dissenting.
We have had a series of cases, all from Clackamas County, in which the same attorney, apparently in part representing a mobile home trade association, has *603repeatedly presented "Brandéis briefs” about the wisdom and desirability of allowing mobile homes. Were I a state or local legislator, I would find many of these arguments cogent. However, until today these arguments were not deemed judicially cognizable by a single judge. Today the perseverance of repeatedly praising the virtues of mobile homes produces a majority opinion holding that mobile homes are an outright permitted use in all single family residential zones in Clackamas County.
I disagree with this conclusion, and specifically disagree with the majority on three points: (I) the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance; (II) the interpretation of the ordinance; and (HI) the application of the ordinance in this case.
I
The majority implies that the definition of mobile home in the Clackamas County Zoning Ordinance— "Building designed in such a manner that it may be moved from one location to another” — might be void for vagueness. As the majority notes, that issue "was not raised” by the parties in the trial court or this court. 30 Or App at 598. The majority next claims "we do not reach” the vagueness issue. 30 Or App at 598. But the majority then enters into a discussion of the issue, the thrust of which is that, had it only been raised, the definition of "trailer house” in the Clackamas County Zoning Ordinance would be held unconstitutionally vague.1
This suggestion is fraught with potential for wreaking havoc with Oregon land-use law which, appropri*604ately I submit, is filled with elastic terms. What is "public convenience” and "traffic congestion”? See Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Mullen et al, 214 Or 281, 330 P2d 5, 74 ALR2d 347 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert den 359 US 436 (1959). What is a "detached accessory structure”? See, Yunker v. Means, 271 Or 56, 530 P2d 846 (1975). What is a "commercial amusement establishment”? See, Clatsop County v. Morgan, 19 Or App 173, 526 P2d 1393 (1974). What are areas of "predominantly” Class I to IV soils that generally cannot be lots smaller in size than "appropriate for the continuation of the existing commercial agricultural enterprise within the area”? Land Conservation and Development Commission, Oregon Administrative Rule 660-10-060, Appendix A, p 13, Goal 3 — Agricultural Lands. My point is that Oregon land-use law contains many terms at least as ambiguous as the Clackamas County definition of a mobile home. The majority’s vagueness discussion casts doubt, to say the least, on the validity of a large body of law.2
Since the majority has spontaneously raised the vagueness problem, I feel it necessary to respond. The vagueness doctrine was discussed in Palen v. State Bd. Higher Education, 18 Or App 442, 446-47, 525 P2d 1047, Sup Ct review denied (1974):
" 'The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness.’ Colten v. Kentucky, 407 US 104, 110, 92 S Ct 1953, 32 L Ed 2d 584 (1972). The ultimate criterion being fairness, the degree of precision required in statutes and regulations varies somewhat depending upon the context. At one end of the spectrum — where the greatest *605degree of precision is required — are statutes defining crimes. See, State v. Hodges, 254 Or 21, 457 P2d 491 (1969); City of Portland v. White, 9 Or App 239, 495 P2d 778, Sup Ct review denied (1972). Toward the other end of the spectrum are, for example, statutes defining the relationship between a governmental employer and its employes — statutes that typically articulate a common standard applicable to myriad different employes performing widely disparate tasks.
"Thus, the United States Supreme Court has upheld broadly worded statutory standards in the context of public employment. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 US 134, 94 S Ct 1633, 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974), and CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 US 548, 93 S Ct 2880, 37 L Ed 2d 796 (1973), are the leading examples. In Arnett the court upheld 5 USC § 7501 which provides that federal civil service employes could be discharged 'only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.’ In Letter Carriers the court upheld the Hatch Act prohibition against certain federal employes taking 'an active part in political management or in political campaigns.’ 5 USC § 7324(a)(2). See also, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 93 S Ct 2908, 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973).”
Where on the continuum between required precision and permitted imprecision do land-use regulations fall? I would hold that in some instances the nature of the subject requires at least as much permitted imprecision as in the public employer-employe context involved in Palen.
The uses to which land can be put are only limited by the seemingly infinite ingenuity of man, ranging from a wilderness preserve to a strip mine. Governmental efforts to control land use can only be as specific as the subject matter permits.3 An example is the previously cited LCDC Agricultural Lands Goal— an attempt to define, in a few manageably brief paragraphs, the millions of acres in the State of *606Oregon where the principal permitted use must be agricultural. I refuse to join the majority’s implication that the Agricultural Lands Goal and much of Oregon land-use law is unconstitutionally vague.
II
In the constitutional discussion, the majority complains "there is no standard provided * * * to * * * the courts for making” the determination of what is a mobile home. 30 Or App at 599. Yet the majority apparently has no difficulty in deciding what we have here is not. The majority is in fact actually supplying the standard through an interpretation of the definition of mobile home in the Clackamas County Zoning Ordinance.
In my dissent in Columbia County v. Kelly, 25 Or App 1, 548 P2d 163, Sup Ct review denied (1976), I stated that local governments are free to define mobile home in such a way that "once a mobile home, always a mobile home.” 25 Or App at 8. Whether the zoning ordinance involved in that case had done so was the question that divided the court.
Again that issue splits us. As I read it, the Clackamas County definition — "Building designed in such a manner that it may be moved from one location to another” — does mean "once a mobile home, always a mobile home.” The definition only requires determination of whether a building, at the moment construction was completed, was designed so as to be readily portable — always assuming, of course, that it has not been so substantially altered as to lose its original identity.
It is not clear to me whether the majority intends to hold that local governments are powerless to provide "once a mobile home, always a mobile home.” It is clear to me that the majority intends to hold that the Clackamas Comity Zoning Ordinance does not do so. This partial clarity emerges from the majority’s repeated emphasis that the question is whether defend*607ants’ abode is a mobile home "in place.” 30 Or App at 600, 601.
The majority reasons the completed-and-in-place test "must” be adopted because all construction involves "components that are readily movable to the site.” 30 Or App at 600. The fallacy here is that the Clackamas County definition focuses on whether a building is designed to be moved as a unit; the portability of the components that make up a building is irrelevant.
m
Our divergent theories of the application of the zoning ordinance follow from our different interpretations. The majority apparently believes defendants’ abode was a mobile home the day it was towed onto defendants’ property, stating: "On October 1, 1972, defendants erected a 'double wide’ mobile home on their property * * 30 Or App at 597. In the majority’s view, this building ceased being a mobile home when the tongue, axles, wheels and springs were removed because it was no longer "designed to be moved” within the meaning of the ordinance.4
On the other hand, under my "once a mobile home, always a mobile home” interpretation of the ordinance, defendants’ abode is now a mobile home. Its continued occupation and use is in violation of the zoning ordinance. I would affirm the trial court’s injunction abating this illegal use.
IV
In summary, the majority today makes a sweeping holding: that mobile homes, once the axles, wheels, *608etc., are removed, are an outright permitted use in all Clackamas County single family residential zones. This follows from the majority’s implicit conclusion that if defendants’ abode is not a prohibited mobile home it must be a permitted single family dwelling. This holding will undoubtedly come as a surprise to defendants’ neighbors who watched defendants’ abode towed onto the subject property. In common sense and common usage, defendants’ neighbors would have regarded the thing they saw towed into the neighborhood as a mobile home. But, according to the majority, it ceased to be a mobile home once the wheels were removed. "It is a scheme which would fool only a lawyer.” Martin v. Oregon Building Authority, 276 Or 135, 145, 554 P2d 126 (1976).
I respectfully dissent.
After referring in text to vagueness being a "pertinent constitutional question” and complaining that the ordinance provides "no standard,” 30 Or App at 598-99, in a footnote the majority claims only the intent to point out "there are more precise definitions available.” 30 Or App at 599, n 1. If the majority’s textual comments do not at least imply that the zoning ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, then with all due respect, I do not think it is any of our business to make gratuitous comments on the relative precision of statutory definitions.
The majority cites certain.provisions from ORS ch 446, which contains extensive state statutes on the subject of mobile homes. The statutory definition of the subject to which these statutes apply reads:
" "Mobile home’ means a vehicle or structure constructed for movement on the public highways, that has sleeping, cooking and plumbing facilities, is intended for human occupancy and is being used for residential purposes.” ORS 446.003(19).
If the majority has doubts about the constitutionality of the Clackamas County definition, i.e., designed to be moved, I presume these same doubts would apply to ORS ch 446 which is built on the foundation of substantially the same definition, i.e., constructed for movement.
Some land-use controls, such as height limitation, can be stated with mathematical precision. Other issues, such as the siting of a nuclear power plant, simply cannot be determined based on precise standards of general applicability. See Marbet v. Portland Gen. Elect., 277 Or 447, 460-63, 561 P2d 154 (1977).
The prevailing opinion and the concurring opinion repeatedly state the county failed to prove defendants’ abode is a mobile home, suggesting that this case is being decided on a narrow factual basis. Actually, the majority’s conclusion is based on a broad legal holding: that a building ceases being "designed to be moved” once the wheels, etc., are removed. Under this legal standard, it is impossible for the county to present any evidence that would establish that a mobile home sans wheels remains a mobile home.