concurring and dissenting.
I join the majority’s discussion and disposition of Wright-Hines’ first, second and fourth claims. I would, however, remand to the ALJ to fully develop the record with regard to Wright-Hines’ past relevant work.
Social security proceedings, unlike judicial ones, are inquisitorial, not adversarial. See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110—11, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000) (plurality). Consequently, the ALJ has a “duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.” Id. at 111, 120 S.Ct. 2080 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). This court has also long recognized an ALJ’s obligation to fully develop the record. Lashley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir.1983) (noting that an ALJ has “the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that every claimant receives a full and fair hearing ....”) (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 411, 91 S.Ct. 1420).1
In the instant case, the ALJ denied Wright-Hines benefits on the basis that she could perform past relevant work as a cashier, which required a determination that her past work as a cashier was substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); SSR 82-62. However, the administrative record contains minimal evidence that she had been a cashier, and no evidence that her work as a cashier met the regulatory criteria to be considered substantial gainful activity. While the majority is correct that a claimant has the burden of demonstrating an inability to perform past relevant work, logically there must first be substantial evidence that a claimant has past relevant experience in the particular employment category.2
At her hearing, Wright-Hines testified at length about past work experience in various clerical and janitorial jobs. She did not mention any work experience as a cashier. AR 294-297. Nor was a cashier position listed on her Work History Report. AR 67. Indeed, the three passing references in the record to WrighWHines’ experience as a cashier are all third-hand. The ALJ asked no questions about Wright-Hines’ past work as a cashier. Notwithstanding the cursory nature of the references to cashier work in the record and Wright-Hines’ failure to testify at all regarding any cashier work, the ALJ based his denial of benefits on Wright-Hines’ ability to perform this work.
This conclusion is particularly troubling because there is a presumption against finding that a claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity if the claimant’s *398average monthly earnings from the work falls below a specified amount.3 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2). See also Carreno v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 99 Fed.Appx. 594, 596 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished). The few references in the record to Wright-Hines’ work as a cashier are silent as to how much she may have earned in that position.'4 In addition, employment of three months or less is considered an unsuccessful work attempt, and thus not substantial gainful activity, if the claimant “stopped working, or L ] reduced [his or her] work and earnings below the substantial gainful activity earnings level because of [an] impairment ...” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(c)(3). Because the record mentioning cashier work also refers to work of a three-month duration, the ALJ should have inquired into whether the employment was sufficient to qualify as substantial gainful activity. Given the investigatory nature of Social Security proceedings and the ALJ’s duty to develop the record, an inquiry into WrighWHines’ prior work history as a cashier should have been made. The ALJ’s failure to do so coupled with the lack of substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Wrighb-Hines performed past relevant work as a cashier warrants a remand.
Finally, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Wright-Hines’ counsel’s failure to address her work experience as a cashier relieved the ALJ of all responsibility to inquire into the matter. Although the initial Explanation of Determination denied benefits on the basis that Wrighb-Hines had been a cashier and was still able to perform the job, there was nothing in the record about the nature or duration of that employment. Nor did Wright-Hines ever mention work as a cashier when she testified at length about past experience at her hearing before the ALJ. Before relying on the conclusory statements in the record, the ALJ should have at least inquired into the discrepancy between Wright-Hines’ testimony and the statements on which he intended to rely. Had the ALJ simply asked Wrighb-Hines at her hearing whether she had previously worked as a cashier, she could have presented her arguments against a finding that any such work constituted past relevant work. The failure to do so contravened the ALJ’s basic obligation to develop the record.
I reiterate that this is an unusual case, and I do not believe that granting a remand would treat WrighWHines differently from other claimants. All claimants deserve a full and fair hearing; Wright-Hines did not receive one.
Thus, I respectfully dissent.
. In Lashley, the claimant was unrepresented at the hearing before the ALJ. This court held that the obligation to fully develop the record rose to “a special duty” in such cases. 708 F.2d at 1051-52. In the present case, Wright-Hines, who is presently litigating pro se, was represented by an attorney before the ALJ. While there is thus no "special duty” on the part of the ALJ, its decision must still be supported by substantial evidence in the record. Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir.2009).
. Indeed, the fact that Wright-Hines never claimed to have experience as a cashier makes this case unusual. This court routinely affirms the Commissioner where the relevant inquiry is whether there was a fully developed record with regard to the ability to perform past work. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 280 Fed.Appx. 456, 459 (6th Cir.2008)(unpublished). However, here, Wright-Hines did not claim experience as a cashier and the ALJ did not question her to ascertain whether she had such experience before relying on what amounts to passing references in the record to support a decision to deny benefits.
. The amount of earnings that will trigger a presumption is adjusted on a yearly basis to account for national average wage growth. As there is no indication in the record as to when Wright-Hines worked as a cashier, the relevant amount for this case is unclear. In December 2000, that amount was $700.
. In her reply brief, Wright-Hines implies that the cashier position relates to her work at Fred’s Dollar Store. On her Work History Report, Wright-Hines indicated that she worked as a "clerk” for four days a week, six hours a day earning $6.00 per hour (the form is marked $6.00 per week, however that appears to be a mistake). AR 67. The amount of her earnings would therefore not qualify as substantial gainful activity.