dissenting.
I do not agree that the result is the same whether or not the stop was valid. I would hold that the state did not meet its burden of proving that defendant’s subsequent consent was voluntary. I dissent.
*503The majority’s reasoning proceeds essentially this way: Every stop involves some coercion; this stop was no more coercive than most; therefore, defendant’s consent after the stop was voluntary. That reasoning fails to take into account the significance of the illegality of the stop.1 In the ordinary case, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s consent was voluntary. State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 137, 806 P2d 92 (1991). When the consent follows illegal conduct, however, that burden is greater. State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 624 P2d 99 (1981). As the Supreme Court held in State v. Williamson, 307 Or 621, 626, 772 P2d 404 (1989):
“We do not hold that consent can never legitimize a search when the occasion to give or refuse consent followed some unauthorized act of the police. We hold only that a search is not legitimized by consent obtained under the pressure of police action that became available to police only by the prior unauthorized conduct. Certainly officers may request permission to inspect or search one’s effects, and consent, particularly when granted after being informed of one’s right to decline, as in this case, could be a voluntary waiver of a known right.”
I agree with the majority that every stop involves some coercion, and the inherent coerciveness of a lawful stop, without more, should not vitiate consent. I disagree with the majority, however, that police may exploit the coerciveness to gain consent when they do not have any reasonable suspicion to support the stop. Those tactics involve using “police action that became available to police only by the prior unauthorized conduct.” State v. Williamson, supra, 307 Or at 626. A consent is not voluntary when it is the product of unlawful coercion. See State v. Anfield, 95 Or App 567, 770 P2d 919 (1989); State v. Hageman, 59 Or App 96, 650 P2d 175 (1982).
Consent after an unlawful stop may be voluntary when the state proves that the consent did not flow from the coerciveness of the situation. State v. Williamson, supra, 307 Or at 626, suggests that that burden might be met by evidence that the police informed the suspect that he has the right to *504refuse consent. Alternatively, the burden might be met by evidence that the defendant volunteered his consent, as in State v. Kennedy, supra, 290 Or at 504. Here, however, no such evidence was presented. Defendant acquiesced in the search after the officer had turned on his overhead lights, asked to see his driver’s license and commanded him three times to get out of the car. I would hold that the state did not meet its burden to prove that the consent was not the product of the coerciveness of the illegal stop.
I dissent.
The police lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. Not only was the source of their information anonymous, the information itself provided only a weak inference that crime was afoot.