would affirm his holding.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The majority opinion notes that we must review an agency action based upon the evidence before such agency (unless additional evidence was taken by the district court pursuant to Rule 12.08, W.R.A.P.), and that we should affirm such action if it was based upon substantial evidence. However, we do not apply the same standard as applied to appeals in other matters; i.e., since 1979, we do not consider only the evidence of the prevailing party in gauging the existence of substantial evidence.1 In Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427, 428-429 (1980), we pointed out that:
“Prior to 1979, the ‘substantial evidence’ standard was definitely mandated in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act:
“ ‘(c) The court’s review pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be limited to a determination that:
⅜ Sfc #S sjs ⅝! Sfc
“ ‘(iv) The findings of facts in issue in a contested case are supported by substantial evidence * ⅜ *.’ Former § 9-4-114(c), W.S.1977.
“This subsection was amended, effective May 25, 1979, to require agency action, findings and conclusions to be supported by substantial evidence, but also to provide for a review of the ‘whole record.’ Under this standard, we do not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision, but we must also examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the Board could reasonably have made its findings and order upon all of the evidence before it. After reviewing the history and rationale in changing the ‘substantial evidence’ rule in the Wagner Act to the ‘whole record’ provision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (similar to present provisions of § 9-4-114(c) [now § 16-3-114(c) ]), the consideration is stated in Universal Camera Gory. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), and quoted in National Labor Relations Board v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 405, 82 S.Ct. 853, 854, 7 L.Ed.2d 829 (1962):
“ ‘ * * * the “reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in' its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board’s view,” it may not “displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” * * * ’ ” (Footnote omitted.)
We have also recognized another standard for review in this type of case:
*410“We must strongly emphasize, however, that each case of this character must be decided upon its own set of facts. It is impossible to lay down a general rule and the case at bar may not be regarded as a precedent or controlling force in all litigated matters of this character.” Unemployment Compensation Commission of Wyoming v. Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111 (1941).
TAXICAB DRIVERS
The status of taxicab drivers has been a particular problem with reference to unemployment compensation statutes. The district court recognized this fact and noted that there was “competent legal authority on both sides of the coin,” citing several cases holding each way. It pointed out that the cases with factual and statutory similarities with this case and our statute found the status to be that of independent contractor. The trial court referred to An-not.: Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab, or independent contractor, under social security and unemployment insurance statutes, 10 A.L.R.2d 369 (1950); to Treasury Regulation 90, promulgated under Title IX of the Social Security Act, Art. 205; and to the definitions of “servant,” “master,” and “independent contractor” in Restatement of Agency 2d, §§ 2 and 220 (1958), to establish that the determinative factor on the issue of whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor is the amount of control exercised over the worker in the means, manner of performance and result in connection with the work activity.
The district court referred to and quoted from Woods v. Nicholas, 163 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.1947); Party Cab Co. v. United States of America, 172 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 818, 70 S.Ct. 62, 94 L.Ed. 496; and Davis Cabs, Inc. v. Leach, 115 Ohio App. 165, 184 N.E.2d 444 (1962), to illustrate holdings and reasoning of other courts that taxicab drivers are independent contractors and not employees under the circumstances of this case. It noted that Davis Cabs, Inc. v. Leach was a case “virtually on ‘all fours’ with the instant ease” in that its lease agreement was almost identical to that in this case.
THE STATUTE
The majority opinion directs its attention to the three items listed in § 27-3-104(b), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Pamphlet),2 as those which mark services by an individual as those of an independent contractor. I need not here consider the first of these three items inasmuch as the majority opinion agrees with the district court that such first item was satisfied in this case. In reviewing the facts of this case, the majority opinion agrees that a review of the entire record reflects that appellee’s “control and direction over the drivers’ job performance is insubstantial in comparison to the freedom enjoyed by the drivers, in fact and under the contract.”
However, the majority opinion finds the two other requirements of § 27-3-104(b) were not met in this case. I disagree. I believe that under the facts of this case, the commission could not reasonably have made findings that (1) the services performed by the drivers were not performed outside appellee’s place of business, and (2) the drivers were not customarily engaged in an independent occupation.
Outside of Places of Business
The legislature did not intend the language of § 27 — 3—104(b)(ii) to encompass all of appellee’s taxicabs as being “places of business,” as was concluded by the majori*411ty opinion. In construing a statute, words must be given their ordinary, usual and plain meaning, and accorded their most obvious import. Stagner v. Wyoming State Tax Commission, Wyo., 682 P.2d 326, appeal dismissed — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 237, 83 L.Ed.2d 177 (1984); Ward v. Board of Com’rs. of Johnson County, 36 Wyo. 460, 256 P. 1039 (1927); Board of Commissioners of Weston County v. Blakely, 20 Wyo. 259, 123 P. 72 (1912).
“ * * * If a statute employs a term which has not a technical law, but has a standard popular meaning, it presumably employs it in the latter, unless another sense is clearly intended. * * * ” McCann v. The United States of America, 2 Wyo. 274, 298 (1880).
Additionally, portions of an act must be read in pari materia, and every word, clause and sentence of it must be given effect, all with the purpose of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intent. Haddenham v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 (1982); Ross v. Trustees of University, 31 Wyo. 464, 228 P. 642 (1924).
“[PJlaces of business” may have varied shades of meaning resulting from the context in which the phrase is employed. Normally there can be a distinction between places of business and places where business is conducted. Likewise, there can normally be a distinction between places of business and places of employment. Sometimes the three terms can refer to the same place. There can be more than one place of business, more than one place where business is conducted and more than one place of employment. A building contractor or a carpenter contractor may conduct his business on the premises of a person who is having a house built. The premises may be the primary place of employment for the painter and carpenters doing the work and they may be a place where the contractors are conducting business. But the premises are not the places of business for the contractors. Process cannot be served on the contractors by leaving it at the houses with their owners as the “places of business” for the contractors. Their places of business are their offices, warehouses, etc., from which their contracting operations are really conducted.
That contained in the last paragraph is recited only to illustrate the varied shades of meaning which may be attributed to the words “places of business” resulting from the context in which used. The meaning may be slightly different where used in the context of service of process, licensing, liquor laws, parole, possession of fire arms, corporate activities, commercial code, etc. My position with reference to use of the phrase in § 27 — 3—104(b)(ii) has to do only with its use for unemployment compensation tax purposes by appellee and only with reference to the facts of this case.
In defining the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “places of business” as used in a statute worded as § 27-3-104(b)(ii), the Washington court held in Northwest Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Employment Security Department, 15 Wash.App. 118, 547 P.2d 908, 910 (1976), that “the term ‘places of business’ * * * was intended to refer only to fixed locations from or within which the employer transacts business, such as an office or warehouse.” The issue in that case was whether the statute entitled the employer to an exemption from payment of unemployment compensation taxes. The dispute centered on whether the services of the sales people were performed outside of all the places of business of the employer, where the fact situation was that trucks were used as display areas and as transportation for the automobile salesmen to reach potential customers and to deliver tools. Certainly if these display delivery trucks were not the employer’s “places of business,” the taxicabs involved in this case were not appel-lee’s “places of business.”
The language “or it is performed outside all of the employing unit’s places of business” would have no pertinency at all as a condition for independent contract status if “places of business” were interpreted to be places where business is conducted, such as in taxicabs as decided by the majority opinion. There never could be an instance or *412place in which the person whose status is in question was not conducting business for or with the employing unit. Such interpretation was not intended. The very language of the paragraph anticipates situations in which the places where business is conducted are outside of the employing unit’s place of business. The statute must be interpreted so as to give it effect in some situations. Every word, clause and sentence of a statute must be considered so that no part is inoperative or superfluous. Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812 (1984); Haddenham v. City of Laramie, supra. Part of appellee’s business may have been conducted in the taxicabs, and the drivers’ places of employment may have been in the taxicabs, but the taxicabs were not appellee’s places of business. A number of similar situations can be noticed: A law firm’s place of business is not the courtroom; a post office’s place of business is not each of the houses in the block where a mailman delivers mail, etc. Yet, these are places where the employer must conduct business. The legislature did not intend to designate the taxicabs as appellee’s places of business.
The requirement of § 27 — 3—104(b)(ii) is pertinent to a situation such as existed in Tharp v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 57 Wyo. 486, 121 P.2d 172 (1942), wherein, as noted in the majority opinion, the lease agreement was for the barber chair, lavatory and surrounding space in the lessor’s barber shop. Obviously the services to be performed were not to be done outside the employing unit's place of business — a situation entirely different from that in this case.
Also of pertinency is the fact agreed upon in the majority opinion that appellee does not have control or direction over the performance of the drivers’ services by contract or by fact. Such control could exist even if the services were performed outside appellee’s places of business, and, perhaps could not exist even if performed within appellee’s places of business. But the failure to have such control under the circumstances of this case is an important factor in deciding that the services were performed outside appellee’s places of business. Lack of control over the manner in which the drivers operated the taxicabs, when they were operated, or where they were operated would amount to an inability on the part of appellee to control his own places of business — if the taxicabs are his places of business. Such result seems inconsistent with the normal and usual principles, rights, duties and obligations which are incident to the relationship which one has over his places of business.
Additionally, when § 27-3-104 is read as a whole, taxicab driving is not included within the statutory itemized list of that considered to be “ ‘employment.’ ” Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned under the rule of “ ‘Expressio unius est exclusio al-terius.’ ” Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700, 708 (1958). Subsection (b) of § 27-3-104 applied in the majority opinion in reaching its result and quoted in full supra is preceded by subsection (a), which reads:
“As used in this act [§§ 27-3-101 through 27-3-704], ‘employment’ means service:
“(i) Performed by an employee defined under 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) including service in interstate commerce, except 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) does not apply;
“(ii) Subject to any federal tax against which credit may be taken for contribution payments into any state unemployment fund;
“(iii) Required to be employment under this act as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3311; and
“(iv) Otherwise specified under W.S. 27-3-104 through 27-3-108.”
26 U.S.C. 1982 ed. § 3306(i) except 26 U.S.C. 1982 ed. § 3121(d)(2) used in § 27-3-104(a)(i) to define employment service causes the applicable federal law to be:
*413“ * * * ‘[E]mployee’ means—
“(1) any officer of a corporation; or ******
“(3) any individual (other than an individual who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who performs services for remuneration for any person—
“(A) as an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages (other than milk), or laundry or dry-cleaning services, for his principal; * * * ⅜ * *
“(D) as a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver, engaged upon a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of, and the transmission to, his principal (except for sideline sales activities on behalf of some other person) of orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar establishments for merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business operations;
“if the contract of service contemplates that substantially all of such services are to be performed personally by such individual; except that an individual shall not be included in the term ‘employee’ under the provisions of this paragraph if such individual has a substantial investment in facilities used in connection with the performance of such services (other than in facilities for transportation), or if the services are in the nature of a single transaction not part of a continuing relationship with the person for whom the services are performed.”3
The district court analyzed the foregoing and concluded that taxicab drivers did not fit the definition contained therein. The district court went on to say in its opinion letter:
“ * * * Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Internal Revenue Service has recognized the drivers’ independent status in the present ease, meaning the Petitioner [appellee] need not make contributions under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3311), a condition referred to in Wyoming’s act, W.S. 27-3-104(a)(iii) cited above. Since the I.R.S. has recognized the drivers’ nonemployee status under their laws, it seems this gives further credence to Petitioner’s [appellee’s] position in this case.” (Emphasis added.)
Construing § 27-3-104 as a whole, subsection (a) supports an interpretation of the language in paragraph (ii) of subsection (b) to not include the taxicabs as appellee’s places of business.
Independent Occupation
With reference to the third requirement of § 27-3-104(b) of the independent contractor status, the very factors which the majority opinion accepted to reflect a lack of control by appellee over the drivers establish the independent occupation of the drivers and the fact that they customarily engage in driving the taxicabs. The majority opinion recites:
<< * * * pjncler the Taxicab Lease Agreement in the instant case, the drivers agree only to operate their leased vehicles courteously and lawfully and to inspect the cabs for defects at the end of each term. The lease leaves the details of the job — such as work days, length of shifts and routes — to the discretion of the drivers. In practice, the drivers set the days and hours they choose to work, use the cabs for nonbusiness purposes, and can refuse to take fares at any time. The drivers pay their own fines for traffic violations, thus minimizing Laramie Cabs’ interest in the daily driving routine.”
The district court points out that the lease agreement purports to create a lessor-lessee relationship where the lessee is an “independent contractor free from interference or control on the part of the lessor in the operation of said taxicab.” The lessee *414is liable for sales and all other taxes. The drivers are free to take or refuse calls, set their own hours and days they wish to work, charge a fee of any amount up to the fare schedule, and use the taxicab for their own personal use. The dispatching feature is also optional with the driver.
All of these factors bear on the existence of an independent occupation on the part of the drivers. Today many businesses and occupations do not purchase their automobiles, tractor-trailers, trucks, etc. They lease them, usually with the lessor paying for the insurance, licenses, etc. One can rent a vehicle from the size of a pickup to a large van with which to move freight or furniture or almost any commodity, without becoming an employee of the lessor. Many of the freight and moving companies lease all of their motor fleets. An employer-employee relationship does not result in those situations. Section 27 — 8—104(b)(ii) does not require the occupation of the individual to be his only occupation. The drivers may also be students attending the University, clerks in a mercantile establishment, housewives, etc. It is sufficient that the driving of taxicabs be an independent occupation, customarily engaged in by them. The nature of the occupation is to be judged as to these factors from the standpoint of the individual.
Once again, the acknowledged fact that the drivers are free from control or direction over the performance of their services, by contract and by fact, establishes the independency of the drivers in carrying on the task or occupation of operating the taxicabs. In this instance, the finding of lack of control by appellee over the drivers is tantamount to a finding that they are customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation or business.
CONCLUSION
The commission could not reasonably have made its findings upon the evidence which was before it in the whole record. I would affirm the decision of the district court.
. We have often said that on appeal we assume the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true and leave out of consideration evidence in conflict therewith, giving the evidence of the successful party every reasonable inference to be drawn from it; e.g., Martin v. Wing, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1159 (1983); Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 (1981); Kinsley v. McGary, Wyo., 390 P.2d 242 (1964).
. Section 27-3-104(b), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Pamphlet), reads:
"Services performed by an individual for wages is [are] employment subject to this act unless the commission finds:
"(i) The individual is free from control or direction over the performance of services by contract and by fact;
"(ii) The service is outside the usual course of business for which the service is performed or it is performed outside all of the employing unit’s places of business; and
"(iii) The individual is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession or business.”
. Paragraph (2) is omitted pursuant to direction in § 27-3-104(a)(i) and subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (3) are omitted pursuant to direction in 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i).