I agree defense counsel’s failure to request a pinpoint instruction relating voluntary intoxication to premeditation and deliberation did not render his representation constitutionally ineffective. The inquiry is two-pronged. Defendant must show inadequate representation and resulting prejudicial effect. Here, he makes a convincing case trial counsel’s performance did fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness ... .[][].. . under prevailing professional standards.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) He fails, however, to “affirmatively prove prejudice.” (Id. at p. 693 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2067].)
In People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588], the court held that as a result of the abolition of diminished capacity as a true defense, the trial court no longer had a sua sponte duty to instruct thereon. (Id. at p. 1117; see People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1].) “Thus it is now more like the ‘pinpoint’ instructions discussed in People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847], and People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247, 92 A.L.R.3d 845], to which a defendant is entitled upon request. Such instructions relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or ‘pinpoint’ the crux of a defendant’s case, such as mistaken identification or alibi. [Citation.] They are required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte.” (Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, italics added.)
In both People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847] and People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247], the court highlighted the function of pinpoint instructions: “Ordinarily, the relevance and materiality of circumstantial evidence is *1020apparent to the trier of fact, but this is not always true, and the courts of this state have often approved instructions pointing out the relevance of certain kinds of evidence to a specific issue [including premeditation and deliberation]. [Citation.]” (People v. Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d 180, 190; see People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d 864, 885; see also, e.g., People v. Granados (1957) 49 Cal.2d 490, 495-496 [319 P.2d 346] [court should not have refused requested instruction that “pinpointed . . . theory of the defense”]; People v. Kane (1946) 27 Cal.2d 693, 698-699 [166 P.2d 285] [defendant entitled to instruction that related defense to elements of crime and doctrine of reasonable doubt].)
This function is significant for present purposes because “[i]t is principally the duty of counsel to provide the jury with routes to reach the various verdicts consistent with the evidence as viewed favorably to the respective parties,” particularly when there is “the danger that a jury exposed to a welter of conflicting evidence may drift to a verdict without proper appreciation that such a verdict necessarily entails rejection of some evidence in favor of other evidence.” (People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 885.) Although the trial court retains “residual discretion” to comment “upon assertions of fact as well as the governing propositions of law” “when confusion still reigns after closing argument,” (ibid.) the law is well established that the defendant generally cannot complain of the failure to more fully instruct if he did not request clarification. (See, e.g., People v. Byrnes (1866) 30 Cal. 206, 208 [general instruction sufficient “particularly . .*. where the accused does not request that the charge may be made more specific or minute”].)
Here, the obvious and only “defense” to first degree murder was lack of premeditation and deliberation—defendant chased the victim with a shotgun and shot him in the head but claimed he was under the influence of PCP—and counsel strenuously argued this theory. While the pattern instructions may have been legally sufficient, they did not plainly draw the connection between voluntary intoxication and proof of premeditation and deliberation. The instructions directed the jury at least twice to “consider [evidence of voluntary intoxication] in [determining] whether [or not] defendant had [the necessary] specific intent or mental state” (see CALJIC No. 4.21); at no point, however, is premeditation or deliberation described as a “mental state.” The instructions simply define them as essentials of first degree murder. The only “mental state” identified as such is malice aforethought. Thus, the instructions were potentially misleading as to the legal relationship of voluntary intoxication to formation of this requisite state of mind. Although the average layperson may not be familiar with the Latin phrase inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the deductive concept is commonly understood, and if applied in this context could mislead a reasonable juror as to the scope of the voluntary intoxication instruction. *1021In these circumstances, clarification was critical. Moreover, the instructions do nothing to “ ‘pinpoint’ the crux” of defendant’s only viable defense to first degree murder. In closing argument, counsel not only argued defendant did not premeditate or deliberate due to PCP intoxication, he specifically directed the jury to consider the instructions on this point. It is difficult to conceive a strategic explanation for not having the trial court include a clarification as well as add its imprimatur to the argument. (See People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1051, fn. 2 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].)
Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to resolve the question of competence since the court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2069].) On this basis, I conclude defendant has failed to sustain his claim.
On the one hand, as explained above, the pattern instructions were potentially misleading as to defendant’s defense even if not legally insufficient or inaccurate. On the other hand, for the reasons explained by the majority, the facts tend to militate against a finding of prejudice. Moreover, the trial court adequately instructed on voluntary intoxication in general, which allowed the jury to consider fully the possible effect of PCP in light of closing argument. Defense counsel could and did argue the inference from the evidence that defendant did not actually have the necessary mental state. (See, e.g., People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 951-952 [12 Cal.4th 825h, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388]; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 68, fn. 24 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)
In reaching a contrary conclusion as to prejudice, the Court of Appeal relied in part on the fact the jury failed to convict of attempted murder and therefore may have found the evidence of voluntary intoxication persuasive to the extent the instructions linked the elements of attempted murder to this defense. “Unlike murder, in which specific intent may or may not be the basis of malice (i.e., express versus implied malice), specific intent is one of the elements of attempted murder.” However, first degree murder cannot be predicated on implied malice, and the trial court explicitly instructed the jury first degree murder required “express malice aforethought.” In light of defense counsel’s argument, a reasonable juror would likely have understood voluntary intoxication applied to premeditation and deliberation, notwithstanding the lack of precision in the instructions. Moreover, the prosecutor never argued voluntary intoxication could not negate premeditation and deliberation, only that defendant was not intoxicated. The jury was also instructed “not [to] single out any particular sentence or any individual point *1022or instruction” but to “[c]onsider the instructions as a whole and each in light of all the others.” (CALJIC No. 1.01.)
I thus conclude defendant has not met his burden to establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [alleged] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2068].) In other words, he has failed to undermine my confidence in the outcome of the trial.
Kennard, J., concurred.