(Dissenting).
While I am mindful of Appellee Reed’s situation, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision upholding the actions of the district court. The analysis employed by the majority expands the powers of an asylum state beyond permissible boundaries in violation of the limitations established by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2, and the Supreme Law of the Land Clause in the New Mexico Constitution, NM Const. Art. II, § 2.
The United States Supreme Court has minimized the scope of inquiry available to asylum states in the context of a request for extradition. California v. Superior Court, 482 U.S. 400, 402, 107 S.Ct. 2433, 2435, 96 L.Ed.2d 332 (1987). Under these guidelines, an asylum state can do no more than decide whether the requirements of the Extradition Act have been met. Id. at 408, 107 S.Ct. at 2438; see also Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (holding that habeas corpus proceedings challenging extradition are limited to set criteria for inquiry: existence of a crime charged against a defendant, technical compliance with required documentation, concurrence of identity between the defendant and the person sought for extradition, and fugitivity).
The majority opinion focuses on the notion of “fugitivity from justice,” see Doran, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S.Ct. at 535, and emphasizes the allegedly unfair circumstances from which Reed seeks asylum. However, the majority overlooks that the fugitivity inquiry permitted by asylum states is a very narrow one. “[T]o be a fugitive from justice, it is necessary ‘that having within a state committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his offence [sic], he has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another.”’ California, 482 U.S. at 419, 107 S.Ct. at 2444 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 97, 6 S.Ct. 291, 300, 29 L.Ed. 544 (1885)). Thus, the term “fugitivity from justice” is very limited in scope and was not intended for the purposes of permitting an asylum state to question the fairness of a demanding state’s actions.
The majority ignores the policy dangers inherent in its holding. In Doran, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the scope of habeas corpus review so that the principles embodied in the Extradition Clause would be protected. In that case, the Court held that it wished to prevent “any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state and thus ‘balkaniz[ing]’ the administration of criminal justice among the several states.” Doran, 439 U.S. at 287, 99 S.Ct. at 534. I believe the majority’s holding presents precisely such a danger.
Furthermore, this Court’s holding will make New Mexico a haven for those seeking asylum and fleeing from what they deem as unjust treatment by other states’ courts. Such a scenario is troubling first because it leaves New Mexico courts in the awkward position of construing another state’s law, requiring New Mexico courts to analyze statutes and procedures with which they are unfamiliar. In addition, the majority’s holding invites adjudication of the merits of a demanding state’s actions in an asylum state’s forum where often there is no one available to answer on behalf of the demanding state. See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 90, 73 S.Ct. 139, 140, 97 L.Ed. 114 (1952). For these reasons, the Supreme Court has rejected this type of interstate asylum “self-help,” holding that flight from a demanding state neither weakens the demanding state’s authority to review accusations of official misconduct, nor creates authority in the asylum state to review the actions of those officials. Id. at 89-90, 73 S.Ct. at 140-41. Stated simply, New Mexico does not possess the authority in our federal system of government to intercede on Reed’s behalf in this extradition proceeding for alleged violations of his right to due process by another state. U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”)
While noting the aforementioned arguments in her special concurrence, Justice Minzner points out that Ohio failed to grant Reed a hearing on probable cause, suggesting that Reed’s due process concerns might have been cured had a hearing been granted in Ohio. However, the fact that Ohio could have set such a hearing does not provide a basis for upholding the actions of the trial court. First and foremost, as noted by a substantial body of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, New Mexico does not have the authority to adjudicate whether or not Ohio provided Reed with fair proceedings in this ease. That is a question for the courts of Ohio or for the federal appellate avenues available to Reed upon exhaustion of his remedies in Ohio. Furthermore, I question the practicality of asserting that Ohio might have handled the situation by setting a probable cause hearing. It is clear that even if such a hearing had been set, Reed would have been unwilling to submit himself to the laws of Ohio voluntarily for the purposes of representing himself.
For these reasons, I respectfully DISSENT.