dissenting.
The opinion of the majority recognizes that an oil and gas lease is not defeated by a temporary cessation of production, but makes a different rule to govern an interest created by a defeasible-term mineral deed. I find this to be a distinction without a difference and I must, therefore, dissent.
While I agree generally with the majority’s definitions and characterizations regarding the nature of the “defeasible-term mineral interest” created in this case, I believe a caveat is necessary. I would find that the interest created by the grant in this case is more precisely characterized as a mineral estate for a term of years which *664is thereafter defeasible by cessation of production. This estate is not analogous to the common law estate upon conditional limitation, known also as a fee base estate or as a defeasible fee. The latter type of estate terminates upon the happening of an event the occurrence of which depends upon a specified, proscribed use of the land through a deliberate act of the grantee or his successors.
I cannot agree with the majority when it finds that the “defeasible-term mineral interest,” no matter how it is defined, should be terminated under the circumstances of this case.
Here the cessation of production, which is the single event which keyed the remain-dermen’s claim that the conveyance was defeated, was accidental, unforeseen and was caused through no fault of appellants’. The risky and unpredictable nature of the production of oil and gas guarantees that such events will occur and I believe that to allow those events to divest a mineral owner of his title will inject an unnecessary and avoidable element of uncertainty into a business already more uncertain than almost any other. While the majority speaks of the operation of equity in matters of title to real property, it nonetheless ignores what I perceive as the inequitable result of the rule pronounced today.
The majority is correct when it notes that case law in Oklahoma clearly establishes that a temporary cessation of production will not result in the termination of an oil and gas lease.1 In the Amoco case we held that where production ceases due to mechanical problems, a lease will continue in force and effect if diligent efforts are made by a reasonable and prudent operator to restore production.2 Put another way, we have heretofore held that a lease continues in force when production ceases for a brief period of time “unless the period of cessation, viewed in the light of all the circumstances, is for an unreasonable time.”3 Nothing in the majority’s reasoning persuades me that this same rule should not apply with equal effect to cases involving defeasible mineral deeds.
The majority’s opinion holds that a temporary cessation of production will terminate a defeasible-term mineral interest, but not an oil and gas lease. While I would not reject the proposition that oil and gas leases are governed by different considerations and rules of construction than royalty interests, I cannot agree that rules applicable to leases which are designed to enhance and encourage the profitable production of minerals do not apply with the same force of logic to defeasible mineral deeds. If the rules are fair and beneficial in the former case, why would they not be fair and beneficial in the latter? I do not believe that leases and royalty interests should never be treated differently, but simply that a cessation of production affects all interests in the same way and no distinction is warranted in the way such cessation should affect title.
In Amoco we held that a lease was not forfeited by cessation of production due to mechanical difficulties when production was subsequently restored by the drilling of a second well.4 Our decision was partly based on two Texas cases which held that a cessation of production with subsequent restoration did not terminate the interests involved.5 Both these cases involved royalty interests, not leases, and the Texas court had no difficulty in seeing that precisely the same considerations should govern in both instances. This reflects my position that a temporary cessation of production, in and of itself, should not terminate either a lease or a defeasible-term mineral interest.
*665Because I would hold that defeasible-term mineral interests are not to be distinguished from leases when deciding if a temporary cessation of production terminates the interest, I would find the holding in Amoco controls this case. I would reiterate the language in Amoco which says that termination of the interest under these circumstances would be harsh and unfair.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that OPALA, C.J., and SIMMS, J., join in the views expressed herein.
. State ex rel. Commissioners of the Land Office v. Amoco Prod. Co., 645 P.2d 468 (Okl.1982); Cotner v. Warren, 330 P.2d 217 (Okl.1958); Kerr v. Hillenberg, 373 P.2d 66 (Okl.1962); Durkee v. Hazan, 452 P.2d 803 (Okl.1968).
. Amoco, supra, at 471.
. Cotner, supra, at 219, (adopting the rule of Lamb v. Vansuckle, 205 Ky. 597, 266 S.W. 253, 254 (1924)); Amoco, at 470.
. Amoco, supra, at 471.
. Amoco Production Co. v. Braslau, 561 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.1978); Stuart v. Pundt, 338 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.1960).