joins (concurring) .
The record we have been furnished indicates that respondent Sidney Lee Vail and co-defendant Timothy Taylor were jointly charged by an Indictment with the offense of first degree murder in violation of AS 11.15.010. According to Vail’s brief, the matter then came on for pre-trial hearing before Judge Carlson on June 18, 1976, “with all counsel present.”1 At this conference it is asserted that counsel for the state and defense counsel informed the superior court that they had been engaged in plea discussion “toward the end of disposing of the pending case by pleas to the lesser included offense of manslaughter.” The superior court was also advised that the prosecution was agreeable to accepting pleas to manslaughter from both Vail and Taylor provided they agreed to a stipulated sentence of 15 years as to each. According to Vail, the superior court then “. . . sua sponte, based apparently upon its review of the file, statements of counsel, the circumstances involved and its wisdom, indicated that it would accept a *273plea of guilty to manslaughter from either or both of the defendants with open sentencing.”
On June 22, 1976, counsel for Vail advised the superior court that Vail would enter a plea of guilty to manslaughter with open sentencing. The matter was set for hearing on June 25, 1976, on the contemplated change of plea by respondent Vail. At this hearing counsel for the state objected to the court’s intention to permit Vail to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of manslaughter and stated his reasons for his opposition. At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Carlson announced that he intended to accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter from Vail on July 7, 1976. This delay in the change of plea proceedings was granted by Judge Carlson to enable the prosecution to seek a ruling from this court as to the propriety of his contemplated action.
In granting the delay Judge Carlson remarked that:
The reason that I would accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter is that I find that the one to 20 years which is the range of sentence for manslaughter appears at this stage of the proceedings to be a sufficient range of sentence to punish Mr. Vail for what he had done.2
The transcript of this June 25, 1976, hearing further reveals that the superior court characterized its actions in the following manner:
I also take into account that this is not a — from the court’s standpoint, this is not a plea bargaining situation, this is
what’s ... or the sub-category of charge bargaining, reducing a case— the charge in a case, and it appears to me that the — justice would be done by the public to having a plea to manslaughter instead of running the risk of an acquittal which to me appears very unlikely, but there’s always that possibility, and the great expense both of prosecution and appeal.
These remarks of Judge Carlson are crucial to analysis and disposition of the issues raised by the state’s petition for writ of prohibition. In my view, they clearly indicate that what really transpired here does not present a true Criminal Rule 43(c) court dismissal issue; rather we are confronted with a question which concerns the extent of the trial court’s authority under Criminal Rule 11(e) governing plea agreement procedures.3
As Rule 11(e)(1) is presently structured, it permits “[t]he attorney for the state and the attorney for the defendant” to engage in discussions encompassing both charge bargaining and sentence bargaining.4 No provision of Rule 11 authorizes the court to engage in either charge or sentence discussions with either the state or the accused for the purpose of obtaining a disposition of the matter without trial. Subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 11(e) essentially contemplate a passive ratification role for the trial court in relation to any charge or sentence discussions which have been entered into by counsel for the accused and for the state.5
*274In the circumstances of the case at bar, the record we do have unambiguously indicates that the superior court actively engaged in charge bargaining. Thus, as I perceive the question confronting this court, we must decide whether Criminal Rule 43(c)6- in light of the provisions of Rule 11, was intended to authorize the trial court to employ the charge dismissal power as a vehicle for an active role in plea discussions encompassing either charge or sentence concessions, or both. I am of the view that Criminal Rule 43(c) was not intended to give legal sanction to such activities on the trial court’s part. For neither Criminal Rule 43(c) nor Rule 11(e) authorizes the use of the trial court’s dismissal powers as an adjunct to judicial plea negotiations. Thus, I join in the majority’s conclusion that the writ of prohibition should issue.
Admittedly, Alaska’s Rule of Criminal Procedure which recognizes the controversial practice of plea bargaining does not contain an explicit prohibition against trial courts engaging in such practice.7 On the other hand, given the tremendously coercive impact judicial activism can have in this area, the erosion of the appearance of judicial neutrality, and the accused’s constitutional rights to jury trial, I am of the view that our trial judges should be totally barred from engaging in either charge or sentencing bargaining.8
Further, I note my agreement with the court’s conclusion that to permit the superior court to dismiss the first and second degree charges against Vail at this stage of the criminal prosecution would be viola-tive of the doctrine of separation of powers.9 In Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 534 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1975), we said:
Under the common law, an attorney general is empowered to bring any action which he thinks necessary to protect the public interest, and he possesses the corollary power to make any disposition *275of the state’s litigation which he thinks best. State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P. 910 (1929). This discretionary control over the legal business of the state, both civil and criminal, includes the initiation, prosecution, and disposition of cases. United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279, 8 S.Ct. 850, 31 L. Ed. 747 (1888); Federal Trade Commission v. Clair Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174, 47 S.Ct. 553, 71 L.Ed. 978 (1927); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965); Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265, 34 P. 707 (1893); Ames v. Attorney General, 332 Mass. 246,124 N.E.2d 511 (1955).
When an act is committed to executive discretion, the exercise of that discretion within constitutional bounds is not subject to the control or review of the courts. To interfere with that discretion would be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. .
Thus, it is clear that the determination whether or not to prosecute and the precise charge to be lodged against an accused are initially committed to the discretion of the executive branch of Alaska’s government.
. There is no indication whether .this conference was on the record or whether Vail and Taylor were present. My own view is that Alaska’s trial courts should refrain from conducting any proceedings relating to a criminal prosecution which are off the record. Additionally, I note that Criminal Rule 38 (a) requires the presence of ,the defendant “at every stage of the trial.”
. The court’s opinion details numerous additional reasons Judge Carlson articulated for accepting a manslaughter plea.
. See ABA, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, Standards 3.1-3.4 [hereinafter cited as Pleas of Guilty]. I do not interpret Criminal Rule 11(e)(3), which provides: “If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that the judgment and sentence will embody either the disposition provided for in the plea agreement or another disposition more favorable to the defendant” as authorizing active plea negotiations on the part of Alaska’s trial judges.
. Since August of 1975 the Attorney General has instituted a policy which purports, in its general outlines, to prohibit all state prosecutors from sentence bargaining and also, for the most part, charge bargaining.
. Alaska’s Rule 11(e) does not contain any provision which parallels Standard 3.3(b), Pleas of Guilty, supra note -2. This Standard provides:
(b) If a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of *274a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in the expectation that other charges before that court will be dismissed or that sentence concessions will be granted, upon request of the parties the trial judge may permit the disclosure to him of the tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of ,the plea. He may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will concur in the proposed disposition if the information in the presentence report is consistent with the representations made to him. If the trial judge concurs but the final disposition does not include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated in the plea agreement, he shall state for the record what information in the presentence report contributed to his decision not to grant these concessions.
The Commentary to .this Standard reads in part:
It does not follow from the above, however, that a trial judge may never indicate his concurrence in the proposed concessions prior to the time the defendant enters his plea. There is one situation in which ,the judge must do so, namely, that in which the concession would be granted by receipt of a plea to a lesser offense. Consent of the court is typically required for a lesser plea, e. g., Ariz.R.Crim.P. 184, and since aceept-anee of the plea to a lesser included offense would bar subsequent prosecution for the greater offense, the determination must be made prior to the time the plea is accepted.
Thus, while the trial judge should not be required to make promises concerning sentence concessions or dismissal of other counts in advance of defendant’s plea, it is proper to have the judge indicate his approval of a plea to a lessor charge before the plea is accepted. . . .
. Alaska’s Criminal Rule 43(c) provides:
The court may, either on its own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action, after indictment or waiver of indictment, .to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal shall be set forth in the order.
. Compare Alaska Criminal Rule 11(e)(1) with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1).
. See Standard 3.3(a), Pleas of Guilty, supra note 2. This Standard provides:
The trial judge should not participate in plea discussions. See also Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1); United States v. Worker, 535 F.2d 198 (2d Cir., 1976).
. See Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976).