(dissenting in part and concurring in part) — I concur with the majority in holding that the trial court correctly ruled that §§ 3 to 44, inclusive, of chapter 10, Laws of 1951, Ex. Ses., which purport to impose a tax upon corporations are unconstitutional and void, but dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that §§ 1 and 2 of the act, the appropriations bill, are also unconstitutional and void.
I agree with the majority that chapter 10, Laws of 1951, Ex. Ses., as enacted, purported to embrace two subjects and prima facie violated Art. II, § 19, of the state constitution. While it is true that both subjects of the act are for the benefit of the state, the two portions of the bill approach the matter from entirely different angles, the first by making necessary appropriations from the state treasury, and the second by raising money to assist in meeting the appropriations. However, the mere fact that legislative acts must be passed for each of these purposes afforded no sufficient ground for uniting the two measures in the same legislative act.
I do not agree with the majority that chapter 10, Laws of 1951, Ex. Ses., should be held void in toto because the act contains two subjects, but, on the contrary, it is my opinion that §§ 1 and 2 of the act, consisting of the appropriations, should be held valid, and the taxing portion of the act void.
*206The majority state that:
“We have here a situation in which neither the appropriation bill, §§ 1 and 2, nor the corporation income tax bill, §§ 3 to 44, standing on its own merits, could pass the legislature in the special session, but when the proponents of these measures combined their interests, both were enacted into Laws of 1951, Ex. Ses., chapter 10.”
Nothing in the record before us discloses a sufficient foundation for the foregoing statement. It appears from the record before us that house bill No. 1, relating to appropriations, was referred to a free conference committee (composed of members of the House and Senate appropriations committees) pursuant to joint legislative rules. This is not an uncommon or at all unusual practice in legislative procedure. The free conference committee reported by recommending the passage of a bill which combined, but made some reductions in, the provisions of two appropriations bills that had been introduced, and added the provisions of house bill No. 14, which related to the taxation of corporate incomes. The bill recommended by the free conference committee was adopted by the legislature, approved by the governor, and became chapter 10, Laws of 1951, Ex. Ses.
To summarize — it appears from the record that two bills (house bills Nos. 1 and 2), which together constituted a complete appropriations bill, were introduced in and passed by the house (with certain minor amendments) during the special session of the legislature, both bills being then transmitted to the senate. The record further indicates that house bill No. 1 only was acted upon by the senate and failed to pass, whereupon it was referred to a free conference committee. The record does not disclose that the legislature as a whole ever took any action upon a complete appropriations bill until it accepted the recommendation of the free conference committee.
Therefore, if we are to indulge in speculation, we may as well assume that house bill No. 1 failed of passage because it did not constitute a complete appropriations bill, as to adopt the theory of the majority that a complete áppropri*207ations bill, such as §§ 1 and 2 of the act in question, could not be passed, inasmuch as no such bill was presented until the free conference committee reported.
I find nothing in the record before us nor am I aware of any facts which would support the statement that judicial notice should be taken of the fact that no appropriations bill could be passed by the legislature unless §§ 3 to 44, inclusive, of the act as passed, were combined with the appropriations.
The legislature was required to enact an appropriations bill for the-continued operation of the state government. Such an appropriations bill had been enacted during the regular session but was vetoed by the governor. The total amount appropriated by the bill passed in the regular session somewhat exceeded the amount appropriated by the act here in question.
Sections 3 to 44, inclusive, providing for the imposition and collection of a tax on corporations are and were unconstitutional and void ab initio. Their enactment by the legislature was a mere nullity.
The two portions of the act are clearly severable, even assuming that it was necessary to raise more money by some new method of taxation, and I see no reason for believing or even imagining that the enactment of §§ 1 and 2, the appropriations bill, was the result of logrolling or any improper legislative procedure, or that §§ 1 and 2 would not have been passed as a separate act.
The following authorities support my contention that §§ 1 and 2 of the act, constituting the appropriations bill, are not unconstitutional:
In State v. Bowen & Co., 86 Wash. 23, 149 Pac. 330, in which the defendant (appellant) was prosecuted and convicted of violation of Laws of 1907, chapter 139, p. 266, referred to as “the commission merchants’ law,” the appellant urged that the law was unconstitutional because of other provisions thereof which were not the basis of the action. In the course of the opinion, the court said:
*208“But that a law may be valid in part and separable and capable of being executed, so that the invalid part may be disregarded, is a well settled principle of statutory construction. Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 578, 579; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.), 246, 247; Pullman State Bank v. Manring, 18 Wash. 250, 51 Pac. 464; Supervisors v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305.
“The provisions in some sections of the act, for imprisonment for debt and for recovery of attorney’s fees in suits upon the bonds provided for in the act, are matters not involved in this prosecution, and with which the appellant has no concern. We may well assume that the legislature would have enacted the body of the act providing for licensing and regulation of commission merchants regardless of the provisions for recovery of attorney’s fees in civil actions upon the bonds and for prosecution and punishment for violation of any of the sections of the act. We, therefore, hold that, as to those sections, whether they are or are not unconstitutional and void, the provisions, so far as involved in this prosecution, are entirely independent and separable therefrom; and if said sections should be determined to be unconstitutional and void, such determination and the elimination of such provisions would not affect the remainder of the act.”
In Swedish Hospital v. Department of Labor & Industries, 26 Wn. (2d) 819, 176 P. (2d) 429, this court, sitting En Banc, held that Laws of 1945, chapter 89, p. 243, was unconstitutional and void because a certain portion thereof was not expressed in the title. The act had no saving clause, and the court could not presume that the legislature would have enacted the bill had it not included the very important portion which the court held unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion, the court quoted the following:
“It is said in 11 Am. Jur. 857, § 162:
“ ‘In accordance with the general principles governing the severability of statutes already discussed, where the title of an act is insufficient, the rule is that the matters in the body of the statute not embraced are invalid, but the remainder of the act is not unconstitutional unless the parts are inextricably interwoven in the texture of the statute.’
“Among the general principles referred to in the above text, we quote the following from 11 Am. Jur. 842, § 155:
*209“ ‘The question as to whether portions of a statute which are constitutional shall be upheld while other divisible portions are eliminated as unconstitutional is primarily one of intention. If the objectionable parts of a statute are severable from the rest in such a way that the legislature would be presumed to have enacted the valid portion without the invalid, the failure of the latter will not necessarily render the entire statute invalid, but the statute may be enforced as to those portions of it which are constitutional.’ ”
In Reilly v. Knapp, 105 Kan. 565, 185 Pac. 47, the supreme court considered an original proceeding in mandamus, the plaintiff, a state employee, seeking to compel the state auditor to issue a warrant for his salary for July, 1919. The auditor contended that the plaintiff was ineligible for state employment for reasons stated and not entitled to the salary demanded, by reason of the provisions of § 2, chapter 1, Laws of 1919. This act was the general appropriations act of 1919, the title reading as follows:
“An act making appropriations for the executive and judicial departments of the state for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1919, June 30, 1920, and June 30, 1921; and fixing the salaries of certain officers, clerks and employees herein named; and providing for employment of additional help; and requiring all fees collected by state officers to be paid into the state treasury for the benefit of the state, and rendering certain persons ineligible to hold any office, place .or position herein referred to.”
The court called attention to the fact that the title was much broader than the act, which was simply a general appropriations act and neither fixed salaries nor provided for the employment of additional help. Section 2 of the act read as follows:
“No person shall be appointed to or employed in any office, place or position, in any of the executive or judicial branches of the state government, or under any commission, board or department, for which appropriations are herein made, who is related by blood or marriage to the head or heads, principal or chief of such office, board, commission, department, or executive or judicial branch, or who is related by blood or marriage to the chief assistant or secretary thereof.”
*210The court observed that the entire act, with the exception of § 2, provided for appropriations, and held that, because of the inclusion of § 2, the act contained more than one subject,
“ . . . first, an act making appropriations for the executive and judicial departments of the state for the next biennial period; second, an entirely different subject from that of the appropriations, an attempt to render certain persons ineligible to hold any office, place or position referred to in the act. It seeks to establish qualifications for certain offices, which has nothing to do whatever with the subject of appropriations.”
In the course of the opinion, after quoting from Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (5th ed.) p. 178, the court said:
“The most important thing for which the legislature is convened is to make appropriations for the executive and judicial branches of the government. . . . Without the appropriations the state could not carry on its functions; and the legislature was well aware of this fact.”
The opinion concludes:
“For the reasons stated, we hold that chapter 1 of the Laws of 1919 contains two subjects, both of which are clearly expressed in the title, and the chapter contains two acts; that section 2, which relates to the subject of the qualifications of persons to hold certain offices, is void, and the remainder of the act, which relates to appropriations, is valid.”
In the later case of Cashin v. State Highway Commission, 137 Kan. 744, 22 P. (2d) 939, the court considered Laws of 1931, chapter 80, the title of which read as follows:
“An act relating to motor vehicles, providing for licensing motor-vehicle operators and chauffeurs, defining the liability of certain persons for negligence in the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways, and to make uniform the law relating thereto.”
The court held that the title clearly expressed two subjects, “the licensing of operators and chauffeurs of motor vehicles, and defining the liability of certain persons for negligence.” The court stated that every section of the statute save § 23 was related and germane to the licensing *211of motor vehicle operators and chauffeurs. Section 23 read as follows:
“This state and every county, city, municipal or other public corporation within this state, employing any operator or chauffeur, shall be jointly and severally liable with such operator or chauffeur for any damages caused by the negligence of the latter while driving a motor vehicle upon a highway in the course of his employment: Provided, This section shall not apply to boards of education, fire or police departments.”
The court, citing its previous decision in Reilly v. Knapp, supra, and after stating the history of the act then under consideration, held that § 23, supra, was “unconstitutional and void and that such ruling is not to affect the validity of the remainder of the act.”
The majority opinion quotes from 1 Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.) 308. However, it should be noted that on p. 359 of the same volume, the learned author continues:
“Statutes Unconstitutional in Part. It will sometimes be found that an act of the legislature is opposed in some of its provisions to the constitution, while others, standing by themselves, would be unobjectionable. So the forms observed in passing it may be sufficient for some of the purposes sought to be accomplished by it, but insufficient for others. In any such case the portion which conflicts with the constitution, or in regard to which the necessary conditions have not been observed, must be treated as a nullity. Whether the other parts of the statute must also be adjudged void because of the association must depend upon a consideration of the object of the law, and in what manner and to what extent the unconstitutional portion affects the remainder. A statute, it has been said, is judicially held to be unconstitutional, because it is not within the scope of legislative authority; it may either propose to accomplish something prohibited by the constitution, or to accomplish some lawful, and even laudable object, by means repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or of the State. A statute may contain some such provisions, and yet the same act, having received the sanction of all branches of the legislature, and being in the form of law, may contain other useful and salutary provisions, not obnoxious to any just constitutional exception. It would be inconsistent *212with all just principles of constitutional law to adjudge these enactments void because they are associated in the same act, but not connected with or dependent on others which are unconstitutional. Where, therefore, a part of a statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning, that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one without the other. The constitutional and unconstitutional provisions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand though the last fall. The point is not whether they are contained in the same section; for the distribution into sections is purely artificial; but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance. If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. The difficulty is in determining whether the good and bad parts of the statute are capable of being separated within the meaning of this rule. If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid as to the other.”
The text last quoted is here in point and, in my opinion, should be applied to the situation presented in the case at bar.
The majority cite the Pennsylvania case of Yardley Mills Co. v. Bogardus, 321 Pa. 581, 185 Atl. 218, in which, as stated by the majority, it was held that “it is impossible to select arbitrarily one of several unrelated subjects included in the title and say that it is constitutional to the exclusion of the others.” That case is not in point here, as, if this court should hold §§ 1 and 2 of the act constitutional, it could not be said that this was an “arbitrary” holding, as the remaining sections of the act are unconstitutional, leaving only §§ 1 and 2 to be considered.
Notice should also be taken of the fact that § 42 of the act, which, with other sections, the trial court held uncon*213stitutional and void, contains a severability provision to the effect that, if any title, section, and so forth, of the act shall be adjudged invalid, such holding shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of the act, the section concluding as follows:
“It is hereby expressly declared that had any section, subdivision of a section, paragraph, sentence, clause, word or any corporation, association, or class of corporations or associations as to which this act is declared invalid been eliminated from the act at the time the same was considered, the act would have nevertheless been enacted with such portions eliminated.”
This section expresses the intent of the legislature that §|1 and 2 of the act (the appropriations bill) and §§ 3 to 44, inclusive, were not to be considered interwoven or mutually dependent, one upon the other. The act may be said to contain a subtitle, § 3 thereof reading as follows:
“The remaining sections of this act shall constitute a new chapter under title 82, R.C.W., and shall be headed ‘Corporation Excise Tax.’ ”
The remaining sections of the act being unconstitutional and void, §§ 1 and 2 stand alone and constitute a complete appropriations bill.
Section 45, the last section of the act, reads as follows:
“This act is necessary for the support of the state government. The first two sections hereof shall take effect immediately and the remaining sections shall take effect May 1, 1951.”
The foregoing quotation from the act indicates knowledge on the part of the legislature that§§l and 2 of the act, the appropriations bill, were of primary importance and should take effect immediately.
It was necessary that the legislature, in its extraordinary session, pass an appropriations bill, otherwise the state government would have been in grave peril. The legislature would have been required to continue in special session until such a law was enacted. The fact that an unconstitutional tax statute was joined with the appropriations bill *214in the same legislative enactment, does not, in my opinion, require that both acts must be declared invalid.
A statute which is void ab initio because it is obnoxious to constitutional provisions, is not a “subject,” within the constitutional provisions referred to above.
Legislative “logrolling” is certainly a most objectionable practice; but examination of the lengthy record before us satisfies me that §§ 1 and 2 were not the result of any such wrongful practice. If any log was rolled, it was §§ 3 to 44.
I can find no constitutional or other legal reason for holding §§ 1 and 2 of the act void, and, in my opinion, that portion of the act was and is a valid exercise of legislative power.
The act contains a severability clause, supra. Sections 3 to 44, inclusive, are and were unconstitutional and void ab initio for the reasons stated by the majority. This being true, in my opinion, chapter 10, Laws of 1951, Ex. Ses., embraces only one subject, which is adequately expressed in the title.
I agree with the majority that the orders of the trial court enjoining the enforcement of §§ 3 to 44, inclusive, of the act in question should be affirmed, but I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that chapter 10, Laws of 1951, Ex. Ses., is unconstitutional in its entirety.