(dissenting):
I dissent. The statute is too clear for argument that the maximum amount to be paid for total permanent disability is $24,-648. If, in fact, the commission has ignored the plain words of the statute and has paid more than the maximum allowed by law, then it should cease and desist from the practice. The fact that it has violated the law in other cases is no reason why we should compel it to do so in this case. We should enforce the law in all cases which are brought before us; and when a case is appealed wherein the commission is paying more than the law allows, we should handle that matter at that time. I think the commission ruled properly in this case.
In separating the source of funds to pay one who sustained a prior injury, the statute 1 provides for payment by the employer or his insurance carrier for that part of the injury attributable to the industrial accident, and the remainder of the amount of the award for. the total combined disability to be paid by the special fund. There is no distinction between the total amounts to be paid when the industrial accident causes all the injury or when it only causes a part thereof.
Nowhere in the statutes cited by the parties are found the words “lifetime benefits,” nor can payments for permanent disability be construed as synonymous with lifetime benefit payments unless an express statement is incorporated to that effect. The converse is readily apparent because the relevant statutes expressly provide both a time and a dollar limitation on the amounts to be paid for a worker’s total and permanent disability. These limitations are set out in particular and cannot be changed except by legislative mandate.
I think the commission ruled properly, and I would affirm its judgment.
CROCKETT, J., concurs.. 35-1-69, U.C.A.1953, as amended.