(dissenting):
I agree with the majority that it is not the role of this Court to determine the merits of Medicaid. Whether the medical assistance plan is good or bad from a philosophical or economic standpoint is just not the issue before this Court. The one and only issue before this Court is whether this plan, admittedly validly adopted and made law in Arizona by a majority of both of the houses of the Legislature of Arizona and approved by the Governor in 1974 is repealed because of the wording of Laws 1976, Chapter 132, § 4. Obviously, the two one-year delays and an aborted attempt to repeal the law show that later Legislatures had second thoughts or even changed their minds about Medicaid. The question, however, is whether the bill as enacted in 1974 imposes mandatory duties upon respondents to implement Medicaid or whether the roadblocks set up by the Legislature are legally effective to prevent implementation of the program. My reading of controlling Arizona case law forces me to disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Laws 1976, Chapter 132, § 4 constitutes a condition precedent to the implementation of the Medicaid program. The majority’s reasoning makes the “tail wag the dog.” It allows the 1976 Legislature to do by implication and indirection what the 1977 Legislature was unable to do directly — repeal Medicaid.
An underlying principle in statutory interpretation is that a legislative act must be construed as a whole to give meaning and effect to all of its parts. E. g., State Board of Technical Registration v. McDaniel, 84 Ariz. 223, 326 P.2d 348 (1958). Thus § 4 must be read in the context of the entire Medicaid Act. Can this one small provision attached to a section postponing implementation of the program for another year negate the mandate of an entire legislative act?
The majority holds that § 4 “evidences a clear legislative intention that staff shall not be hired until funds are specifically appropriated by the legislature therefor.” As a preliminary matter, I disagree that such an intention is clear. There are a *60number of provisions of the Medicaid Act which explicitly and emphatically obligate respondents to implement Medicaid this year. If the Legislature wanted to modify those clear mandates, it could have placed in the statute itself a clear prohibition against implementation until specifically approved by the Legislature, as was done for mental retardation centers in A.R.S. § 36-558A.1 Accordingly, § 4 could be read as respondents urge: no state funds are to be used for administration purposes until the Legislature appropriates therefor.
Much more importantly, however, the intent of the Legislature in § 4 is not the issue here. The issue is whether, even if so intended, § 4 can operate to block implementation of the Medicaid Act. No matter how strong or clear the legislative intent, that intent must be accomplished according to law before it can be effective. For example, and hypothetically, the Legislature could clearly intend a bill to be an emergency act which takes effect immediately. But if the emergency clause were omitted, this Court has no power to effectuate the legislative intent by supplying a non-existent paragraph.
The case law in Arizona as I read it is clear. This Court will, if reasonably possible, avoid interpretation of a statute to repeal by implication. State Land Department v. Tucson Rock and Sand Co., 107 Ariz. 74, 481 P.2d 867 (1971). The majority argues their interpretation is in the nature of a postponement as was done twice previously rather than a repeal. The earlier postponements, however, were properly accomplished by extending the effective dates of all aspects of the Medicaid program. By contrast, § 4 as the majority reads it will accomplish through lack of specific appropriation for administrative costs just what the Legislature failed to do by legitimate means: repeal Medicaid. This it cannot do. State of Arizona v. Angle, 54 Ariz. 13, 91 P.2d 705 (1939); State of Arizona v. Ash, 53 Ariz. 197, 87 P.2d 270 (1939); Carr v. Frohmiller, 47 Ariz. 430, 56 P.2d 644 (1936).
Arizona case law is also clear that payment of funds into the state treasury does not necessarily vest the state with title to or control over those funds; custodial funds do not constitute state funds which can be appropriated by the Legislature. Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dept. of Administration, 111 Ariz. 279, 528 P.2d 623 (1974). At the very least, this means the federal monies contributed to the Medicaid fund are not subject to legislative control and can be used for administration costs. Accord, State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974); MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972).
The decisions of this Court I find most persuasive — indeed, dispositive on this issue — are those holding that the appropriation process cannot be used for legislative purposes. Carr v. Frohmiller, supra; Caldwell v. Board of Regents, etc., 54 Ariz. 404, 96 P.2d 401 (1939); Sellers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 239, 24 P.2d 666 (1933). It is difficult to conceive of a situation more clearly analogous to the issue here than that of Carr v. Frohmiller, supra. In Carr the Legislature had enacted an Old Age Pension Act (OAPA) which set up a program to pay for pensions and burial of the indigent aged and also appropriated monies therefor. Two years later, in the general appropriations bill, the Legislature appropriated only $275,000 for old age pensions and forbade the State Treasurer to draw warrants for pensions or burials above this amount. Of course, under the OAPA there was appropriated an additional amount of money. This Court held that the Legislature could not, through the appropriation process, amend, repeal or suspend a general law (i. e., the OAPA). Under the Constitution the Legislature cannot use its appropriation power to prohibit the expenditure of money levied and collected under a valid statute. Since there was money in the treasury le*61gaily collected for the purpose of the OAPA, this Court ordered the Auditor to pay out these funds as directed by the OAPA, even though the amount appropriated in the general appropriations bill was exhausted.
The Medicaid situation is similar. The Legislature did not (successfully) amend or repeal the Medicaid Act. The Act clearly sets up a process whereby full funding goes into the State Treasury as the “Medicaid Fund.” Inter alia A.R.S. §§ 11-292, 11-292.01. As the majority concedes, the money in the Medicaid Fund may be spent for administration costs, and therefore the Medicaid Act is self-executing; there is no need for a specific appropriation for administration expenses. As we ruled in Carr the Legislature, by the appropriation process (here, by failure to appropriate funds specifically for administration costs), cannot prohibit the proper expenditure of funds levied and collected under a valid statute.
Another way of viewing this problem is that attempts by the Legislature to prohibit the valid expenditure of properly levied and collected funds is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, Article 3 of the Arizona Constitution. The Governor, through the Executive Branch, is charged with the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. See, e. g. Ahearn v. Bailey, 104 Ariz. 250, 451 P.2d 30 (1969). Respondents have acted according to the statutory mandate of the Medicaid Act. The attempt by the Legislature to use an appropriation restriction to interfere with the executive’s duty to obey the statutory mandate is an unconstitutional encroachment upon the Executive Branch.
For the foregoing reasons, I have concluded that the Legislature has no power to prevent the implementation of a validly enacted program by using the method attempted in § 4.
The majority states that their holding with regard to § 4 is a basis for granting the relief requested by petitioners. Then by dicta they discuss the constitutionality of the delegation of power to respondents. These comments were clearly unnecessary by the majority’s own words. I will follow the usual practice of this court and refrain from deciding an issue if it is unnecessary to the disposition of the case, particularly where the issue is the constitutionality of a statute. Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 424 P.2d 159 (1967); School Dist. No. 26 (Bouse Elem.) of Yuma County v. Strohm, 106 Ariz. 7, 469 P.2d 826 (1970).
I respectfully dissent.
JAMES D. HATHAWAY, Judge, Court of Appeals, Division 2, concurs in the dissent.Note: Vice Chief Justice FRED C. STRUCKMEYER, Jr., having disqualified himself from participation in this matter, The Hon. JAMES D. HATHAWAY, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, was called in to sit in his stead.