dissenting.
The question before us is a question of statutory interpretation. Charles L. Brant and Richard Archambault had entered pleas to felony charges but had not yet been sentenced. The state charged them under AS 11.61.200(a)(1) for being felons in possession of a concealable firearm. Brant and Ar-chambault defended on the ground that, since they had not been sentenced, they had not yet been “convicted of a felony” for purposes of AS 11.61.200(a)(1). The trial courts rejected the defendants’ interpretation of the statute. On appeal, the majority of this court upholds those convictions. I dissent from this conclusion. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that “[a]m-biguities in criminal statutes must be narrowly read and construed strictly against the government.”1 Since we have previously interpreted AS 11.61.200(a)(1) to require a defendant to have been sentenced for a felony offense before he has been “convicted of a felony,” I conclude that we should reverse the defendants’ convictions.
Alaska Statute 11.61.200(a)(1) states: “A person commits the crime of misconduct involving weapons in the third degree if the person (1) knowingly possesses a firearm capable of being concealed on one’s person after having being convicted of a felony ... by a court of this state[.]” The phrase “convicted of a felony” is not explained by the statute. Likewise, the word “convicted” is not defined in AS 11.81.900 which contains the definitions for purposes of Title 11, the title on criminal law. Therefore, the statute itself does not clearly designate when a person has been convicted for purposes of applying the statute.
In Berg v. State2 the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a concealable firearm under AS 11.61.200(a)(1). The defendant argued that since, at the time he possessed the firearm, his underlying felony conviction was on appeal and his sentence was stayed, he could not be convicted as a felon in possession of a concealable firearm. We rejected defendant’s arguments, stating:
We hold that a person has been “convicted of a felony” when the appropriate trier of fact has made a determination of guilt and sentence has been imposed. A timely appeal does not suspend a conviction, even though a formal stay is entered under [the Appellate Rules].3
Therefore, we have previously interpreted the phrase “convicted of a felony” in AS 11.61.200(a)(1) to require the court to sentence a defendant. The majority rejects this language as dicta, because it was not strictly necessary to decide whether Berg’s conviction became final before or after the court sentenced him to decide the case. But the language in Berg tracks prior decisions.4 For *595instance, in Sawyer v. State5 we were called upon to decide when a person had been previously “convicted of a felony” for purposes of applying presumptive sentencing. We held that:
[A] person has not been convicted of a felony offense, for presumptive sentencing purposes, until after he has been sentenced on the first felony , offense.
In reaching this conclusion, we relied on several previous cases, including State v. Carlson6 where the supreme court held that “in order for a felony conviction to count toward habitual criminal status an offender must commit a felony, be convicted therefor, and begin to serve his sentence before the commission of a subsequent felony.” In Sawyer, we set .out policy reasons for holding that a conviction was final, only after the court imposed sentence:
We conclude that the policy set forth in Carlson seems to- be better fulfilled by establishing the time of sentencing as the point when the conviction is final, rather than the time when there is a finding of guilty or a plea of guilty or nolo contende-re. At sentencing the defendant will be made aware of the punishment that was the result of his criminal offense.
We have also considered the fact that a finding of guilty by a jury or the entry of a plea of nolo contendere is not as clearly a final conviction as is the sentencing proceeding. For instance, after a defendant is found guilty by a jury, the court may still grant a motion for judgment of acquittal or a motion for a new trial. After a defendant has entered a plea of guilty and that plea is accepted by the court, he may withdraw his plea before sentencing “for any fair and just reason.” The rules also require the court to inquire about the defendant’s plea just prior to sentencing. We conclude that it is preferable to have a clear and definite time when a conviction will be final and that this time is the time of sentencing. We therefore hold that a defendant has not been - finally convicted, on a charge, for presumptive sentencing purposes, until he has been sentenced on that charge.7
For purposes of applying the felon in possession statute, there .is another .policy reason for waiting until sentence-is imposed to finalize the felony conviction. This gives the court the opportunity to inform the defendant of the felon in possession statute. The state points out that the holding in Sawyer has apparently been modified by AS 12.55.145.8 But as the defendants point out, AS 12.55.145(f) specifically, provides, that it is limited to the presumptive sentencing section. The point is that the language in Berg was not an accident or an oversight, but a reflection of a substantial body of Alaska case law. It is appropriate for us to rely on this case law in interpreting the statute.
I do not want to overstate the case. In Larson v. State, we stated that “the word ‘conviction’ may have different meanings depending on the context in which it is used.”9 For instance, in Kelly v. State10 we noted that “[t]he term ‘conviction’ does not always denote a formally entered judgment.” In Kelly, we held that a witness could be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction of dishonesty or false statement under Evidence Rule 609 where the “verdict of guilt has been accepted but sentencing has not yet occurred.”11 But in Kelly, we were not construing a statute defining a criminal offense. Furthermore, Kelly and Larson illustrate that the phrase “convicted of a felony” is ambiguous.
As stated earlier, “[ajmbiguities in criminal statutes must be narrowly read and con*596strued strictly against the government.”12 I believe that the holding in Berg, as supported by substantial case law, demonstrates that the language “convicted of a felony” is ambiguous, and that we must strictly construe that language against the government. It seems fundamentally unfair to convict a defendant based upon an ambiguous statute.
I fail to see that strictly construing the felon in possession statute is inconsistent with a legislative purpose to protect the public. Any defendant who has entered a plea of guilty or been found guilty of a felony charge is subject to conditions of bail. The public can be adequately protected by appropriate bail conditions. Accordingly, I would reverse the defendants’ convictions.
. State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 907 (Alaska App.1985) aff'd 723 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1986); See also 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.03 (5th ed. 1992).
. 711 P.2d 553 (Alaska App.1985).
. Id. at 554.
. See State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26, 30 (Alaska 1977); State v. Rastopsoff, 659 P.2d 630, 641 (Alaska App.1983); Sawyer v. State, 663 P.2d 230 (Alaska App.1983).
. 663 P.2d 230 (Alaska App.1983).
. 560 P.2d 26, 30 (Alaska 1977).
. Sawyer, 663 P.2d at 231-32 (citations omitted).
. AS 12.55.145 defines when prior convictions are to be considered for'presumptive sentencing. AS 12.55.145(f) provides:
Under this section, a prior conviction has occurred when a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo contende-re, or when a verdict of guilty or guilty but mentally ill has been returned by a jury or by the court.
. Larson v. State, 688 P.2d 592, 597 (Alaska App.1984).
. 663 P.2d 967, 971 (Alaska App.1983).
. Id. at 972.
. Andrews, 707 P.2d at 907. See also Singer, supra Note 1.