(dissenting).
I dissent.
It should be here recorded that the appellant’s primary attack upon this statute was that it impairs his constitutional liberties: (a) by depriving him of his presumption of innocence and (b) by compelling him to give testimony against himself. The court refused to sustain those contentions.
The prevailing opinion is now narrowed to the one proposition: That the ordinance does not come within either the express or implied powers of Ogden City.
The Chief Justice suggests in his concurrence that such an ordinance would be valid if expressly authorized by the legislature; it would follow that the legislature could enact a valid statute of similar import. With this, I agree. But I also go further, believing that the ordinance itself is valid, being within the authority of the City fairly implied from powers expressly granted.
*353A city is not limited to powers expressly spelled out, but necessarily possessés those fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly conferred. 1 McQuillan Muiicipal Corporation, 2d Ed. Sec. 367. The following sections of Utah Code Annotated 1943, all referring to powers of cities, are pertinént to our inquiry into the authority of the city to enact the ordinance in question:
Sec. 15-8-11:
“They [cities] may regulate the use of streets, * * * sidewalks, cross-walks * *
Sec. 15-8-30:
“They may regulate the movement of traffic on the streets, sidewalks and public places * *
By a later enactment, in our motor vehicle code, Sec. 57-7-85, our Legislature provided:
“(a) The provisions of this act * * * Shall not be deemed to deprive said [local] authorities of existing powers with respect to streets * * * in:
“(1) Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles including the requirement for payment of a parking fee * * [Emphasis added.]
This reference to and recognition of the power of cities to require the payment of a parking fee is a legislative construction of a prior grant of power to the city plainly indicating that the legislative intent is for the cities to have power to regulate parking and to charge fees therefor.
Sec. 15-8-84, referring to the general powers of cities, provides:
“They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred by this chapter * * * and may enforce obedience to such ordinances with such fines or penalties as they may deem proper * *
*354Regulation of parking is a part of traffic regulation. See People v. Rubin, 284 N. Y. 392, 31 N. E. 2d 5.1, and authorities cited therein. That fact is so obvious that it should be unnecessary to detail why and how it is so. The specific power to regulate parking and requirement of the payment of a parking fee would be useless unless the City also has the practical means to make and enforce regulations necessary to do so.
The prevailing opinion cites no case where a statute or ordinance of the substance of the one under consideration has been declared void. So far as I know, none exists. Reliance is placed upon the declarations of this court concerning the implied powers of cities in various other cases. I expressly agree with Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe’s statement, “some of our holdings we have too narrowly construed the granted powers.” No better examples of this could be pointed out than those cited in the prevailing opinion. Narrow to the point of being unreasonable (as it seems to me) are the holdings: that to regulate and suppress billiard tables did not authorize an ordinance prohibiting billiard playing,13 that street railways did not include motor buses to empower the city to operate them.14 The narrowness of the latter holding is pointed up by the fact that in construing a state statute the court held that street railways did include motor buses.15
I submit that these cases, varying as they do from an extremely narrow limitation of the power of the city to a wide latitude of practical application to permit accomplishment of the legitimate purposes implicit in express grants of power, for no such pattern as to make a compelling precedent requiring us to reverse the district court’s holding that the ordinance in question is within the fairly implied powers of Ogden City. On the contrary it seems *355to me that the pattern of the law which may be derived from the later and better considered cases is that this court will give a liberal, sensible and practical construction to statutes conferring power upon cities and afford them prerogatives reasonably incident thereto to enable the city to carry out its legitimate functions. An excellent illustration of this is the case cited by the Chief Justice wherein by such practical construction we held that authorization of the city to build a municipal power plant also implied authority to issue bonds payable upon its revenues to defray the cost of the construction thereof.16 Similarly, we have also held that the power granted a city to pass inspection ordinances carried with it the implied authority to charge a fee to cover the cost of such inspection,17 and that although the city had no such express authority, there is included in its general powers the implied power to make a valid ordinance prohibiting drunken driving.18
Whether a power may be fairly implied from powers expressly granted seems to rest largely upon whether the court believes the legislation beneficial to the welfare of the city and essential in carrying out its legitimate functions. The scope of power seems to vary as the matter in issue appeals to the sense of propriety of the court. It thus appears to me that had the court desired, it very well could have placed what I have termed a liberal, sensible, and practical construction upon the statutory authority granted to Ogden City and held the enactment of the ordinance to be within the powers fairly implied in connection with the regulation of parking on the streets and the charging of a fee therefor.
We must be aware that it is the responsibility of lawmakers in creating, and the courts in interpreting the law, *356to take cognizance of and keep pace with the march of social progress and adapt the law to social needs insofar as that may be done within the framework of our Constitution and statutory law. With the growing congestion caused by the ever-increasing number of the cars being used on public streets, there must be some sort of system for the sharing of use; otherwise the streets would be monopolized by a few. It is not only the right, but the duty of the city to make the most efficient possible use of its parking areas. This can only be accomplished by limiting the time and manner of parking so that the greatest number of people may enjoy their use for a period of time of optimum benefit to themselves and the business in the locality, and then relinquish to others. This requires that parking of vehicles in such areas must be reasonably limited and effectively regulated.
Therefore, it is absolutely essential that there be some feasible method of establishing responsibility for parking cars in such congested areas and removing the same within the proper time limits. It is an obvious impossibility for the police of a modern city of any size to watch over all cars to see both who parks and who comes to get them. The cost of such policing would be entirely prohibitive. The use of an ordinance such as Ogden has enacted is an effective and perhaps an indispensable aid in getting the maximum use out of parking areas.
In Commonwealth v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 20, 122 S. W. 2d 1006, the defendant made the contention that a city had no authority to make an identical prima facie evidence rule by ordinance. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held squarely that under its power to regulate traffic the city could provide a rule of evidence necessary for effective enforcement of its ordinance.
The Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Kayne, 286 Mich, 571, 282 N. W. 248, held valid a similar prima facie ordinance passed by the city of Detroit, as also did the Missouri Supreme Court in City of St. Louis v. Cook, 359 Mo. 270, 221 S. W. 2d 468, regarding an ordinance similar *357to Ogden’s as against the same attack as to its constitutionality. The Ogden ordinance is no different in effect than those held to be constitutional in the authorities above cited. In People v. Bigman, 38 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 773, 100 P. 2d 370, a state statute was similarly held to be valid.
So far as I am advised, or have been able to learn, wherever such legislation, be it ordinance or statute, has been taken to courts of last resort, it has been declared valid. The courts have uniformly recognized that the powers of cities to manage traffic and the use of streets carries the implied power to effectively regulate parking and parking meters.
The majority opinion ignores these authorities which have held such enactments, both ordinance and statute, to be valid, blandly waiving them aside with the euphonious, but nebulous and meaningless, phrase:
“Ogden * * * looks for support * * * to sister states where fountains of power radically may differ from our own” [emphasis added]
but fails to point out any single instance where there is any such difference.
Furthermore, I observe that such ordinance merely declared what is permissible as a matter of law anyway, that is, to infer that the owner parked his automobile or was responsible for doing so. In the case of Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N. E. 601, 602, it was charged that the defendant permitted her car to stand on a public street in violation of a rule of the Traffic Commission of Boston. On the trial, the only evidence that the defendant parked the car was her ownership thereof. The court refused defendant’s request to rule as a matter of law:
“that ownership of a motor vehicle is no evidence that the said motor vehicle was parked illegally by the defendant”
and found her guilty. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction. It pointed out numerous instances *358in the law where criminal liability is imposed without requiring proof of guilty knowledge, see 189 N. E. at page 603 and further observed that the rules of the Boston Traffic Commission were intended to cover any such violation whether by the registered owner personally or by one under permission of the owner. It expressly stated 189 N. E. at page 604:
“In a word this is one of the unusual instances where a person at his peril must see to it that the rules and regulations are not violated by his act or by the act of another. The reported evidence established a prima facie case which was not met by evidence offered by the defendant. * * * the ‘findings of guilty are to stand.’ ”
It was also so held in City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N. E. 2d 802, and in People v. Rubin, supra.
Upon the basis of these authorities, this ordinance does no more than declare the law as to an existing rule of evidence and it therefore would not be improper to apply it in the plaintiff’s trial. How could one dispute that the connection between the registered owner of an automobile and its operation is a natural and reasonable one? In most instances, the car would be parked either by the owner or with his permission. As it is necessary to place responsibility upon someone for the parking of automobiles, the owner of course is the one who should bear it. The actual effect of the ordinance will not be to cause undue inconvenience or hardship to respectable law-abiding citizens but will help to prevent abuses by persons who are habitually trying to side-step or circumvent the law.
The convenience to public authority and to the public generally, of such an ordinance will far outweigh any inconvenience that may be occasioned to registered owners of automobiles who may be under some circumstances required to defend against accusations that they illegally parked their cars when such was not the fact. If this amounts to a burden it is one which law-abiding citizens will willingly bear for the privilege of more fair, efficient, and orderly *359use of street parking areas. It appears to me that necessity-dictates that such eventually must be the law. And that it falls within the powers necessarily implied in those granted to cities and is an absolute essential to the fair and orderly management of traffic and the use of streets. We may as well recognize and deal forthrightly with the problem instead of passing the responsibility to the legislature where conflicts may arise because the rural representatives are not concerned with this problem, and may therefore be indifferent to it, while the urban areas may feel it of vital concern.
Inasmuch as the majority opinion is limited to the proposition that the ordinance is not within the implied powers of the city, I will not burden this dissent with a discussion of appéllant’s contention concerning the ordinance unconstitutionality because it deprives him of his presumption of innocence and compels him to give testimony against himself. I observe in passing that on the basis of the adjudicated cases, a number of which are hereinabove cited, it is clearly demonstrable that this contention is untenable.
I believe that a fair analysis of this ordinance, keeping in mind the functions and duties of Ogden City in regard to the regulation of its streets, which entitles it to powers which are fairly implied from those expressly granted to accomplish that purpose, impels the conclusion that the ordinance is valid, as ruled by the district court.
I would affirm the judgment.
American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249.
Utah Rapid, Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P. 2d 1.
Utah Light & Traction Co. v. State Taf Commission, 92 Utah 404, 68 P. 2d 759.
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P. 2d 1191.
Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Oil Co., 80 Utah 530, 15 P. 2d 648.
Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P. 2d 671.