dissenting:
The majority holds that a plaintiff, in order to qualify for the knowing concealment exception to the medical malpractice statute of limitations, must show that: (1) the defendant knew he had committed a negligent act or admission; and (2) the defendant intentionally made a material misrepresentation or failed to disclose material information that impeded the plaintiffs discovery of that negligence. Maj. op. at 512. The majority then holds that, based upon this standard, the respondents in this case have raised material issues of disputed fact that preclude imposition of summary judgment. Id. at 514.
I dissent because the respondents have not met their burden to demonstrate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact in this case. The respondents thus have not made the requisite showing to avoid the entry of summary judgment against them.
I.
On December 23, 1985, petitioner Dr. Stuart Smith operated on respondent Patricia Boyett at Lutheran Medical Center to remove her gall bladder and explore her common bile duct. The respondents allege that Dr. Smith perforated Ms. Boyett’s common bile duct during the course of the exploration, allowing bile to leak into her abdominal cavity. After some improvement in her condition, Ms. Boyett was discharged from Lutheran Medical Center on January 7, 1986.
Ms. Boyett was readmitted to the hospital on January 10, 1986, with abdominal pain. On January 16, 1986, diagnostic procedures performed at the hospital indicated that Ms. Boyett had a hole in her common bile duct. On or about January 17, 1985, Dr. Smith met with Ms. Boyett and told her that she had a hole in her common bile duct and that he believed the hole was caused by a gallstone. On January 18, 1985, Dr. Smith transferred Ms. Boyett to University Hospital where she was treated by Dr. Greg Stiegmann and Dr. John Goff. After Ms. Boyett’s transfer, Dr. Smith had no further contact with her.
Ms. Boyett was hospitalized at University Hospital until March 21, 1986, when she was discharged. She was subsequently admitted to University Hospital six times between April 1986 and March 1989, and continued under the treatment of Dr. Stiegmann and Dr. Goff until early 1989.
On December 28, 1990, the Boyetts filed the instant action against Dr. Smith. In their complaint, the respondents alleged that Dr. Smith perforated the common bile duet during surgery, that he knew at the time of surgery the common bile duct had been perforated, and that he failed to take any measures to immediately repair or correct the injury to the common bile duet. The lawsuit was filed nearly five years from the time the surgery was performed by Dr. Smith and over four and a half years after Dr. Smith provided any medical care to Ms. Boyett. In his answer, Dr. Smith denied the allegations in the complaint, and raised the affirmative defense that the Boyetts’ claim was time barred by section 13-80-105, 6A C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), which requires that medical malpractice actions be filed within three years after the act or omission giving rise to the claim *516unless one of the exceptions contained in the statute applies.1
On May 1, 1992, Dr. Smith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that section 13-80-105 precluded the Boyetts’ malpractice action. Dr. Smith asserted that the Boyetts’ claim was barred because- the Boyetts filed their suit nearly five years after the operation giving rise to the alleged negligence took place. The Boyetts contended that section 13-80-105 did not bar their action because Dr. Smith knowingly concealed his negligence from Ms. Boyett when he informed her of his belief that the hole in her common bile duct was caused by a gallstone, and that the exception in section 13 — 80—105(l)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), thus applied.
The trial court ordered summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith. In so holding, the trial court cited Adams v. Richardson, 714 P.2d 921 (Colo.App.1986), for the proposition that
a knowing concealment occurs when a plaintiff suspects or discovers that a wrong has been committed and is subsequently misled or misinformed by the doctor as to what was done or its effect. There must be a negligent act and a subsequent fraudulent concealment.
Boyett v. Smith, No. 90CV4859, at 2-3 (July 7,1992). The trial court went on to hold that there was no evidence of such a knowing concealment and that the Boyetts’ claims were thus barred by section 13-80-105.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court incorrectly added an element not required by the express language of the statute by holding that the plaintiff must suspect or discover that a wrong has been committed before being misled by her doctor. The court of appeals then stated:
We, therefore, conclude that the fact finder here must determine whether, at the time Smith explained the cause of the bile duct perforation to Boyett, he knew that his surgery had caused it and that appropriate steps should have been taken promptly after the surgery to treat the condition.
Boyett v. Smith, 888 P.2d 294, 297 (Colo.App.1994). The court of appeals went on to hold that, under this standard, the Boyetts had sustained their burden on summary judgment of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact, thereby precluding dismissal of their claim as time barred. Id. Dr. Smith then petitioned for certiorari review which this court granted.
II.
The majority states the elements of knowing concealment as follows:
[1]n order to prove knowing concealment under section 13-80-105, the Boyetts must prove that (1) Dr. Smith knew he had committed a negligent act or omission, and (2) he intentionally made a material misrepresentation or failed to disclose material information that impeded the Boyett’s discovery of that negligence.
Maj. op. at 513 (footnote omitted). I agree with the majority’s formulation of this standard. I disagree with the majority’s finding that the Boyetts made the requisite showing to avoid summary judgment before the trial court.
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Peterson v. Halsted, 829 P.2d 373, 375 (Colo.1992). Once the movant shows that genuine issues are absent, the burden shifts, and unless the non-movant shows that a true factual controversy exists, summary judgment is appropriate. Ginter v. Palmer & Co., 196 Colo. 203, 206, 585 P.2d *517583, 585 (1978). To avoid summary judgment, the non-movant must set forth facts indicating that a controversy exists; a litigant may not avoid summary judgment by merely asserting a legal conclusion without evidence to support it. Fritz v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 196 Colo. 335, 339-40, 586 P.2d 23, 26 (1978); see also Hoary v. Lowe, 734 P.2d 154, 155 (Colo.App.1987) (holding that once the defendant invoked section 13-80-105 as a defense, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to come forward with facts, rather than conclusory allegations, sufficient to invoke the knowing concealment exception).
In this case, Dr. Smith motioned the trial court for summary judgment, asserting that the Boyett’s claim was time barred by section 13-80-105. Dr. Smith included affidavits with his motion which contained factual support for his assertion that the Boyetts’ claim was precluded by section 13-80-105. The burden then shifted to the Boyetts to demonstrate by relevant and specific facts that Dr. Smith knew he had committed a negligent act or omission, and that he intentionally made a material misrepresentation or failed to disclose material information that impeded the Boyetts’ discovery of that negligence. See Hoary, 734 P.2d at 155.
The Boyetts asserted, in their response to Dr. Smith’s motion for summary judgment and in their brief in support of their motion for amendment of findings, that Dr. Smith knowingly concealed the fact that he caused the hole in Ms. Boyett’s common bile duct during surgery when he told Ms. Boyett on or about January 17, 1986, that the hole in her common bile duct had been caused by a gallstone. Dr. Smith insisted, in his reply brief on summary judgment, that he had no knowledge on January 17, 1986, that he had caused the hole in Ms. Boyett’s common bile duct, and thus could not have been knowingly concealing information from her.
Had the Boyetts presented facts in the documents accompanying their brief opposing summary judgment supporting an inference that Dr. Smith had knowledge when he met with Ms. Boyett on or about January 17 that he caused the hole in her common bile duct, this would indeed constitute a disputed material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment. The Boyetts, however, have only made the type of bald assertion of fact on this point that our eases teach is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. See Fritz, 196 Colo. at 339—40, 586 P.2d at 26; Hoary, 734 P.2d at 155.
In the affidavits and other affirmative material accompanying the Boyetts’ brief opposing summary judgment, the Boyetts have only presented evidence of negligence, rather than of the knowing concealment required by the statute. The majority, in determining that the Boyetts made a sufficient evidentia-ry showing to avoid summary judgment here, points to: (1) evidence presented by the Boy-etts of tests done during the initial operation that indicate that “Dr. Smith should have known of the puncture” during or soon after surgery; and (2) deposition testimony by two doctors who stated their opinion that it was unreasonable of Dr. Smith to attribute the hole in Ms. Boyett’s common bile duct to gallstone corrosion. Maj. op. at 513-14.
This evidence indicates that, at most, Dr. Smith was negligent when he informed Ms. Boyett that her injury was caused by a gallstone. Mere evidence of negligence, even when cumulative, is insufficient to draw the inference of knowledge required by the statute.2 Furthermore, the Boyetts’ bald assertion that Dr. Smith was consciously misleading Ms. Boyett when he told her that her injury was caused by a gallstone is inade*518quate to avoid summary judgment without supporting factual evidence. I would thus reverse the court of appeals and hold that the trial judge, although applying the incorrect standard for knowing concealment, correctly ordered summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith.3
. Section 13-80-105, 6A C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), states in pertinent part:
(1) No person shall be permitted to maintain any action ... to recover damages from ... any person licensed in this state or any other state to practice medicine ... unless such action is instituted within two years after the person bringing the action discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence and concern should have discovered, the injury. In no event may such action be instituted more than three years after the act or omission which gave rise thereto, subject to the following exceptions:
(a) If the act or omission which gave rise to the cause of action was knowingly concealed by the person committing such act or omission ... then such action may be instituted within two years after the person bringing the action discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence and concern should have discovered, the act or omission....
. To hold otherwise would contravene the plain language of § 13 — 80—105(l)(a) by allowing a plaintiff to avail herself of the knowing concealment exception in that statute without making the factual showing of knowledge required at the summary judgment stage. In order to make the evidentiary showing necessary to survive Dr. Smith’s motion for summary judgment, the Boy-etts were required to submit factual evidence that Dr. Smith knew that the information he imparted to Ms. Boyett on January 17 was incorrect. The Boyetts did not do so. They merely submitted evidence that Dr. Smith was negligent for not knowing the information was incorrect. To allow the Boyetts to survive summary judgment on a factual showing of negligence, rather than knowing concealment, directly contradicts the clear mandate of § 13 — 80—105(l)(a). See Dodge v. Montrose Potato Growers Coop. Assn, 34 Colo.App. 223, 227, 524 P.2d 1394, 1396 (1974) (holding that exceptions to statutes of limitations are to be strictly construed).
. The majority makes much of the fact that the trial court relied on Adams to hold that a plaintiff must suspect or discover that a wrong has been committed in order to avail herself of the knowing concealment exception to § 13-80-105. Adams holds, however, and the majority concedes, that a negligent act and a knowing concealment are required. Maj. op. at 512; Adams, 714 P.2d at 925. The Boyetts’ failure, therefore, to allege facts to support their assertion of a knowing concealment on the part of Dr. Smith is fatal to their claim.