dissenting, and concurring in
Justice JOHNSON’S opinion.The majority holds that H.J.R. 4 was properly presented to Idaho voters in November 1992, and that it is therefore a valid constitutional amendment. Being unable to agree with this assessment, I respectfully dissent.
It is axiomatic that constitutional amendments should receive a higher level of scrutiny than ordinary legislation. Amendments are intended to be more permanent, and our constitution is the foundation of all government activity — it is fundamental. Yet, here, the majority outright admits that the primary motivation of the constitutional amendment was to prevent the development of gaming enterprises on Indian reservations, but nevertheless affirms the validity of H.J.R. 4, the text of which contains no mention of this purpose or its intended effect.
A better and more enlightened view is that the Secretary of State’s choice of words in drafting H.J.R. 4 is, at best, disingenuous and under-inclusive, and at worst (perish the thought), deliberately misleading and intentionally oblique. However, regardless of what may be the State’s motive, it must at the very least comply with the letter of the law. The Idaho Constitution is clear relative to the requirements of the drafting of amendments. The State did not comply with these requirements, and thus the amendment to Art. 3, § 20 should be found unconstitutional.
As the majority states in its opinion, for each proposed constitutional amendment the *46legislative council is required by Art. 20, § 1, and I.C. § 67-453 to prepare for the Secretary of State:
(1) a brief statement setting forth in simple, understandable language the meaning and purpose of the proposed amendment and the result to be accomplished by such amendment. The statement shall be included in the publications of the proposed amendment required by law of the secretary of state, and shall be printed on the official ballot by which " such proposed amendment is submitted to the electors; ... (emphasis added).
The statement of meaning and purpose for H.J.R. 4 does not state that affecting gaming on Indian reservations is even one of the purposes of this amendment, much less the purpose. Regardless of how this amendment is phrased, its undisputed purpose was the prevention of reservation gaming. The amendment thus violates this constitutional directive. Because the statement of purpose omits any mention of the true purpose, and because the amendment itself fails to address its effect on Indian gaming, I find the amendment constitutionally unacceptable.
The majority states that “the actual issue to be determined” by the voters was phrased in a way that was not misleading or deceptive. The majority admits that Indian gaming is one of the issues but forgives its absence from the language of the amendment. The obvious, acknowledged, undisputed purpose of this law appears to have been to prevent Indian casino-style gaming. Yet, even though the constitution requires a drafted statement of the law’s meaning and purpose, the Court today will unfortunately be seen as giving an approving nod to a description which fails to acknowledge the law’s true purpose.
The majority states that “[t]he statement makes it clear that all casino gambling, Indian or otherwise, is prohibited.” Where the statement does not mention casino gambling on Indian reservations it is not apparent how it nevertheless “makes it clear” that such gambling is prohibited. New citizens are fully cognizant of the legal nuances of state versus tribal jurisdiction, but it is common knowledge that special rules apply to Indian reservations and that tribal members are exempt from most state laws and state taxes.
The inhabitants of Indian reservations are among the poorest people in this nation. In other states around the country, through the development of gaming enterprises, tribes have been able to stimulate their economies, improve their schools, health care, and other services, and most importantly affirm their right and their ability to be self-determinating. Thus, a constitutional amendment impacting Idaho’s tribes should at the very least have been carefully presented in conformity with the requirements of H.J.R. 4 before it is allowed to restrict their long-established rights as sovereign nations. I therefore agree with Justice Johnson that H.J.R. 4 was not properly presented.