concurring in result:
I agree that petitioner’s position is supported by the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 49-5-704 (Supp.1996). First, subsection (l)(a) expressly states, “Except as provided in Subsection (3).” Next, subsection (3)(a) provides, “In the event of a court order ... a former spouse of a retired member is entitled to ... the court designated share of the spouse’s death benefit.” Finally, subsection (3)(b) provides, “This subsection supersedes conflicting subsections of this section.” Consequently, a plain reading of the statute clearly provides death benefits for a former spouse of a retired member where a statutorily complying court order is in place.
Because we have accorded this statute its plain meaning, any commentary about relevant policy considerations or the reasonableness of our construction is unwarranted. See Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1995) (“[W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we will not look beyond it to divine legislative intent.”); see also Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (“ ‘When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.’ ”) (quoting Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127, 135, 202 P. 377, 380 (1921)). I therefore concur only in the result.