dissenting in part.
I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which affirms the superior court’s award of rehabilitative alimony. In my opinion, the superior court should not have awarded rehabilitative alimony without making specific findings to support its decision.
Maska Statute 25.24.160 provides for the award of alimony when “just and necessary.” See AS 25.24.160(a)(2); Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1986). The just and necessary statutory requirement applies to all forms of alimony, permanent or temporary. In general, spouses who cannot support themselves should have their basic needs met with a weighted division of property, rather than alimony, where the marital assets are adequate. Schanck, 717 P.2d at 5; see also Ramsey v. Ramsey, 834 P.2d 807, 809-10 (Alaska 1992); Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1987); Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221,1224 (Alaska 1981). However, rehabilitative alimony is appropriate when it is just and necessary and “when the recipient spouse intends to apply the alimony toward job training designed to lead to employment.” Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173, 1178-79 (Alaska 1992); see also Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165 (Alaska 1987) (stating that rehabilitative alimony “is appropriate only when it is directly related to developing a *824source of income” and therefore “should not be awarded to a spouse who refuses to use it for its intended purpose”).
To support an award of rehabilitative alimony, we have required the superior court to make specific findings regarding the spouse’s need for the alimony and how he or she intends to use the award to develop a source of income. See e.g., Dixon, 747 P.2d at 1174 (remanding case for specific findings because spouse’s “vague education plans” did not support trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony); Miller, 739 P.2d at 165 (rejecting alimony award absent specific findings as to whether wife intended to use alimony for job training); Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 225 (Alaska 1986) (requiring trial court to reconsider alimony award and to state reasons for its decision); see also Jones, 835 P.2d at 1178-79 (requiring superior court to make specific findings regarding spouses’ financial needs when awarding spousal support).
In this case, the superior court did not make specific findings to justify the support award. The court stated:
On the issue of spousal support, it is in both the children’s and Andy’s best interests that Lynda become fully self-supporting. It was part of Lynda’s reasonable expectation with the marriage that she be assisted in achieving her educational goal of a degree and certification as a professional engineer. She has worked toward realizing her career goals during the marriage. There is a correlative benefit to the children of their mother’s attaining this professional degree. Therefore, the court awards spousal support for the five years that Lynda reasonably expects to take courses, part-time at UAA.
The court’s statement does not discuss Lynda’s specific need for the support nor her educational plans. It also does not address the legitimate question of whether Lynda’s full-time earnings plus child support will be sufficient to maintain the household while she pursues her engineering degree. Thus, I would remand with instructions that the trial court make specific findings regarding the need for rehabilitative alimony. If, after further review, the superior court remains convinced that rehabilitative alimony is necessary, it should fashion an award that is directly related to Lynda’s educational goals and needs.